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Abstract 
There is extensive empirical evidence which suggests that moral judgment involves 
not only rational assessment, but also cognitive processes involving emotion, biases, 
and intuitions which can at times conflict with rationality. Nowhere is the 
understanding of such dynamics of more importance than in situations of seemingly 
intractable conflict, such as that between Israel and the Palestinians.  My original 
contribution to such understanding is twofold.  First, in applying Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT) to analysis of the real-world, situated experiences of Israeli reserve 
soldiers and conscientious objectors within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, I (a) identify differences along the liberal-conservative continuum in the 
selective application of the moral foundations relating to harm and fairness, and (b) 
critique the structural relationship between the fairness and loyalty moral 
foundations as currently presented within MFT.  Second, using both qualitative and 
experimental research, I present evidence in support of a proposed cognitive bias not 
currently in the literature which can affect moral judgment: the influence of 
competent performance on assessment of actor morality.   
As individuals and as members of collectives we are responsible for making 
moral judgments.  But cognitive biases, intuitions, and emotional responses can 
colour our perceptions in ways that can, in the case of intergroup conflicts, 
sometimes prove catastrophic.  In highlighting (a) the relationship between political 
ideology and intuitive responses to violations of harm- and fairness-based moral 
foundations, and (b) how competent performance can influence assessment of actor 
morality, this research makes a small contribution to our understanding of what are 
necessarily incredibly complex dynamics around moral judgment.  
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Introduction: Cognition, Morality, and Conflict 
Aims of the research 
The overarching remit of this thesis comprises three distinct but interrelated aims, 
the combination of which allows for engagement with dynamic tensions between the 
universal and the particular.  First, at the level of the particular, the research seeks to 
understand moral judgment processes of Jewish Israeli
1
 soldiers and conscientious 
objectors within the specific context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Detailed 
ethnographic data and interpretative phenomenological analysis shed light on the 
complexities within Israel of concepts of ingroup-outgroup identities and of how 
individuals perceive the ongoing conflict and prospects for peace.  Discursive 
analyses of nationalist narratives prevalent within Israel, and of how these are 
embodied through military service, provide insight into how the impact of a specific 
cognitive bias—the influence of competent performance on assessment of actor 
morality—can affect the perceptions and behaviours of individuals facing moral 
dilemmas relating to military service within this particular context. 
At the level of the universal, the research engages with evolutionary theories 
of moral judgment and of ingroup-outgroup relations (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  Applying research on cognitive processes 
hypothesized to be universal, to the particular real-world context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, facilitates a process through which “the universal” 
simultaneously interrogates, and is interrogated by, “the particular.”  For example, 
through engagement with moral foundations theory (MFT) (Graham et al., 2009; 
                                                 
1
As will be detailed in Chapter 3, there is much disagreement within Israel regarding what makes 
someone Jewish.  For the purposes of this thesis I am defining “Jewish Israelis” as groups and 
individuals who would meet the criteria for living in Israel under the Law of Return, and who are 
therefore subject to military conscription. 
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Haidt, 2007) this approach provides a (universal) conceptual framework through 
which to explore differences between Israeli participants across the political 
spectrum in terms of their selective application of moral intuitions relating to harm 
and fairness.  But equally importantly, through engagement with cultural specifics of 
the Israeli-Palestinian context, the research also tests the robustness of the MFT 
model itself.  Similarly, competence and morality have been described as distinct and 
orthogonal dimensions (Wojciszke, 2005a), but idiographic analysis of interview 
material, coupled with a nomothetic approach to hypothesis testing, provide evidence 
that competence and morality are only weakly orthogonal.   
Staying with this theme, the current research provides evidence in support of 
a  proposed (hypothesized to be universal) cognitive bias which to date has not 
appeared in the literature, the aforementioned influence of competent performance 
on assessment of actor morality.  The existence of this cognitive bias was suggested 
by analysis of semi-structured interviews with Jewish Israeli reserve soldiers and 
conscientious objectors.  In other words, it emerged from an idiographic phase of the 
research, but has implications for the literature on (universal) cognitive biases.  Such 
recursive dynamics between universal cognitive processes and specific cultural 
contexts are at the heart of the research presented in this thesis.  
To a more limited extent, this research also engages with aspects of moral 
philosophy.  In Chapter 4, the research addresses the controversy pertaining to 
normative claims which have come to be associated with moral foundations theory 
(see Jost, 2012; Graham, 2014). And the conceptual framing of the experimental 
research on cognitive bias (see Chapter 6) adopts a person-centred approach to moral 
judgment which is grounded in virtue ethics (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015).  
This approach is in contrast to the more usual engagement with moral philosophy 
12 
 
currently found within social psychology, which tends to focus on act-centred moral 
judgments in the form of deontological and consequentialist judgment (e.g. Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008).  A person-centred approach to 
moral judgment is particularly appropriate when seeking to understand how 
individuals make sense of their own behaviours, and those of perceived ingroup 
members, when faced with situations in which ingroup and outgroup identities are 
salient, such as those involving moral dilemmas relating to long-standing conflict.  
Ingroup-outgroup dynamics which involve stereotyping of “us” and “them” colour 
perceptions of the morality of individuals and groups engaged in morally 
problematic behaviours, along the lines of “our” violence cannot be compared with 
“their” violence because “we” are inherently better people.  The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is, to the great detriment of everyone involved, a classic example of such 
dynamics. 
Moral judgment among Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors 
Moral judgment on the part of those called to active military service can necessitate 
responding to moral dilemmas in which the behavioural demands of competing 
moral imperatives come into stark conflict.  But how are such judgments made?  
And how do these cognitive processes within individuals affect the possibilities of 
societies moving beyond seemingly intractable conflict?  Such were the questions 
with which I began my present research.  There is extensive empirical evidence 
which suggests (a) that moral judgment involves not only rational assessment, but 
also cognitive processes involving emotion, bias, and intuitions which can conflict 
with rational judgment (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Greene et al., 2008; 
Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012), and (b) that individuals experience moral 
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intuitions differently depending on how liberal or conservative they are (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007).  But how do these dynamics play out in the real world?   
Nowhere is the understanding of such dynamics of greater importance than in 
situations of seemingly intractable conflict, such as that between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  Over 700,000 Palestinians became refugees during the 1948 conflict 
which established the State of Israel.  They and their descendants, who are also 
classed as refugees by the United Nations, now number over five million.  The 
military occupation of Palestine has been in force since 1967 when Israel captured 
territories in the West Bank and Gaza during the Six Day War, creating a further 
wave of Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, accessed 2015.).  From the start of the first 
intifada (Palestinian uprising) in 1987 until 2014, this conflict has claimed the lives 
of over 11,000 individuals: over 1,600 Israelis, and over 10,000 Palestinians 
(B’Tselem, 2014).  Both Israelis and Palestinians have suffered from psychological 
trauma related to the conflict (Pat-Horenczyk, Qasrawi, Lesack, Haj-Yahia, Peled, 
Shaheen, Berger, Brom, Garber, & Abdeen, 2009).  In addition the economic aspects 
of the occupation have resulted in high levels of unemployment and poverty in the 
West Bank and Gaza (Samara, 2000; Ajluni, 2003).  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
is also cited by Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda as a justification for violent attacks 
on western targets (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Fattah & Fierke, 2009).  
Traditional political approaches to understanding conflicts based on rational 
choices made by the actors involved can only go so far in grappling with the issues 
that underpin such situations for the following reasons.  They cannot touch upon 
cognitive processes that serve to colour perceptions and polarise views of the 
meanings of events, situations, and the “nature” of the enemy.  Nor can they explore 
the psychological mechanisms involved in challenging the well-established norms of 
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one’s perceived ingroup.  Conversely, psychological approaches which seek to 
generalise empirical findings without taking into consideration cultural particularities 
including such specific factors as history, geography, and socio-economic structures 
risk making pronouncements that at best underestimate, and at worst disregard, the 
impacts of cultural context. 
 In contrast, research in fields such as cognitive anthropology, and social and 
political psychology increasingly seeks to address recursive interactions between 
psychological processes and specific cultural contexts.  Recent research specific to 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been able to explore such dynamics.   
For example, Bar-Tal (2007) describes how Israelis and Palestinians have developed 
specific psychological coping strategies in which collective identity is construed in 
opposition to the enemy “other,” thereby contributing to the continuation of the 
conflict.  Gubler (2011; 2013) provides empirical evidence from research involving 
Palestinians and Israelis suggesting that for individuals who strongly contrast their 
own identity against that of a demonised outgroup, experiences of meeting outgroup 
members in situations designed to humanise the “other” can prove 
counterproductive: such meetings result in increased cognitive dissonance, and to a 
hardening of prejudice, as beliefs that are important to these individuals’ sense of 
identity are challenged.  Experiments conducted in Israel and Palestine by Ginges, 
Atran, Medin, and Shikaki (2007) demonstrate that for both sides, the offer of 
material incentives in exchange for compromise over issues which they hold to be 
sacred, contrary to the predictions of cost-benefit analyses favoured by rational actor 
models, result in an increase in violent opposition to compromise.  Such opposition 
decrease however, when instead of material incentives, symbolic concessions to their 
own sacred values are made by the “other.”  While such findings can, to differing 
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degrees, also be applied to other contexts, all of these studies were able to draw their 
unique conclusions as a result of engaging with cultural specifics. 
My research aims to contribute to this growing body of literature by 
integrating analysis of universal cognitive processes involved in moral judgment, 
grounded in evolutionary theory, with the particularities of a real-world case study.  
The specific purpose of the research is to analyse how moral intuitions and cognitive 
biases affect moral judgments relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the 
perspective of Israeli citizens called to participate in military service.  The original 
contribution to the field that this research makes is twofold. First, by using moral 
foundations theory (MFT) as a theoretical frame with which to analyse dynamics of 
moral judgment of Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I introduce evidence of ‘selective fairness’ 
in intergroup dynamics, which  (a) identifies how narrow or broad application of the 
moral foundations relating to harm and to fairness differs along the liberal-
conservative continuum, and (b) provides a critique of the current structural 
relationship within MFT between the fairness and loyalty moral foundations.  
Second, through analysis of my qualitative and experimental research, I present 
novel findings regarding a cognitive bias not currently found in the literature which 
can affect moral judgment: the influence of competent performance on the 
assessment of actor morality.  Although the main focus of the research is descriptive, 
my critiques of MFT (see Chapter 4) and my categorisation of the influence of 
competence on assessment of actor morality as a “cognitive bias” (see Chapter 6) 
also necessarily entail engaging with normative issues relating to moral judgment.   
The psychological, sociological, and political dynamics involved in violent 
conflicts such as that between Israel and the Palestinians are incredibly complex.  
16 
 
There will be no nice, neat single-factor explanation for either why such situations 
arise or how they may best be ended.  But the more we are able to understand about 
the dynamics involved in moral judgment, the better our chances of finding ways of 
dealing with seemingly intractable conflict.  Through analysis of the relationship 
between political ideology and selective application of moral foundations relating to 
harm and fairness, and by highlighting the impact that competent performance can 
have on assessments of morality, the aim of this thesis is to try to contribute in a 
small way to such understanding.  
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters.  The first three chapters “set the stage” for 
the project: Chapter 1 engages with the theoretical grounding of the current research, 
Chapter 2 addresses methodological and epistemological issues and describes the 
rationale for the choice of methods employed, and Chapter 3 presents contextual 
information by providing insight into the complex understandings of perceived 
ingroup and outgroup identities relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 40 
Jewish Israeli interviewees, and of their perceptions of the nature of the conflict itself 
and the prospects for peace.  Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the key theoretical and 
empirical contributions of the research.  The concluding chapter (number 7) 
summarizes and discusses the findings, limitations, and implications of the research. 
This research contains distinctive elements in the form of theoretical and 
empirical contributions specific to research relating to (a) moral foundations theory, 
particularly its application in situations of ingroup-outgroup conflict, (b) cognitive 
bias, specifically regarding its influence on moral judgment, and (c) models of 
competence and morality.  These elements are woven into a coherent whole through 
their application to the overarching question of how cognitive processes in the form 
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of intuitions and biases affect the moral judgment of Jewish Israelis relating to 
military service in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
The theories function to highlight different but complementary aspects of 
moral judgment relevant to this specific context.  As such, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
engage in turn with the idiographic (applying moral foundations theory to analysis of 
moral judgment among IDF reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors in Chapter 
4; analysing nationalist narratives specific to Israel, and their embodiment through 
military service in Chapter 5); and the nomothetic (experimentally testing for the 
presence of a specific cognitive bias hypothesized to influence moral judgment 
beyond the confines of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Chapter 6).  These inter-
related threads are analysed as a coherent whole in the concluding chapter of the 
thesis. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The overarching question with which this thesis engages is that of how cognitive 
processes involving intuitions and biases affect moral judgments relating to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for Jewish Israelis conscripted into the military. 
 Chapter 1: Theoretical Grounding engages with literatures relating to 
selected theories and models relevant to the exploration of how Jewish Israelis from 
across the political spectrum experience and seek to deal with mora dilemmas 
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Chapter21: Methodology and Methods addresses methodological and 
epistemological issues relevant to the choice of research methods for this project, 
with a particular focus on debates relating to nomothetic versus idiographic 
approaches to research.  The positioning of the present study within these debates—
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that of epistemological pluralism— is specified.  The rationale for choosing moral 
foundations theory (MFT) as the cornerstone for the research is outlined, as well as 
an explanation of how the inclusion of theories relating to models of competence and 
warmth/morality, ingroup-outgroup dynamics, and cognitive dissonance supplement 
this choice.  The key research methods employed in the project—semi-structured 
interviews analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) and 
embodied discourse analysis; discourse analysis of nationalist narratives; and online 
experiments—are described in detail.  Reflexivity issues relating to both structural 
and personal strengths and limitations relevant to the conducting of the research are 
addressed.  Finally, a brief description is given of how each phase of the research 
informs the subsequent phases, and of how the overall research design has engaged 
with both idiographic and nomothetic research methods. 
Chapter 3: “Us,” “Them,” and Hamatzav: an Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews.  Ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics are at the heart of the research questions addressed in the thesis.  
Therefore, how individuals conceptualise what constitutes “us” and “them” is of 
prime importance for this research.  Chapter 3 applies interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) to semi-structured interview data from 40 Jewish 
Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors in order to ascertain the 
interviewees’ own understandings of identity, and specifically what it means to them 
to be categorised as Jewish and Israeli.  Separate analyses are conducted relating to 
the interviewees’ family history and ethnic/cultural backgrounds; their perceptions of 
what makes someone Jewish; their attitudes towards Palestinians; their perceptions 
of hamatzav (“the situation” between Israel and the Palestinians); and their thoughts 
on possible solutions to the ongoing conflict.  Within each of these sections, points 
19 
 
of convergence and divergence between four political categories (left wing, centre 
left, centre right, and right wing) are analysed.  Cumulatively, these analyses provide 
insights into the significant complexities involving understandings of “ingroup” and 
“outgroup” identities among Jewish Israelis, and of how these differences affect 
individuals’ perceptions of “the situation” with the Palestinians, and of prospects for 
peace.  This chapter contributes to the literatures on ingroup-outgroup identity, 
intergroup conflict, and ethnographies of Israel.  It provides useful context for 
understanding differences in moral judgment exhibited by Israelis from across the 
political spectrum which are addressed in the subsequent chapters. 
  Chapter 4: Selective Fairness in Intergroup Dynamics applies moral 
foundations theory (MFT) to analysis of the interview data with 40 Jewish Israeli 
conscientious objectors and reserve soldiers.  This chapter introduces the first 
original empirical contribution of the thesis, providing evidence of ‘selective 
fairness’ in intergroup dynamics (a) highlighting differences across the political 
spectrum in the selective application of moral foundations relating to Harm and 
Fairness, and (b) critiquing the current structural relationship within MFT between 
the Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty moral foundations, and the current definition of 
Fairness within MFT.  The findings from this research indicate that, within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are key differences between political 
liberals, centrists, and conservatives within Israel regarding how broadly or narrowly 
they apply the Harm and Fairness moral foundations with relation to the Palestinian 
population, with more liberal individuals applying these foundations more 
universally than do their conservative compatriots.  These variations correspond with 
differences between the political groups regarding sacred values which they attach to 
idealized notions of the State of Israel.   
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Building on these findings, it is argued that the “Binding” moral foundations 
(ingroup loyalty, deference to authority, sanctity/purity) effectively function to limit 
to whom the “Individualising” moral foundations (Harm, Fairness) are applied.  The 
implications of this finding for the current debate around normative claims 
associated with MFT
2
 are addressed, and the current structure of MFT, in which 
Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty are presented as distinct moral foundations is 
questioned.  An alternative structure in which Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty 
constitute polarized positions along a single continuum is proposed, and MFT’s 
current inclusion of “justice” as synonymous with “fairness” is critiqued in light of 
MFT’s aim to provide a descriptive framework which incorporates non-western, 
non-liberal conceptions of elements of morality.   
This chapter builds on Chapter 3 by further illuminating differences between 
liberals and conservatives in Israel with respect to the salience of perceived ingroup 
and outgroup identities, and the impact that these differences can have on the 
continuation of seemingly intractable conflict.  These findings indicate that for 
“groupish” individuals, who identify strongly with a perceived ingroup which they 
deem to be inherently different from (and superior to) other groups, the categories of 
people to whom they apply the Individualising moral foundations are more limited 
than for less groupish individuals.  This chapter contributes to the literatures on 
moral foundations theory, sacred values, intergroup conflict, and specifically the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Chapter 5: Narratives of competence and morality in Israeli nationalist 
discourse explores themes of competence and morality within nationalist narratives 
                                                 
2
 Although MFT is purely descriptive in and of itself, normative claims relating to the perceived 
moral benefits of the Binding moral foundations have led to debates (see Haidt, 2012; Jost, 2012; 
Graham, 2014). 
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within Israel, how these colour perceptions of contrasts between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinian Arabs, and how these narratives are embodied through military service.  
Three nationalist narratives which have been prevalent within the Israeli nationalist 
discourse since the inception of the State are analysed.  The first two narratives, 
“making the desert bloom,” and “or lagoyim,” have biblical origins, while the third, 
“Jewish genius,” is of more recent provenance.  All three were employed by Israel’s 
first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion in the creation of a nationalist discourse 
capable of uniting Jewish people from diverse backgrounds into a unified Israeli 
state.  This analysis proposes that a discourse in which Jewish Israeli competence is 
perceived as contributing to a moral justification for control of land, combined with 
Israeli governmental policies which severely restrict the ability of Palestinians to 
develop their lands competently, may produce a self-fulfilling prophecy which 
reinforces a narrative in which Jewish Israelis have a greater moral claim to the land, 
due in part to their competence in developing it, than do the Palestinians. 
The embodied discourse analysis section of the chapter uses the 40 semi-
structured interviews with Jewish Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors 
to unpack how their lived experiences of preparation for, participation in, and for 
some, refusal to participate in military service effectively embodies nationalist 
narratives in which competence and morality become intertwined.  The findings of 
this chapter suggest that when individuals are faced with moral dilemmas relating to 
military service in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if they or their 
colleagues perform what the individuals consider to be morally problematic actions 
competently, then their moral qualms about performing the actions may be to some 
degree assuaged.  However, incompetent performance of actions which they find 
morally problematic may enhance their moral qualms.  In some cases this appears to 
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have contributed to the decision of some soldiers to become conscientious objectors 
and refuse further military service.  This proposed influence of competent 
performance on the assessment of actor morality is subsequently tested for using 
controlled experiments as described in Chapter 6.  These findings contribute to the 
literatures on nationalist discourse, military studies, and specifically studies of the 
Israeli Defense Forces. 
Chapter 6: Being Good at Being Bad introduces an original theoretical 
contribution by testing for the presence of a proposed cognitive bias suggested by 
analysis of the 40 interviews: the influence of competent performance on the 
assessment of actor morality.  Two between-subject experiments (n=1194) were 
conducted online with Jewish Israeli participants.  In these experiments, participants 
read a scenario in which the main character(s) were performing morally dubious 
actions either competently or incompetently, and then assessed the morality of the 
character(s).  In the first experiment, participants read a scenario written in the 2
nd
-
person and were asked to imagine themselves as the main character, a counterfeiter 
attempting to cash a forged cheque.  In the second experiment a different set of 
participants read a 3
rd
-person scenario describing a group of international spies 
attempting to place a surveillance device in the embassy of a friendly ally.  In this 
experiment the spies were either presented as Israelis spying on Micronesia, or as 
Micronesians spying on Israel.  In both experiments the main characters were 
presented as either competent or incompetent, and regardless of this difference the 
outcome of the actions (trying to cash the cheque, trying to bug the embassy) was the 
same.  The purpose of these experiments was to ascertain whether competent 
performance of a morally dubious action influenced the assessment of the morality 
of the person performing the action. 
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The design of these experiments drew on findings from existing models 
which posit that competence and morality/warmth are the two primary dimensions 
on which individuals judge themselves and others (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; 
Wojciszke, Bazinsky, & Jaworski, 1998).  In the existing models, competence and 
morality/warmth are presented as orthogonal.  However, the findings from the 
experiments suggest that morality and competence are only weakly orthogonal and 
that, in certain circumstances, competent performance of a morally dubious action 
can influence how moral one perceives the actor to be.  In these experiments, the 
circumstances in which the cognitive bias appeared were (a) the actor was 
conforming to social norms; and/or (b) the victim of the action was an outgroup 
member.  In the second experiment, although the competence/morality dynamic was 
evident across the political spectrum, differences were found between liberals and 
conservatives in how moral they assessed the Israeli spies to be, with conservatives 
rating their morality significantly higher than liberals.  The dynamic was not 
exhibited when assessing the morality of outgroup members targeting the ingroup.  
Implications of this finding for the literatures on competence and morality, moral 
judgment,  and institutional ethics are discussed. 
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion summarizes and integrates the 
findings of the preceding chapters within the framework provided by the overarching 
research questions; discusses limitations of, and future directions for, the current 
research; and reiterates the original theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
thesis. 
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Key Concepts and Terms 
Below I give definitions and brief descriptions of key theoretical concepts which 
underpin the current research, key theoretical concepts introduced by the thesis, and 
relevant terminology specific to the Israeli-Palestinian context. 
Theoretical Concepts Drawn from Existing Literature 
 Moral Foundations Theory (MFT): Proponents of MFT argue that western 
liberal scholarship has largely limited its conception of morality to issues 
relating to the protection of individual rights, and to refraining from harming 
others.  MFT instead engages as well with alternative understandings of 
morality, and contends that there are at least five core moral foundations with 
which humans engage (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007).   
o Individualising Moral Foundations: as recognised within liberal 
western scholarship: 
 Harm versus Care: protecting the vulnerable, refraining from 
causing others harm  
 Fairness versus Unfairness: treating people equally3 
o Binding Moral Foundations:  these specifically reinforce group 
solidarity, and are conceived of as integral to morality within more 
conservative collectives: 
 Loyalty: being loyal to the perceived ingroup 
 Authority: respecting the authority of those higher in the 
hierarchy 
                                                 
3
 Recently Haidt (2013) has distinguished between how liberals and conservatives understand the 
concept of fairness, with liberals favouring equality of outcome, while conservatives favour equality 
of opportunity.  See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this position. 
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 Purity/Sanctity: respecting boundaries between the perceived 
ingroup and outsiders 
MFT proposes that liberals rely to a greater extent on the Individualising 
moral foundations, while conservatives rely more evenly on both the 
Individualising and Binding moral foundations.  Differences along the 
political continuum can also be reflected in the sacred values espoused by 
liberals and conservatives. 
 Sacred Values: Sacred values are defined as emotionally-charged values 
which are non-negotiable for those who hold them (Atran, 2010).  These are 
moral commitments which should never be measured along an instrumental 
metric (Ginges & Atran, 2009).  In situations of conflict negotiation 
therefore, suggesting an exchange of material incentives for concessions 
relating to sacred values is perceived as an insult, and is counter-productive.  
Sacred values are an integral element of group identities, and can function to 
reinforce boundaries which distinguish “us” from “them.” 
 Models of Competence versus Morality/Warmth  
o Stereotype Content Model: Stereotyping is another key way in 
which perceived ingroups are distinguished from perceived 
outgroups.  The stereotype content model presents Competence and 
Warmth as two distinct dimensions which are of primary importance 
when individuals assess others.  People tend to judge their perceived 
ingroup as stereotypically high in both Competence and Warmth, but 
tend to judge perceived outgroups in different combinations: High 
Competence, Low Warmth; Low Competence/Low Warmth; or Low 
Competence, High Warmth (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007).  
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o Wojciszcke’s Model of Competence versus Morality: This model 
is similar to the Stereotype Content Model, but distinguishes between 
Competence and Morality, rather than between Competence and 
Warmth (Wojciszke et al., 1998).  Fiske et al. (2007) consider the 
conception of morality espoused by Wojciszke and colleagues to be 
congruent with their conception of Warmth, but see Chapter 4 for 
Goodwin, Piazza & Rozin’s (2014) critique of this stance. In the 
models of both Fiske and colleagues and Wojciszcke, it is proposed 
that individuals prioritize Competence when judging themselves (or 
their ingroups), and Warmth/Morality when judging “others.”  
 Ingroup/Outgroup Dynamics: Group-specific social norms can also 
function to reinforce inter-group boundaries.  Individuals have a propensity 
to conform to the social norms of perceived ingroups with which they have a 
strong psychological identification, and to prioritize the needs of perceived 
ingroups over those of perceived outgroups (e.g., Tajfel, 1982; Wildschut, 
Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). 
 Cognitive Dissonance: The protection of a perceived ingroup’s reputation, 
for example as being high in morality and competence, can be of huge 
importance for individuals who identify strongly as members of the group. 
When this comes under threat, individuals can experience cognitive 
dissonance.  Festinger (1957) originally described cognitive dissonance as 
the uncomfortable psychological tension felt by individuals when they 
become aware that they hold two or more important but inconsistent 
cognitions.   Steele and Liu (1983) refined this definition as the holding of 
psychologically inconsistent ideas which specifically threaten one’s positive 
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sense of self.  Holding a consistently positive view of one’s self and of 
perceived ingroups with which one strongly identifies minimizes cognitive 
dissonance.  A person-centred approach to moral judgment can function to 
help retain a consistently positive self- or ingroup image even when 
confronted with specific morally problematic behaviours. 
 Person-Centred Approach to Moral Judgment: Working within the 
philosophical tradition of Virtue Ethics, this approach posits that individuals 
intuitively make moral judgments of individuals based on their perception of 
the individuals’ characters as a whole, rather than on specific, isolated 
behaviours (see Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Uhlmann et al., 2015).  A 
negative aspect of the person-centred approach is that it provides both scope 
for glossing over specific morally-problematic actions performed by one’s 
self or ingroup members, and also allows for downplaying morally laudable 
actions performed by members of demonized outgroups. 
 
Original Theoretical Concept Introduced in the Thesis 
 The influence of competent performance on assessment of actor 
morality:  This original contribution posits that when individuals perform 
actions that they find morally problematic, they judge themselves to be more 
moral if they perform the morally problematic actions competently than if 
they perform incompetently, if they are conforming to social norms or 
targeting outgroup members.  This proposed cognitive bias also affects 
assessment of the morality of perceived ingroup members in situations of 
intergroup interactions.  The influence of competent performance on 
assessment of actor morality can result in individuals judging the morally 
28 
 
problematic behaviors of themselves or of their ingroups less harshly if they 
perform the morally problematic actions competently.   
Ethnographic Terminology 
 Largest Ethnic Categories of Jewish Israelis: 
o Ashkenazi: Jewish population from Central Europe.  Ashkenazim 
(plural), although numerically a minority, are the dominant ethnic 
group within Israeli society.  Members of this ethnic group 
established the modern Zionist project.  Relative to size of population, 
they are over-represented in the higher ranks of the Israeli military 
and in positions of political power (Levy, 2003). 
o Mizrahi/Sephardi:  Although Mizrahi and Sephardi are two 
definitionally distinct groups, these terms are frequently used 
interchangeably within Israel.  The Mizrahim originate from Middle 
Eastern countries with Muslim majorities such as Iraq, Syria, and 
Yemen.  The Sephardim are descended from Jewish communities 
who lived in the Iberian Peninsula until around the 15
th
 century.  The 
Mizrahim and Sephardim have a lower social status then the 
Ashkenazim, and in the 1950s government policy placed them mainly 
in socially deprived “development towns” (Yiftachel, 2000). 
o “Russian” or FSU: People who identify as Jewish and who 
emigrated to Israel from former Soviet Union (FSU) countries starting 
from when this became possible in the 1990s.  Due to historical and 
modern persecutions of Jewish people in these countries, many did 
not have the necessary paperwork to prove that they were Jewish.  
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Although required to serve in the Israeli military, in order to be fully 
accepted as Jewish they have to officially “convert” to Judaism.  For 
some, this has been a source of resentment (Neiterman & Rapaport, 
2009). 
o Ethiopian: This population originates from the Beta Israel Jewish 
communities in Ethiopia.  There were two main waves of immigration 
from Ethiopia, known as Operation Moses in 1984, and Operation 
Solomon in 1991, when the Israeli government organized mass airlifts 
of Jewish emigrants from Ethiopia, many of whom had attempted to 
make their way to Israel through the desert.  Smaller groups of 
immigrants have travelled from Ethiopia since these two main waves.  
Ethiopian Jews are conscripted into the military, but were required to 
undergo a process of conversion in order to confirm their status as 
Jewish (Salamon, 2003). 
 Jewish Israeli Religious Categories:  
o Secular: people from Jewish families who identify as not religious. 
o Traditional: people who identify with Jewishness in terms of culture, 
history, and ethnicity, and for whom maintaining Jewish traditions is 
primarily a means of strengthening social cohesion. 
o Religious: religiously observant Jews who also incorporate modern, 
secular attitudes into their way of life.   
o (Ultra) Orthodox: religiously observant Jews who, to a large degree, 
eschew modern, secular attitudes and ways of living.  (Cohen & 
Susser, 2000). 
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 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Service-Related Categories: 
o Reserve Soldiers: After fulfilling their compulsory 2-4 years of 
military service, soldiers in the IDF are required to be available for 
compulsory reserve duty until they are in their 40s.  Frequency and 
duration of reserve duty, as well as exact age of exemption, varies 
according to the needs of the state and the skills of the soldier. 
o Conscientious Objectors: Israeli citizens who have been called to 
serve in the military but who refuse to serve on moral grounds.  This 
may entail refusing any military service at all, any military service 
within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), or military service 
associated with specific actions, such as removing Jewish Israeli 
settlers from their homes.  The first two categories are primarily 
associated with left wing individuals, and the third category with the 
religious right wing. 
 Explicit Refusers: Conscientious objectors who explicitly 
and openly refuse to serve in the military.  Such refusal can, 
but does not always, result in arrest and detention in prison. 
 “Grey” Refusers: Individuals who find ways of avoiding 
military service without explicitly declaring themselves to be 
conscientious objectors (Linn, 2002). 
 Other Useful Terminology 
o Halacha: Jewish law based on the legislative aspects of the Talmud 
(the collection of ancient Rabbinic interpretations of scripture which 
underpins Orthodox authority in relation to law and tradition).  
Halachic law plays a major role in disputes between religious and 
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secular Israelis with respect to what makes someone Jewish (see 
Chapter 2).  
o Halutz: Literally, “pioneer,” in Hebrew.   The term refers to Jewish 
people who emigrated to Palestine post-WW1as part of the Zionist 
project in order to work the land and create Jewish settlements as a 
precursor to the creation of a Jewish state.  Ben-Gurion (the first 
prime minister of Israel) envisioned the IDF soldiers as the natural 
successors to the pre-state halutzim, reclaiming the desert and 
protecting the nascent state (see Chapter 5). 
o Aliyah: In Hebrew, “ascension.”  When a Jewish person from another 
part of the world immigrates into Israel, they are described as 
“making Aliyah.”   
o Hasbara: This is a term which can be translated either as 
“propaganda,” or as “clarification.”  In the context that will be 
referenced in this thesis it refers to explaining to an international 
audience important aspects of Israel’s situation in the Middle East, 
and the reasons for its military actions and policies.  Hasbara is 
intended to counter international criticism of Israel, particularly, but 
not exclusively, with regard to the military occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories.   
o Tohar HaNeshek: “Purity of arms” in Hebrew. This concept is 
detailed in the ethical code of the IDF, and decrees that IDF soldiers 
will only use their weapons to the extent necessary for the completion 
of their missions, will not use excessive force, will not harm prisoners 
of war and non-combatants, and will, as far as possible, avoid 
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harming their property, bodies, or dignity.  This ethical code 
underpins the controversial claim that the IDF is “the most moral 
army in the world” (see Chapter 6). 
o Hamatzav: In Hebrew, “the situation.”  This term is commonly used 
to refer to the political situation between Israel and the Palestinians.   
o Nakba: In Arabic, “catastrophe.”  This term is used by Palestinians to 
refer to the displacement of over 700,000 Palestinians from their 
homes and lands during the 1948 war which led to the creation of the 
State of Israel. 
o Occupation: Although this term is widely used within Palestine and 
the international community to describe Israel’s control of the West 
Bank and Gaza since 1967, the term is contentious within Israel, and 
is usually only used by individuals towards the left of the political 
map.  Individuals further to the right tend to refer to “military 
operations” or “the military presence” in Gaza and either (a) the West 
Bank (political centrists) or (b) by the biblical names Judea and 
Samaria (religious right). 
o Intifada: In Arabic, literally “shaking off.”  This term refers to 
Palestinian uprisings against Israel’s military occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza.  The first intifada began in December 1987 and is 
generally considered to have ended with the signing of the Oslo 
Accords in 1993; the second began in September 2000 and is 
generally considered to have ended with the Sharm el-Sheikh summit 
in 2005.   
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1.   Theoretical Grounding 
The overarching aim of the current research is to analyse differences across the 
political spectrum in the experience of moral dilemmas relating to conscription into 
military service for Jewish Israelis within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  I am approaching this task by seeking to analyse how relevant cognitive 
processes hypothesized to be universal may influence moral judgment within this 
specific context.  To that end, the thesis engages with theories relating to moral 
intuitions, cognitive dissonance, models of competence and morality, and heuristics 
and cognitive biases.  These theories address factors which have been shown to 
influence individuals’ moral judgment and are therefore relevant to my research 
remit.  By integrating these theories and applying them to the real-world context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this research hopes not only to shed light on how 
specific cognitive processes influence moral judgment within this specific context, 
but also to use the findings from the empirical research to interrogate relevant 
aspects of the theories themselves. In the following sections I detail the specific 
theories which underpin the current research, why they are applicable to my research 
questions, and where relevant I identify debates relating to these theories to which I 
hope my empirical research will be able to make a contribution.  I begin with a 
review of a theory which is particularly relevant to questions of moral judgment and 
how these might vary across the political spectrum: moral foundations theory. 
1.1   Moral Foundations Theory 
Haidt (2012) has described a liberal western bias in much academic engagement with 
morality, in which morality is understood as relating solely to individual rights and 
to refraining from causing harm to others.  Moral foundations theory seeks to 
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transcend this perceived bias by engaging with alternative understandings of 
morality (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph 2004).  Haidt and Joseph (2004) take 
as their starting point Shweder’s anthropological research into morality, which 
identified three distinct elements recognised in many cultures as constituting 
morality: community, autonomy, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1987).  They unpack these three elements and contend that there are at least five core 
moral foundations with which humans engage, and that these evolved in response to 
specific adaptive challenges found in our ancestral past.  They have categorised these 
five groups as either “Individualising” foundations, in which the locus of moral 
value was seen as resting with individuals; or as “Binding” foundations, in which the 
locus of moral value was the preserve of the group.  The Individualising and Binding 
foundations break down as follows: 
Individualising: the Harm versus Care foundation refers to the adaptive 
challenge of needing to keep vulnerable offspring alive and healthy, which Haidt 
argues is too important to evolutionary success to be left to learning through a 
domain-general learning mechanism, and that therefore it is probable that a harm-
detection module or predisposition evolved in order for mammals to recognise signs 
of suffering in their offspring.  Similarly, the Fairness/Injustice foundation addresses 
the adaptive challenge of needing to behave in ways that strengthen the cooperative 
capabilities of the group.  
Binding: Ingroup Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity/Purity all relate to 
adaptive challenges that threaten the stability of the group.  Loyalty/Betrayal pertains 
to the predisposition of humans to organise themselves into groups that compete 
with other groups, and addresses the adaptive challenge of the need to defend the 
group from other groups.  The Authority foundation refers to the benefits to social 
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stability of hierarchies which require not only deference from those lower down the 
scale, but also protection of the weaker members by those higher up the scale.  Haidt 
views Sanctity/Purity as the only one of the moral foundations to have evolved from 
a nutritive rather than a social adaptive challenge.  Humans have evolved cognitive 
and emotional adaptations related to disgust that initially served to make individuals 
cautious regarding what foods are considered clean, and that appears to have been 
transferred to the social realm in the form of ideas around notions of bodily purity 
which can be “contaminated” by immoral activities (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).   
In his later research, Haidt (2012) added a sixth moral foundation: Liberty 
versus Oppression, and proposes that this foundation evolved in response to early 
human small-group living in which it was possible for physically strong individuals 
to bully, dominate, and constrain others.  He describes this moral foundation as 
operating in tension with the Authority foundation, in as much as it discriminates 
between what is perceived as legitimate or illegitimate forms and uses of authority.  
Haidt also proposes that liberals and conservatives employ the Liberty versus 
Oppression foundation differently, with liberals using it in the defence of oppressed 
people universally, while conservatives primarily limit concerns regarding liberty to 
their own ingroups (Haidt, 2012).  Haidt has not situated the Liberty versus 
Oppression foundation within the Individualising /Binding framework, and as such, I 
have not included it in my current research: it is the contrast between relative 
reliance on the Individualising versus the Binding moral foundations which is 
relevant for answering my research questions. 
The inclusion of the Binding moral foundations places Haidt and his 
colleagues at odds with moral philosophers such as Richard Joyce (2007) who focus  
on interpersonal relations concerning fairness and harm as the basis for a universal 
36 
 
morality, and do not consider MFT’s Binding foundations as constituting morality at 
all.  However, Haidt and his colleagues are not alone in their stance: Stich (2008) 
criticised Joyce’s thesis as being based on western-centric norms, and also cites 
concepts of purity and deference to authority as important components of many 
cultures’ understandings of morality.   
Empirical research has demonstrated that, in accordance with MFT’s 
predictions, individuals who identify as liberal draw largely on the Individualising 
moral foundations, while conservatives draw more consistently on all five 
foundations, with an emphasis on the Binding foundations (Graham et al., 2009; 
Haidt & Graham, 2007).  This pattern holds true across many cultures even though 
some cultures are, overall and according to MFT’s measures, more conservative or 
liberal than others (Graham et al., 2011).  It must be borne in mind that cultures are, 
of course, fluid and subject to change rather than stable and reified.  But, on balance, 
MFT provides a useful descriptive framework through which to analyse differences 
in experiences of moral perception and judgment along the liberal-conservative 
continuum.   My current research includes a study which creates a Hebrew language 
version of the moral foundations questionnaire (moralfoundations.org, 2008a) in 
order to establish whether MFT is suitable for research into moral judgment within 
Israel, and follows this with analysis grounded in an MFT framework of interview 
data relating to individual Israeli soldiers’ and conscientious objectors’ experiences 
of moral dilemmas relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Chapter 4).   
  An area of particular contention surrounding MFT involves the normative 
suggestion by Haidt (2012) that in relying primarily on the Harm and Fairness moral 
foundations, the moral palette of liberals is less rich than that of conservatives who 
draw more heavily on all five foundations.  Jost (2012) disputes Haidt’s analysis that 
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liberal morality constitutes a mere subset of a more comprehensive conservative 
morality, and instead suggests that in drawing primarily on the Harm/Fairness moral 
foundations, liberals demonstrate more differentiated moral judgments than do 
conservatives.  Jost (2012) also refers to empirical evidence which suggests that 
social dominance, authoritarianism, and prejudice are positively associated with the 
Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations.  Similarly, Kugler, Jost, and Noorbaloochi 
(2014) demonstrate empirically that greater reliance on the Authority/Loyalty/Purity 
moral foundations by conservatives corresponds to relatively higher levels of 
authoritarianism, and that liberals’ heavy reliance on the Harm/Fairness moral 
foundations corresponds to relatively lower levels of social dominance.   
In response to such critiques, Graham (2014) acknowledges that there has 
been lack of clarity at certain points regarding a clear distinction between MFT as a 
descriptive model and normative interpretations relating to the perceived benefits of 
adherence to the Loyalty/Authority/Purity moral foundations.  However, in defence 
of MFT’s normative leanings, Graham (2014) refers to studies within sociology and 
psychology which point to negative societal impacts of high levels of individualism, 
and to benefits accruing from strong and enduring social bonds, to argue that 
exclusive reliance on the Harm/Fairness foundations might result in a society that 
was less humane than one that relied on all five foundations.  Indeed, Haidt (2012) 
adopts a group-level selection argument in contending that societies which are made 
up of a mix of liberals and conservatives are more successful than societies which 
are either primarily liberal or primarily conservative.  The findings from the 
empirical research as described in Chapter 4 contribute to this debate by introducing 
data gleaned from the interview analysis which illustrates dynamics between the 
Individualising and Binding moral foundations.  Although particular to the context 
38 
 
of intergroup dynamics relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these findings 
suggest that strong adherence to the Binding foundations can effectively limit to 
whom individuals apply the Individualising foundations, with conservatives largely 
restricting application of the Individualising foundations to perceived ingroup 
members.  
Moral foundations theory provides a framework through which to explore 
how intuitions can affect our moral judgment with respect to perceived ingroups and 
outgroups.  The understanding of the implications of cognitive processes which 
affect such judgment—and which do not conform to rational, cost benefit analyses—
are crucially important when attempting to find solutions to intergroup conflict.  
Approaches to conflict resolution that rely exclusively on utilitarian reasoning risk 
misunderstanding powerful motivations involved in conflictual intergroup dynamics.  
Such motivations also surface in the form of powerful emotional attachments to 
symbolic personifications of important aspects of our collective identities.  These 
‘sacred values,’ if ignored, can present crippling obstacles to intergroup negotiations.    
1.2   Sacred Values: the Collective Search for Meaning 
Tetlock, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000) define sacred values in terms of boundaries 
placed by people around non-negotiable principles whose violation provokes moral 
outrage regardless of whether such violations incur material costs.  Ginges and Atran 
(2011) argue that the understanding of sacred values is crucial in trying to make 
sense of intergroup conflict.  They cite findings from their experimental research in 
the Middle East, Nigeria, and the US which indicate that judgments about violent 
episodes in intergroup conflict are not based on utilitarian reasoning relating to their 
perceived levels of success or efficacy, but are instead grounded in deontological 
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reasoning around sacred values.  As part of their research, Ginges and Atran 
contributed to an fMRI study in which integrity was used as a proxy for sacred 
values (Berns et al, 2011).  In this study participants’ neurological responses were 
monitored while they were offered cash payments as inducement to disavow values 
that the participants considered sacred, such as belief in God.  The researchers found 
that engagement with values that participants refused to sell—those treated as 
sacred—were associated with higher levels of activity in the left temporoparietal 
junction and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, regions associated with semantic rule 
retrieval.  Berns et al. (2011) suggest that this indicates that it is through the retrieval 
and processing of deontic rules rather than utilitarian cost benefit analyses that 
sacred values affect behaviours. 
Graham and Haidt (2012) explore how cultural specifics impact on such 
deontological reasoning, and argue that sacred values are constructed on different 
combinations of moral foundations, in ways that meet particular collective needs.  
They argue that sacred values can only be understood as a collective endeavour: to 
be sacred, values must be constructed by close-knit communities, and they must be 
viewed as ‘all or nothing.’  Graham and Haidt describe how moral monism— the 
belief that there is only one correct way to live—can be used to justify idealistic 
support of violent acts, and that, depending on which moral foundations provide the 
basis of the sacred values being protected, such violent ideologies can come just as 
easily from the left end of the political spectrum as from the right.  What is crucial is 
not so much the particular content of sacred values, but the fact that they provide 
individuals with a sense of meaning that makes them feel bound to something larger 
than themselves.   
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Similarly, Atran (2011) cites the need to belong as key to the establishment 
of terrorist groups, explaining that while such groups may include a strongly 
ideologically motivated minority, for most members it is the social bonding that 
provides the greatest attraction.  In a presentation given at Oxford University he 
explained, “…people don’t simply kill and die for a cause.  They kill and die for 
each other, to give a collective meaning to life beyond the morning mist” (Atran, 
2009).  Adhering to the social norms of a valued ingroup creates meaning, a sense of 
belonging, and emotional connection.  Kishida, Yang, Quartz, Quartz, and Montague 
(2012) (cited in Berns and Atran, 2012) have conducted neuroimaging studies which 
indicate that individuals who are able to inhibit the amygdala (which is associated 
with emotional processing) are also better able to resist conforming to cultural 
norms.  In situations involving emotionally charged sacred values, such research 
suggests that utilitarian approaches to conflict resolution are unlikely to be effective. 
To test this hypothesis, Ginges, Atran, Medin, and Shikaki (2007) conducted 
experiments with Israelis and Palestinians which demonstrated that not only were 
utilitarian approaches to this particular long-running conflict unsuccessful, they were 
actually counterproductive.  When Israelis and Palestinians were offered material 
incentives to compromise with regard to sacred values, such as giving up territory for 
Israeli settlers and giving up the right of return for Palestinians, they became even 
more determined not to compromise.  Although ‘rational actor’ models would 
predict that the offers presented by the experimenters should be accepted, the 
recognition that the Israelis and Palestinians in this context were functioning instead 
as ‘devotional actors’ committed to sacred values (Atran, 2003) would correctly 
predict the participants’ refusal: offering material incentives in exchange for 
betraying sacred values is perceived by devotional actors as highly insulting.  
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However, when the ‘other side’ was willing to make a symbolic concession – such as 
Palestinians acknowledging the right of the Jewish people to establish a nation in 
Israel, or Israelis acknowledging the right of the Palestinians to their own state—
opposition to compromise with the other side decreased.  Interviews with political 
leaders in the Middle East reinforce these findings, with even hard-line leaders 
expressing willingness to be flexible in return for strong symbolic gestures from the 
‘other side,’ such as a sincere apology for historical incidents relevant to the current 
conflict (Atran, 2012).   
Such research suggests that in situations of apparently intractable conflict, an 
understanding of the sacred values of the groups involved can provide a means of 
overcoming seemingly immovable barriers to peace.  In the current thesis I will 
analyse differences in the content of sacred values held by individuals across the 
political spectrum within Israel in order to identify how these correspond with 
differences between liberals and conservatives in their experiences of moral 
dilemmas within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In analysing 
differences between liberals and conservatives in (a) their experiences of moral 
dilemmas resulting from the competing behavioural demands of different moral 
foundations, and (b) differences in the contents of sacred values, this part of the 
research will integrate moral foundations theory and sacred values theory.  A key 
area of interest will be that of the possible role of cognitive dissonance—and of the 
motivation to reduce it—within these dynamics. 
 1.3  Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance has largely been understood in one of two ways: either as 
resulting from an individual simultaneously holding two inconsistent cognitions, or 
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as resulting from a conflict between an individual’s belief and their actual behaviour 
(Reber and Reber, 2001).  In the following sections I will explore how these 
seemingly different conceptualisations interrelate, and why they are relevant to the 
exploration of moral dilemmas. 
Induced Compliance with Insufficient Justification 
In his ground breaking research Festinger (1957) used the phrase “cognitive 
dissonance” to describe the uncomfortable psychological tension felt by individuals 
when they become aware that they hold two or more important but inconsistent 
cognitions.  Festinger describes dissonance as a motivational state having a 
“magnitude” which increases in line with the degree of discrepancy and the level of 
importance of the individual’s conflicting cognitions: the greater the magnitude, the 
more uncomfortable the tension, and the greater the motivation for the individual to 
take measures to reduce the dissonance (Festinger, 1957).   
In an innovative experiment Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) tested the effect 
of induced compliance on participants who were asked to perform a very tedious 
task and then paid either one dollar or twenty dollars as compensation.  The 
participants were then asked, ostensibly as a favour, to tell someone else who had 
turned up to take part in the experiment (but who was actually a confederate of the 
experimenters) that the task had been enjoyable.  The purpose of this part of the 
experiment was to induce participants to behave in a way that was inconsistent with 
their attitude that the task had been boring, thus triggering cognitive dissonance.  
They predicted that participants who were only paid one dollar for completing the 
task would feel greater cognitive dissonance than those paid twenty dollars when 
reporting that the task had been enjoyable, as not only had they had to perform a 
tedious task, but they had been poorly compensated for doing so (induced 
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compliance coupled with insufficient justification).  Crucially, they also predicted 
that in an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance, the participants paid one dollar 
would be more effusive in their praise of the task when speaking with the 
confederate, not so much to convince the confederate, but to convince themselves 
that they had not wasted their time.  In other words, in the face of conflicting attitude 
and behaviour where they were now unable to change their behaviour (they had 
already performed a very tedious task for little compensation), they would instead 
change their attitude toward the task in order to minimise the cognitive dissonance 
that they were experiencing.   
As predicted, the participants who were only paid one dollar were more 
lavish in their subsequent praise of the task than were the participants who were paid 
twenty dollars.  This study proved highly influential, leading to (a) the use of 
induced compliance coupled with insufficient justification, and (b) the adoption of 
cognitive dissonance reduction strategies, such as attitude change, as a proxy for 
dissonance itself, to be employed as standard techniques for exploring cognitive 
dissonance in many subsequent academic studies, as well as providing inspiration for 
new applications of the theory (Cooper, 2007). 
Effort Justification and Free Choice 
Building on Festinger and Carlsmith’s research, Aronson and Mills (1959) 
hypothesised that individuals might also engage in attitude change in order to reduce 
cognitive dissonance resulting from having to endure punishing activities.  They 
devised an experiment to determine whether individuals who endure difficult 
initiation rites when joining a group assess the group they have joined more highly 
than individuals who have undergone either mild or no initiation rites.  They 
randomly allocated participants into groups in one of three conditions: initiation 
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involving severe embarrassment, mild embarrassment, or the control condition of no 
initiation.  They found that participants who had endured severe embarrassment 
provided higher ratings for their group and fellow group members than did 
participants in either of the other two conditions.  They concluded that adopting such 
a positive attitude towards the group was a strategy employed to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance triggered by participating in activities that caused them distress.  This 
study provided a challenge to behaviourist predictions that individuals’ behaviour is 
motivated in a straightforward manner by reward and punishment. 
Although it preceded Festinger’s terminology, Jack Brehm’s (1956) free 
choice study—in which participants first rated their liking for various home 
appliances, were then asked to choose between two similarly-rated items to take 
home, and finally re-rated all of the appliances—has also come to be viewed as a key 
cognitive dissonance study.  Brehm found that once participants had to make a 
choice between two similarly-rated appliances, they subsequently rated the one they 
had chosen higher than the one they rejected.  Brehm described the process by which 
participants minimised the cognitive dissonance inherent in rejecting a well-rated 
appliance through exaggerating the benefits of the chosen item and the shortcomings 
of the rejected item as the “spreading of alternatives.”    
Self-Affirmation and the Relevance to Moral Judgment 
Steele and Liu (1983) describe dissonance processes in terms of self-affirmation, 
proposing that cognitive dissonance is caused not by psychologically inconsistent 
ideas in general (as Festinger argued), but instead only results from cognitions that 
present a threat to one’s positive sense of self.  In a series of experiments they 
observed that dissonance triggered by induced compliance tasks could be reduced by 
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having participants subsequently reaffirm positive self-worth in areas unrelated to 
the original dissonance-triggering task, and concluded that self-affirmation strategies 
could be as effective at reducing dissonance as could attitude change.  
 Indeed, Steele has argued that the dissonance-reducing tactic of spreading of 
alternatives observed in free choice experiments can best be understood as an 
attempt to regain a positive self-image when faced with the possibility that one may 
have acted incompetently when making a difficult choice (Steele cited in Heine and 
Lehman, 1997).  This finding is key to my current research, which attempts to 
identify whether a motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance plays a role in 
processes of moral judgment in situations where a threat to a positive sense of an 
individual’s moral self may be ameliorated by reinforcement of their positive sense 
of self as a competent actor. 
1.4   Models of Competence and Morality/Warmth 
Findings from research in experimental social psychology, the psychology of 
personality, election poll results, and cross-cultural studies have revealed that 
individuals consistently judge individuals and groups with relation to two distinct 
universal dimensions: competence and warmth/morality (see Cikara, Farnsworth, 
Harris & Fiske, 2010; Cohrs, Asbrock & Sibley, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002; Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998).  The competence dimension is 
described as including traits such as skill, creativity, and intelligence.  In the work of 
Fiske and colleagues (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), competence is contrasted against the 
warmth dimension, which encompasses characteristics including trustworthiness, 
fairness, and helpfulness.   However, Wojciszke et al., (1998) conceptualize a model 
contrasting competence and morality, rather than competence and warmth.  Fiske, 
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Cuddy, and Glick (2007) regard the traits included within Wojciszke and colleagues’ 
conception of morality as indicating pro-social intentions that are congruent with 
those of the traits which comprise the warmth dimension in their own research.  
But the conceptual fit between warmth and morality is problematic: in 
addition to using words which are synonymous with warmth in their list of terms 
relating to morality (e.g., “helpful,” “understanding”), Wojciszke et al. (1998) also 
include words which do not relate to warmth (e.g., “honest,” “righteous”).  Indeed, 
Goodwin et al. (2014) argue that warmth and moral character, although related, are 
themselves distinct constructs.  Their empirical research demonstrates that it is 
possible for individuals to be assessed as warm but not moral, or as moral but not 
warm.  Their findings also provide evidence that moral character is perceived as a 
more stable trait than warmth, which is seen as more context-dependent.  It is 
interesting to note that morality as understood in this research correlates with MFT’s 
Individualising moral foundations, but not with the Binding foundations.  This is 
consistent with Haidt’s (2012) observation that most academics to date have 
focussed on what he would describe as a liberal conception of morality that does not 
include the Binding foundations favoured by conservatives.  What all of the 
competence versus morality/warmth studies detailed above agree on is that 
competence on the one hand, and morality and/or warmth on the other, are distinct 
constructs which are to some degree orthogonal.    
According to morality/warmth and competence research, when making 
judgments about others, the assessment of morality/warmth occurs more quickly, 
and is considered of greater importance than the assessment of competence.  
However, when assessing one’s self, competence is deemed more important 
(Wojciszke et al, 1998; Fiske et al, 2007; Leach et al., 2006).  As an adaptive 
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strategy this makes sense: both malevolent intentions on the part of another 
individual or group, and lack of competence on the part of one’s self or one’s 
ingroup can make surviving and thriving far less certain (Fiske et al, 2007).  And, as 
these assessments would often need to be made quickly in order to be able to 
respond to strangers in an appropriate and timely manner, we evolved cognitive tools 
to aid us with these judgments. 
The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007) presents 
a two-dimensional space in which four different combinations of warmth and 
competence represent stereotypical perceptions of one’s ingroup as opposed to 
outgroups.  In this model, ingroups are typically rated in a positive manner as being 
high in both warmth and competence.  But outgroups can be judged in one of three 
combinations: high in warmth but low in competence; low in warmth and low in 
competence; or low in warmth but high in competence.  Individuals have been 
observed to react to outgroups which they perceive as low warmth/low competence 
with contempt and disgust.  Harris and Fiske (2006) conducted an fMRI experiment 
in which participants viewed photographs of various social groups, and found that 
when viewing pictures of low warmth/low competence groups (such as drug addicts) 
there was significantly increased activation in the amygdala, and in the insula, a 
brain region associated with disgust.   
Data from the USA revealed that outgroups deemed low in competence but 
high in warmth (such as elderly people and the disabled), tend instead to be viewed 
paternalistically and with affection, but enjoy fewer social and employment 
opportunities, while those stereotyped as high in competence but low in warmth 
(such as minority professionals, Jewish people, and the British) are treated with 
suspicion and may also suffer limited employment and social opportunities (Fiske et 
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al, 2007; Oldmeadow and Fiske, 2007).  Cikara et al. (2010) applied the 
warmth/competence model to an adaptation of the trolley moral dilemma experiment 
(see Foot, 1978; Greene et al., 2001)  in order to examine whether participants would 
value the lives of ingroup members over those from various outgroups.  They found 
that the lives of ingroup individuals viewed as high competence and high warmth 
were valued more highly than outgroup members, and that outgroup members rated 
as low in both warmth and competence were more readily sacrificed to save 
individuals from more highly rated groups.  How an individual or group is perceived 
with relation to warmth/morality and competence would appear to have a significant 
impact on interpersonal and inter-group interactions. 
 That we differentiate between what is deemed salient when judging ingroups 
as opposed to outgroups is not surprising given the findings produced by the wealth 
of research on inter-group dynamics.  Extensive research in social psychology has 
demonstrated that we tend to compete with perceived outgroups (e.g., Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  Indeed, empirical 
studies have shown that individuals’ responses towards the suffering of outgroups 
differs from their responses to ingroup suffering (e.g. Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 
2011; Cikara, et al., 2010; Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010), with outgroup 
suffering eliciting less empathy than the suffering of ingroup members.  And 
evolutionary theory posits that cooperation towards ingroup members and 
compliance with the ingroup’s social norms serve the (arguably) adaptive function of 
enhancing group solidarity (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 2005; Kitcher, 2011; Krebs, 
2008; O’Gorman, Wilson, & Miller, 2008).  Such analysis suggests that individuals 
will be more likely to assess outgroup members as potential competitors, and 
ingroup members as potential allies.   
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 My current research investigates how perceptions of competence and 
morality within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affect moral judgments 
relating to perceived ingroup and outgroup members, and crucially, provides 
evidence which suggests that competence and morality are only weakly orthogonal.  
In focusing on how competent performance may influence assessment of actor 
morality, my current research adopts a person-centred approach to analysis of 
processes of moral judgment. 
1.5  Moral Judgment: Person-Centred and Act-Centred Approaches 
In a move away from the current trend in moral psychology research to focus on 
moral judgment relating to specific actions, recent research has reconnected with a 
person-centred approach to moral judgment (see Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; 
Uhlmann, Pizarro & Diermeier, 2015).  Act-centred research employ dual process 
frameworks grounded in the distinction between deontological and utilitarian 
reasoning when making moral judgments
4
 (e.g., Greene, Nystrom, Engel, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2004; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008).  In contrast, 
the person-centred approach draws on the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics in 
arguing that people make judgments about the moral character of individuals, and 
not just on the morality of specific acts that they perform.  This change in focus has 
suggested a reinterpretation of key research findings in moral psychology relating to 
dual process models of cognition (Uhlmann et al, 2015).   
 Proponents of a person-centred approach argue that many alleged 
“inconsistencies” in moral judgment presented as evidence of cognitive bias in 
psychological research do not represent inconsistencies at all.  Instead, they are 
                                                 
4
 Although see Kahane, 2012 for a criticism of Greene’s association of automatic and controlled 
processing with deontological and utilitarian judgment. 
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evidence of people interpreting, in a logical and valid way, information regarding the 
performance of specific acts as relevant to understanding the moral character of the 
actors (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Ulhmann et al., 2015).  For example, research 
into how people attribute blame has shown that information which is interpreted as 
providing clues about an actor’s moral character affects how morally responsible the 
actor is judged to be.  Pizarro and Tannenbaum (2011) cite Alicke’s (1992; 2000) 
experimental research in which participants judge the culpability of a car driver who 
was involved in a road accident, causing injury to others, while exceeding the speed 
limit.  If the driver was presented as speeding because he was hurrying home to hide 
an anniversary present for his wife, he was judged as less morally responsible for 
causing injury to others than if he was presented as hurrying home to hide cocaine.   
 While Alicke interprets this as evidence of cognitive bias, Pizarro and 
Tannenbaum (2011) and Ulhmann et al. (2015) argue that instead of indicating 
irrational cognitive bias, when character-based inferences influence other judgments 
this is evidence of the workings of a moral system which has evolved in order to 
allow individuals to distinguish between “good” and “bad” people, as such 
information is necessary for successfully navigating the complexities of the social 
world.  Uhlmann et al. (2015) argue that character-based inferences can only be 
considered to be irrational biases if the information they contain is irrelevant to the 
understanding of the event to which they are being applied.  My current research 
actively engages with analysis of whether the proposed competence/morality 
dynamic is best considered as an appropriate heuristic or as a cognitive bias. 
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1.6   Conclusion 
The literatures with which I engaged at the beginning of my research for this 
thesis—moral foundations theory, sacred values, and cognitive dissonance—were 
chosen as being of particular relevance to understanding how individuals across the 
political spectrum experience and attempt to resolve moral dilemmas associated with 
intergroup conflict.  In addition, and as a result of initial analysis of the interview 
material, I subsequently incorporated the literatures on morality and competence, and 
on person-centred approaches to moral judgment.   
The recurring theme that weaves its way through all of the various theories and 
models touched upon in this chapter is that of how intuitive cognitive processes, as 
opposed to conscious reasoning, can influence our moral judgment.  The overarching 
purpose of the current thesis is to analyse how these hypothesized to be universal 
cognitive processes underpin and constrain perceptions and behaviours relating to 
moral dilemmas for Jewish Israelis within the specific context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  In the next chapter I will detail how I approached this task. 
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2     Methodology and Methods 
In this chapter I engage with debates within social psychology around experimental 
and social constructivist/critical approaches, and locate my own position within this 
debate.  I then provide a detailed account of my methods and of how they address 
my research questions. Finally, I address reflexivity concerns, and how the overall 
design of the research project corresponds with my epistemological stance.  But first, 
in order to orient the reader, I provide Table 2.1 below which illustrates the different 
methods employed to answer the research questions addressed in Chapters 3 - 6. 
Table 2.1: Research Questions and Methods 
Chapter Research Questions Methods 
Chapter 3: 
“Us,” “Them,” and 
Hamatzav: Interpretative 
Phenomenological 
Analysis of Semi-
Structured Interviews 
How do Jewish Israelis 
perceive ingroup and 
outgroup identities 
relevant to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict? 
 
How does this vary 
between and within 
ethnic and political 
groups? 
 
How does this relate to 
their perceptions of the 
Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and of prospects 
for peace? 
 
These RQs provide 
useful context for the 
remaining chapters 
relating to the 
complexity of identity 
issues within Israel. 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Interpretative 
Phenomenological 
Analysis (IPA) 
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Chapter 4:  
Selective Fairness in 
Intergroup Dynamics: a 
moral foundations theory 
analysis of moral 
dilemmas experienced by 
Jewish Israeli reserve 
soldiers and conscientious 
objectors within the 
context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict 
 
How do Jewish Israelis 
along the liberal-
conservative continuum 
differ regarding selective 
application of moral 
foundations relating to 
Harm and Fairness with 
respect to perceived 
ingroups and outgroups? 
 
What are the implications 
of these findings for (a) 
the current structure of 
Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT), and (b) 
normative claims 
associated with MFT? 
 
These RQs address the 
role of moral intuitions 
on individuals’ moral 
judgment, and employ 
these findings to 
critique structural 
elements of, and 
normative claims 
associated with, MFT. 
Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Thematic content analysis 
incorporating MFT 
framework 
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Chapter 5:  
Narratives of Competence 
and Morality in Israeli 
Nationalist Discourse: the 
possible role of cognitive 
bias 
 
How are Israeli 
nationalist narratives 
interwoven with concepts 
of competence and 
morality? 
  
How are the resulting 
discourses embodied by 
individuals through 
compulsory military 
service? 
 
Are Israeli individuals’ 
assessment of the 
morality of themselves 
and their colleagues 
when engaged in military 
actions affected by 
perceived competence? 
 
Analysis of these RQs 
suggest the existence of 
a proposed cognitive 
bias which affects real-
world judgments 
relating to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
Discourse analysis of 
Israeli nationalist 
narratives 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Embodied discourse 
analysis of semi-structured 
interviews 
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Chapter 6:  
Being Good at Being Bad: 
the influence of competent 
performance on 
assessment of actor 
morality 
Does competent 
performance affect 
judgment of actor 
morality? 
 
Is the need to reduce 
cognitive dissonance, 
which arises from the 
morally problematic 
action posing a threat to 
individuals’ positive self- 
perception, a mediating 
factor in this process? 
 
Does this vary: 
(a) when targeting 
ingroup and outgroup 
members? 
 
(b) when judging ingroup 
and outgroup members? 
 
(c) when conforming to 
social norms? 
 
These RQs test for the 
existence of a proposed 
cognitive bias which can 
affect individuals’ 
moral judgment. 
Two online experiments 
involving participants 
making moral judgments 
after reading scenarios in 
which competence is 
manipulated. 
 
One 2 x 4 design. 
 
One 2 x2 design. 
 
 
 
 Methodology and Epistemology 2.1
The overarching question addressed by this thesis is that of how cognitive processes 
involving intuitions, emotion, and biases affect the moral judgments of Israelis called 
to active military service within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  I 
therefore needed a theoretical framework which acknowledged such processes.  At 
the beginning of the research process I chose to use Moral Foundations Theory 
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, & Joseph, 2004) in order to unpack the 
dynamics between the application of the moral intuitions relating to (1) treating 
others with fairness and care, and (2) those relating to ingroup loyalty, respect for 
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authority, and notions of purity, as experienced by Israeli reserve soldiers and 
conscientious objectors in the context of the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.  
Moral Foundations Theory is grounded in evolutionary theory and posits that these 
moral intuitions are universally shared by humans.  In applying this universal 
framework to the analysis of a particular real-world situation, my research embraces 
the inherent tension between the nomothetic and the ideographic.  The 
methodological implications of this are significant. 
2.1.1 Current Debates on Nomothetic and Idiographic Approaches 
Historically, psychology has taken a nomothetic stance and has sought to identify 
generalizable, law-like principles which hold universal relevance.  Nomothetic 
research is epistemologically positivist, and uses scientific methods drawn from 
those used in the natural sciences.  In contrast, ideographic research focuses on 
particularities rather than on universals (see, for example, Kral, 2007; Bender, 
Hutchins & Medin, 2010; Bender & Beller, 2011), and has historically been 
associated with anthropology.  Astuti and Bloch (2012) illustrate these differences by 
comparing the methodologies and epistemologies of cognitive psychologists with 
those of cognitive anthropologists.  They describe the two disciplines as setting out 
from opposite starting points, with psychologists formulating and testing hypotheses 
in artificial lab conditions designed to isolate the hypothesized phenomenon.  
Anthropologists, however, begin with a phenomenon observed in a real-world 
setting, and then engage in reflection and apply theories in order to identify 
processes contributing to the phenomenon.  Astuti and Bloch (2012) describe 
cognitive psychologists as critical of anthropology due to the lack of reproducibility 
of anthropologists’ findings, while cognitive anthropologists are critical of 
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psychology for seeking to test phenomena in situations devoid of all meaningful 
social context.   
Given these differences, it is hardly surprising that some researchers, such as 
Stainton Rogers (2003), consider the gap between nomothetic and idiographic 
research to be unbridgeable.  Stainton Rogers cites the debate within social 
psychology regarding whether the discipline should be experimental, or should 
instead take a critical approach.  She describes how the experimental approach, in 
seeking to generalize, effectively downplays individual complexity, treating it as 
unwanted noise, while the critical approach instead perceives complexity as integral 
to understanding the phenomena in question. 
However, some researchers in both psychology and anthropology have 
sought to bridge the gap between the nomothetic and the idiographic.  For example, 
Brown and Seligman (2009) argue that ethnographic data from anthropology can be 
utilized in order to design experiments that will enable exploration of the interplay 
between universal human cognitive functions and culturally-specific environmental 
factors.  Similarly, Astuti and Bloch (2015) have stressed the importance of ensuring 
that the questions that researchers ask participants actually manage to get to the heart 
of what the researchers are looking to understand.  They argue that questions, for 
example, which assume that individuals are making moral judgements as isolated 
individuals rather than as individuals within societies can produce misleading results.  
Ginges, Atran, Sacheva, and Medin (2011) point out that in order to produce 
research that is relevant to real-world problems, psychology would benefit from 
moving beyond a strict focus on lab experiments conducted with university 
undergraduates, by expanding both its methods and its study populations (see also 
Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010). 
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While some researchers have sought to make a clear distinction between the 
roles of psychologists as being concerned with cognitive processes as universal, 
while anthropologists focus on cultural content, others take a more nuanced approach 
and argue that, as cognitive processes and cultural contexts interact recursively, there 
is much to be gained from addressing them together (Kral, 2007; Bender et al., 2010, 
Astuti & Bloch,2012).  Tyson, Jones and Elcock (2011) describe the use of mixed 
methods, based on the understanding that although humans share universal cognitive 
processes, these are marshalled in unique ways depending on specific contexts, as 
“epistemological pluralism.”  Similarly, Kral (2007) advocates the benefits to 
researchers of being open to combining divergent epistemological positions within 
research through the use of mixed methods.  Doing so requires the understanding of 
individuals or groups as being made up of “contextualized particularities” and 
enables researchers to address how these may affect and even modify current 
psychological categorizations of cognitive processes.  Epistemological pluralism 
thus provides the opportunity for the respective strengths of both nomothetic and 
idiographic research approaches to compensate for each other’s respective 
weaknesses, thereby enabling the possibility of transcending what advocates of 
either epistemological position would be able to achieve in isolation (Bender & 
Beller, 2011). 
2.1.2 My epistemological/methodological position 
The current research adopts a position of epistemological pluralism.  From the 
outset, the overarching design plan for my PhD research was to conduct semi-
structured interviews constructed so as to explore (a) the meanings that the 
participants constructed around concepts of ingroup and outgroup identity, their 
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perceptions of the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of the prospects for 
peace, and (b) dynamics of moral judgment of reserve soldiers and conscientious 
objectors within a Moral Foundations Framework, with an eye to identifying the role 
of cognitive dissonance in their experience of, and strategies for dealing with, moral 
dilemmas.  By addressing issues around identity, including family and personal 
history, ethnicity, politics, and religion, the interview questions would enable me to 
situate the data relating specifically to moral judgment into the socio-cultural 
contexts of the interviewees.  The plan was then, following analysis of the interview 
data, to design an experimental protocol which would draw from the qualitative 
findings in focusing on one aspect of the interviewees’ judgment making processes 
which appeared amenable to experimental analysis.  I would then apply the findings 
of this experimental research to further analysis of the interview data. 
It was important to me to conduct the interviews in a way that (1) 
systematically ensured that each interviewee was asked the same key questions, but 
also (2) allowed space for them to talk about things that they deemed important that I 
had not anticipated.  Although my research focus was on how the application of 
moral intuitions varies across the political spectrum in situations of ingroup-
outgroup conflict, and the role that cognitive dissonance might play in this, I wanted 
to be receptive to other relevant phenomena that the interviews might reveal.   
In doing this, I remained open to useful “noise.”  To employ a metaphor 
drawing on my experience as a filmmaker, I view the dynamics between the 
nomothetic strategy of isolating the phenomenon of interest, and the idiographic 
commitment to situating phenomena within a rich cultural context, in terms of vision 
(nomothetic) and sound (idiographic).  When filming, one is able to focus one’s 
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vision precisely onto the object of interest, framing out all other elements so that the 
world, according to what is inside your frame of vision, exists exclusively of the 
object of your interest.  Vision is very amenable to such focus.  Sound is not.  To 
anthropomorphise for a moment, sound does not care if you are only interested in the 
specific thing at which you are pointing the camera: sound is anarchic, and will 
intrude regardless.  You may be filming a scene that, visually, is the epitome of a 
rural idyll, but if your location is near a motorway, the noise from the traffic will not 
politely stop at the edge of your visual frame.  This may prove very frustrating if you 
aim to analyse the world only in terms of what you are specifically looking at.  But 
if, instead, you wish to understand the world in all of its often contradictory 
complexity, then sound’s intrusiveness is a gift.  With this in mind, I listened out for 
useful “noise” during the course of the interviews.  And, as will become clear, what I 
heard became the basis of my experimental designs. 
2.2 Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews 
This section provides details relating to conducting the qualitative phase of the 
research.  I describe, in turn, why I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews, how 
I recruited participants, the materials I used, and the type of data produced.  I also 
discuss relational and ethical considerations. 
2.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews: Choice of Method 
I chose semi-structured interviews for the qualitative element of my research as this 
method allows a great deal of freedom for the interviewees to take the discussion 
into areas that I had not anticipated, and to introduce themes and concepts that more 
restricted methods would miss.  In this way, semi-structured interviews introduce 
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both breadth and depth to the research, and can help to guard against a researcher 
simply finding what they were initially looking for.  There are limitations to this 
approach as well.  Interviewees will only tell the interviewer what they are both 
aware of and feel comfortable revealing.  Interviewees may also be influenced in 
their answers by social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993).  However, if participants 
differ in their understanding of what constitutes morally acceptable behaviour then 
this will affect how they perceive social desirability, and these differences will be 
reflected in their answers. As I was interested in identifying variations along the 
liberal-conservative continuum in attitudes and perceptions relating to moral 
dilemmas, such differences provided useful data. 
One limitation of the study was that the interviews were conducted in English, 
which reinforced my status as an outsider.  Some of the interviewees said things 
during the course of the interviews which made it clear that they assumed that I was 
not Jewish, while others asked me if I was Jewish after our interviews had 
concluded.  My status as non-Israeli and non-Jewish was likely to have a greater 
impact on the openness of more right wing interviewees, who disapprove of 
speaking critically of Israel to the outside world, than on the more left wing 
interviewees.  One obvious downside of conducting the interviews in English was 
that I was only able to interview English-speaking Israelis.  Fortunately, English is 
widely spoken within Israel and I was able to recruit sufficient numbers of people, 
including from minority ethnic groups.  But I was aware that this criterion effectively 
functioned as a filter eliminating everyone who either did not speak English at all, or 
did not feel sufficiently confident in their English to participate in an interview.  I 
have only very basic Hebrew language skills, so conducting the interviews in 
Hebrew was not an option.  I considered the possibility of using an interpreter in the 
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interviews but, especially when dealing with sensitive topics, it is important to be 
able to build trust and rapport with one’s interviewees, and having a third person 
acting as intermediary inevitably makes this more difficult. 
2.2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews: Participants 
I recruited 40 Jewish reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors in Israel for the 
interviews, which were conducted in two tranches.  The first tranche was conducted 
during March 2012, and the second during May-June 2013.  Each interview was 
conducted separately.  At the time of the first set of interviews I had been focused on 
identifying differences between left wing conscientious objectors as one category, 
and serving soldiers as another.  To that end, I initially interviewed 24 people: 10 
conscientious objectors, and 14 serving soldiers.  In the following year, having 
adjusted the research design to analyse differences more evenly along the liberal-
conservative continuum, I conducted 16 further interviews, giving a total of 40 
individuals.  As the interviews formed the basis of the idiographic elements of the 
research project (involving interpretative phenomenological analysis and discursive 
analyses), the 40 interviews provided a satisfactory sample size.  Although my 
priority was to ensure similar numbers of interviewees from each of four political 
categories—left wing, centre left, centre right, and right wing—this additional 
tranche of interviews also enabled me to ensure that I recruited a more representative 
mix of ethnicities than I had managed during the first tranche. 
I used a form of purposive sampling to recruit interviewees, specifically 
snowball sampling, with four starting points: left wing, centre left, centre right, and 
right wing political affiliations.  I operationalized the definitions of the political 
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categories as follows.  “Left wing” included both explicit and “grey5” conscientious 
objectors who oppose Israel’s military activities in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT)
6
 on moral grounds; “centre left” includes those who oppose the 
military activities in the OPT but continue to do their military service there; “centre 
right” individuals do military service and consider the military operations in the 
West Bank and Gaza as necessary and justified; and “right wing” individuals support 
and serve in IDF operations in the West Bank and Gaza except when operations  
conflict with the settlement project
7
, as occurred during the Disengagement from 
Gaza
8
.   
  Some groups were easier to access than others.  From my previous research 
on conscientious objectors I already had contacts among left wing Israelis, which 
made recruiting people from this group straightforward.  Centre right individuals 
also proved relatively easy to access.  But it took time to establish trust with 
individuals from the right wing and from the centre left who, for different reasons 
appeared wary of speaking with a non-Israeli researcher.  For the right wing, this was 
due to suspicions that I might prove to be hostile towards Israel.  For the centre left, 
there was the fear that an outsider would not be able to understand the apparent 
contradiction of their continuing to serve in the army enforcing a military occupation 
                                                 
5
 “Grey” refusers find ways of avoiding military service, rather than openly becoming conscientious 
objectors. 
6
 Terminology regarding these geographic areas is contentious, and varies across the political 
spectrum.  Right wing religious Israelis refer to Gaza and frequently use the biblical names Judea and 
Samaria when referring to the West Bank, centrists generally refer to Gaza and the West Bank, and 
those further left politically tend to refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories collectively, or to 
Gaza and the West Bank separately. 
7
 Under international law, the Jewish Israeli settlements in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, 
(and previously also those in Gaza) are illegal.  Attitudes towards the settlements varied along 
political lines.  The left wing and centre left saw them as constituting an illegal military occupation, 
the centre right and right wing saw them as necessary for Israeli’s military security.  The right wing 
also believed the settlements represented the fulfilment of a religious obligation to provide a 
homeland for the Jewish people. 
8
 In 2005 the Israeli government ordered the evacuation of the Jewish Israeli settlements in Gaza.  The 
evacuation was enforced by the IDF. 
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of which they disapproved.  It also took time to make inroads into the Ethiopian 
community as I had no previous contacts from this group. 
In order to make the interviewees as comfortable as possible with talking about 
sensitive topics, I encouraged them to select where we would meet.  Some were 
happy to be interviewed in public spaces such as cafes or parks, while others 
preferred to speak with me in their homes or offices.  Each interviewee signed a 
release form, and was advised that if at any time they did not feel comfortable with 
my questions they could end the interview (none of them chose to do so).  I also 
confirmed that all interviews were confidential, and that participants’ identities 
would not be revealed either explicitly or through identifying details.  The interviews 
lasted from 50 minutes (sufficient for covering my planned interview questions) up 
to nearly two hours, depending on how much the interviewees wanted to discuss
9
.  
The interviews took me across Israel from Tel Aviv, with its reputation as secular 
and hedonistic, through more traditional and conservative towns and cities, including 
Jerusalem, as well as to a tiny outpost inhabited by ideological right wing settlers, 
consisting of 30+ caravans on the top of a hill in the West Bank. 
The final demographic breakdown for the interviewees was as follows:  
 Politics: Left Wing = 25%, Centre left =27.5 %, Centre right = 25%,  Right 
Wing = 22.5%;   
 Gender: Male = 85%10, Female = 15%;   
                                                 
9
 Word counts of interviews with each political group. Left wing: M=8251.00; Centre Left: 
M=7195.36; Centre Right: M=8243.60; Right Wing: M=12,110.11.  A univariate ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference between the political categories’ mean word counts, F(3, 36) = 4.23, p = .012.  
However, a post hoc Tukey test showed that none of the groups differed significantly from each other 
except for the centre left and right wing at p = .009 
10
 The IDF conscripts women as well as men, but it is easier for women to be exempted from service, 
for example because of being married, or having children, or on religious grounds. In 2011 women 
made up only 3% of combat soldiers, 15% of technical personnel, and 33% of all soldiers (“More 
female soldiers in more positions in the IDF,” 2011). 
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 Ethnicity: Ashkenazi = 62.5%11, Mizrahi = 2.5%, Sephardi = 5%, 
Russian/FSU = 15%,  Ethiopian = 10%, Mixed = 5%;  
 Religion: Secular = 70%,  Religious = 30%;   
 Age range:  22 to 77 (M=33.4).   
2.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews: Materials 
The interviews needed to provide data for three separate forms of analysis.  First, 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was used to gain insights into the 
interviewees’ own understandings of ingroup-outgroup identities, and of the nature 
of the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.  Second, a moral foundations theory 
(MFT) framework was used to analyse how the interviewees differed across the 
political spectrum in their selective application of moral foundations relating to 
Harm and Fairness with respect to perceived ingroups and outgroups.  And third, 
embodied discourse analysis was used to understand how the interviewees’ lived 
experiences of military service embodied nationalist discourses in which competence 
had become conflated with morality. 
Therefore, I needed to devise an interview framework which would address 
theory-driven questions relating to moral judgment, provide information about each 
interviewee’s unique history and context, and allow space for emergent themes 
arising from the interviewees’ descriptions of their experiences and of the meanings 
they attached to these.  To that end, I prepared open questions relating to: (1) how 
the interviewees viewed the relationships between their personal, family, religious, 
and national identities, (2) how their perceptions of Palestinians from the West Bank 
                                                 
11
 The primary goal of the sampling was to ensure an even mix between political categories.  The first 
tranche of interviewees was almost exclusively Ashkenazi.  In the second tranche I ensured that other 
ethnic groups were also represented.  
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and Gaza, and of Palestinian citizens of Israel, correlated with their understanding of 
the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict, (3) their childhood perceptions of the 
military and of the conflict, (4) their personal experiences of military service, 
including any moral dilemmas related to military service, (5) their perception of the 
purpose of the IDF, (6) their loyalty to the IDF, (7) their identity as Jewish and as 
Israeli, (8) the nature of their interactions with Palestinians, (9) how/whether the 
conflict affected their daily lives, (10) their perceptions of agency relating to the 
continuation or ending of the conflict, and (11) their perceptions of the morality of 
different Jewish Israeli groups.  I was careful to phrase questions in an open manner 
that did not impose expectations of any particular answer.  The framework for the 
questions I used can be found in Appendix 1.  I collected basic demographic data 
relating to age, ethnicity, religion, politics, if/where they served in the military, 
education, occupation, and marital status/children at the end of each interview. 
I also introduced the “Moral Continuum Exercise” as part of the interview 
process.  In this exercise participants were presented with blank examples of a 
“moral continuum,” as in Figure ‎2.1 below. 
Figure  2.1: Moral Continuum structure 
 
 
Participants were given coloured dots each representing different group 
behaviours, which correspond with my operationalized definitions of left wing, 
centre left, centre right, and right wing:  
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 Red = conscientious objectors who refuse to serve in the military in the 
West Bank and Gaza on moral grounds 
 Black = soldiers who protest against the occupation on moral grounds, 
but continue to do their military service in the West Bank and Gaza 
 Green = soldiers who serve in the West Bank and Gaza and who perceive 
the military activities there as necessary  
 Yellow = soldiers who refuse to evict Jewish settlers from their homes, as 
occurred during the Disengagement from Gaza.  
Participants placed the dots along the continuum, ranking these different behaviours 
according to how moral they perceived them to be.  They were then asked to fill in 
the remaining identical scales but from the point of view of the groups of other 
political persuasions.   As a small-n exercise in which participants were allowed to 
assign the same colour dot to more than one place, or to leave it off entirely, the 
moral continuum was not intended for quantitative analysis.   
The purpose of this exercise was to move the discussions away from abstract 
concepts of morality within military service and to introduce a more concrete 
assessment of specific behaviours, of the interviewees’ perceptions of the 
motivations of the actors involved, and of their understanding of how Israelis with 
different political beliefs perceived these actions and motivations.  Most of the 
interviewees stated their views about the specific moralities of different political 
groups fairly confidently during the main parts of the interviews, but when I 
introduced the Moral Continuum exercise, which required them to rank particular 
behaviours against each other in a more concrete way, the confidence displayed 
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during the more abstract discussions often vanished, and the discussions took on 
greater depth.   
The necessity of locating dots not only along the moral continuum itself, but 
also in relation to other dots, effectively created a series of ranking orders of 
perceived morality of different behaviours: one order relating to their own 
judgments, and three relating to how the interviewees viewed the judgments of their 
compatriots from other political categories.  This could prove illuminating not only 
to me as a researcher, but also to the interviewees as participants.  For example, one 
interviewee, who described himself as centre right politically, became uncomfortable 
when he realised that he had placed the dots representing his own views almost 
identically to where he had placed the dots representing his understanding of right 
wing Israelis’ views.  Although the moral continuum is extremely simplistic in 
design, the concreteness of having to place dots along a scale resulted in useful, in-
depth discussions that transcended abstract generalities.   
2.2.4 Semi-Structured Interviews: Data and Analysis 
Each interview was recorded using two small Olympus USB digital recorders.  I 
used two in case either of them developed a technical fault or ran out of battery 
power during an interview.  I then transferred the recordings onto my laptop where I 
manually transcribed them using Express Scribe software.   
For analysis and reporting, I assigned each of the 40 interviewees a unique 
identifier indicating their political categorisation:  L1– L10 (left wing), CL1 – CL11 
(centre left), CR1 – CR10 (centre right), and R1 – R9 (right wing).  I employed two 
separate qualitative methods of analysis.  As I planned to do three separate 
qualitative analyses of the data—interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), 
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thematic content analysis, and embodied discourse analysis—I needed to develop a 
coding framework which allow for all three types of analysis.  IPA focuses on how 
interviewees understand and construct meanings from their experiences (Smith & 
Osborn, 2003; Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009).  Therefore IPA coding involves the 
researcher identifying specific themes which emerge from the interviewees’ 
discussions in answer to questions based on broader themes.  This approach involves 
a double hermeneutic in that the researcher is interpreting the interviewees’ 
interpretations of their own experiences (ibid.).   
In contrast, the approach of thematic content analysis (Guest, MacQueen & 
Namey, 2012) is more researcher-led.  In this case, it allowed me to address my 
broad analytic objective of analysing how the interviewees experienced and dealt 
with moral dilemmas through a pre-defined theoretical framework, as well as 
situating their experiences within their unique socio-cultural contexts.  Thematic 
content analysis involves creating families of thematic codes, which when applied to 
the text of the interviews, enables the researcher to link these themes to theoretical 
models.  Similarly, discursive analysis involves creating theory-driven codes.  For 
the current research the embodied discourse analysis required coding for elements 
which also appeared in the thematic content analysis: themes relating to competent 
performance and assessment of morality.  Although the mode of analysis between 
IPA, thematic content analysis, and embodied discourse analysis differs, the actual 
process of coding the necessary data was complementary. 
Using NVivo 10 software, I developed a coding framework divided into two 
major sections: theory-driven codes and ethnographic data codes.  Theory-driven 
codes relating to moral intuitions and to theories of cognitive dissonance, 
essentialism, causal attribution, and sacred values had been planned from the outset 
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and represent a deductive approach to the data.  But inductive analysis of the data 
suggested a relationship between competence of performance and assessment of 
morality, so it was necessary also to include theory-driven codes relating to models 
of competence and morality in the coding framework.  These would be used in both 
the thematic content analysis and the embodied discourse analysis.  Coding of 
ethnographic data was categorized according to demographic data, and to the broad 
analytic themes identified within the interview questions.  During coding, these 
analytic themes were segmented into specific sub-themes emerging from the 
interviews, allowing for both a richer thematic content analysis, and also for 
interpretative phenomenological analysis.  Coding was exhaustive but not exclusive, 
with specific elements frequently fitting into more than one interrelated category.   
For the IPA, I was primarily interested in finding points of convergence and 
divergence relating to broad analytical themes (ingroup and outgroup identity, 
perception of the nature of the conflict, and perceptions of the possibilities for peace) 
within and between the four different political groups.  However, to provide a richer 
idiographic perspective regarding perceptions of identity, I also analysed these 
themes within a framework in which the political categories served as sub-divisions 
of ethnic categories.  Coding for the IPA involved identifying recurrent themes 
within each political or ethnic sub-grouping.  Themes were classified as recurrent if 
they appeared in at least half of the relevant interviews.  This allowed me to identify 
themes that were broadly representative of the different political/ethnic groupings.  I 
also identified anomalous themes which were interesting for their distinctiveness, 
and identified these as such in the analysis. 
For the thematic content analysis, the coding framework allowed for cross-
referencing between different aspects of theory-driven and ethnographic data codes 
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in order to fully engage with my research questions.  In Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 I 
use the example of right wing interviewees’ experience of the Disengagement from 
Gaza to illustrate how the coding framework enabled me to situate interviewees’ 
descriptions of specific lived experiences of military operations within a theoretical 
framework grounded in moral foundations theory, and within a conceptual 
framework of “ingroup”-facing versus “outgroup”-facing moral dilemma triggers.  
 
Figure  2.2: Partial Theory-Driven Coding Framework 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) 
Individualising Moral Foundations  Binding Moral Foundations 
Harm/Care Fairness/Unfairness  Authority Loyalty Purity 
    State  Religion 
          Requires    Forbids 
   Disengagement Disengagement 
 
Cross-reference with Moral Dilemma Triggers, Military Operations,  
and Politics 
 
 
Figure  2.3: Partial Ethnographic Coding Framework 
Military Operations 
Bombing Borders Checkpoints  Gaza Disengagement           Etc. 
Cross reference with MFT, Moral Dilemma Triggers and Politics 
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Figure  2.4: Partial Conceptual Framework (sub-set of Ethnographic 
Framework) 
Moral Dilemma Triggers 
“Ingroup”-facing Dilemmas   “Outgroup”-facing Dilemmas 
Gaza       Ethical Code    Ceding land   Etc.   General  Civilians 
Disengagement   ties hands    makes Israel  Population             
       less secure                            Adults        Kids 
 
Cross reference with MFT, Military Operations and Politics 
 
For the embodied discourse analysis I needed to identify instances where, (a) 
in response to questions about moral judgment and moral dilemmas, the interviewees 
answered by describing incidents in terms of either competent or incompetent 
performance, and (b) where interviewees spoke of morality and competence in the 
same breath when describing experiences relating to military service.  As the 
thematic content analysis coding included themes of both competence and morality, 
identifying relevant data for the embodied discourse analysis was straightforward.   
Coding the second tranche of interviews provided a useful opportunity for 
reassessing the original coding framework in terms of the applicability and usability 
of its design structure, as well as on how effectively it provided space for 
interviewee-led data categories.   At this point, in order to check reliability of the 
initial coding, I also re-coded four interviews, one from each political category, from 
the first tranche.  The only changes between the first and second codings related to 
“splitting” and “lumping” (Guest et al., 2012): in the second coding I was able to 
include a small percentage (less than 7%) of codes within higher level codes.  New 
codes were also introduced in the second tranche of interviews specific to the 
experiences of ethnic minorities who had not been represented in the first tranche.  
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Once these changes had been made I enlisted a second coder to code extracts relating 
to three key thematic areas: how fixed or fluid the interviewees considered Jewish 
and Arab identities to be; which segments of the Palestinian population triggered 
moral dilemmas for the interviewees; and what they perceived as possible solutions 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Two interviews from each of the four political 
categories were chosen at random for each of these three themes, producing 24 
extracts.  Inter-coder reliability was 95.5%. 
Remaining open to “useful noise” allowed space for the emergence of an 
additional analytical theme: that of the dynamics between competent performance 
and moral judgment.  In response to my questions relating to morality, the 
interviewees often responded in terms of competence.  For example, left wing 
interviewees sometimes cited failures in competence, rather than some new moral 
outrage, as the final straw which led to them to becoming conscientious objectors.  
Centre left interviewees sometimes described focusing on doing their particular tasks 
as professionally and competently as possible as a means of reducing the disquiet 
they felt about participating in a military project of which they disapproved on moral 
grounds.  Interviewees further to the right along the political continuum would refer 
to Israeli and/or Jewish competence in unrelated areas when discussing the morality 
of specific state policies or military strategies.  To me, this suggested the possibility 
of the existence of a cognitive bias by which competent/incompetent performance 
can affect moral judgment.  I next set out to design experiments in order to test this 
hypothesis. 
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2.3 Methods: Discursive Analysis of Nationalist Narratives 
In support of the embodied discourse analysis of the semi-structured interviews in 
Chapter 5, I first conducted discourse analysis of nationalist narratives within Israel 
which incorporated themes of competence and morality, and demonstrated how these 
narratives informed (a) perceived inherent differences between Israelis and 
Palestinians, and (b) a discourse in which Israel was perceived as destined to fulfil a 
unique role among the nations of the world.  The three narratives which I chose for 
this analysis were that of or lagoyim (Israel serving as a light unto the other nations), 
of Jewish Israelis reclaiming the desert and making it bloom, and of Jewish genius.   
These three narratives, as well as being in prevalent use within Israeli society 
today, were also selected by Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, as 
integral to the project of unifying Jewish immigrants from around the world into a 
unified Israeli nation (see Tzahor, 1995).  Unpacking how these narratives supported 
a nationalist discourse in which themes of competence and morality were interwoven 
and sometimes became conflated was a necessary precursor for the embodied 
discourse analysis of the semi-structured interviews. 
Discursive analysis is a broad and varied field, a comprehensive summary of 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The term “discourse” can be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, ranging from definitions in which it is understood in terms of 
societal influences on spoken or written language (e.g., Barthes, 1988; Fairclough, 
1989; Van Dijk, 1993) through broader definitions influenced by post-structuralist 
thought focusing on power dynamics inherent in the construction of meaning 
(Foucault, 1977; Foucault, 1980) and incorporating non-verbal practices as forms of 
discourse (e.g., Sampson, 1996; Mehta & Bondi, 1999; Weiss, 2001).   
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The purpose of the current research is to unpack how narratives of 
competence and morality are interwoven in Israeli nationalist discourse, and how the 
embodiment of competence narratives through military service affects perceptions of 
morality.  I therefore employ discursive analysis (a) to examine both content and 
function of relevant nationalist narratives, and (b) engage in analysis of a specific 
form of discourse—embodied discourse— to examine dynamics between nationalist 
discourse and individuals’ lived experiences of military service. 
Like Foucauldian discourse analysis, embodied discourse analysis explores 
the interplay between structures of power and the agency of individuals, but it also 
draws upon Bourdieu’s notion of “bodily hexis” as “political mythology realized, 
em-bodied” (Bourdieu 1990:69), in which the body serves as a means not only of 
enacting, but also of constituting, dominant narrative discourses.  Individuals are 
able to realize political and cultural identities through their own behaviors (Guthrie, 
Raymond, & Stivers, 1997), thereby gaining non-linguistic, practical knowledge, 
which is difficult to untangle from discursive knowledge (Mehta & Bondi 1999).   
Embodiment of nationalist discourses can materialize through routine, 
ordinary activities, such as attending sporting events with teams representing “us”, or 
by distinguishing between national and international news.  Such “flagging” of 
“banal nationalism” becomes so familiar that we largely do not recognize it as such 
(Billig 1993).  But Weiss (2001) describes a different mode of embodiment—“deep 
nationalism”—in which non-ordinary, critical events emphasize the contours of 
nationalist discourse.  Weiss describes deaths of Israelis from suicide bombings as 
events through which the national territory of Israel becomes equivalent to individual 
bodies: “the body politic and the citizen become one” (Weiss 2001:38).   
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In Chapter 5 I propose that participation in military service in Israel involves 
embodiment of nationalism which incorporates elements which are both “banal” and 
“deep.”  With near-universal conscription of Jewish Israelis, military service 
functions both as a familiar rite of passage, but also as a field of experience which 
may involve events which are critical in the extreme.  Regardless of their political 
leanings or their moral interpretations of the government policies that the IDF 
enforces, young people are compelled to leave home, put on a uniform, and 
“become” soldiers.  Whether or not individuals’ perceived motivations to participate 
in military service conform to nationalist discourses, or whether they are instead 
motivated by other factors—such as the opportunity to gain skills and connections 
which will eventually help them to succeed in the business world, or simply because 
they fear the reprisals that refusal to serve would invite—their physical participation 
in the military project means that they effectively embody a nationalist discourse to 
which they have been systematically exposed since childhood.   
2.4 Methods: Online Experiments 
This section details the process of the design and implementation of the quantitative 
phase of the research.  Here I describe the pilot phase, the design strategy, 
recruitment of participants and, briefly, data processing. 
2.4.1 Online Experiments: Pilot Phase 
The research questions for the online experiments emerged from inductive analysis 
of the interview data.  This analysis suggested the presence of a cognitive bias that 
could affect moral judgement: the influence of competence of performance on 
assessment of actor morality. My first attempt at finding a way of testing for this 
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through the use of experiments involved designing scenarios drawing directly from 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so that the experiments would have 
ecological validity (see Brown & Seligman, 2009).  However, I soon realised that 
such an approach would be problematic in this case as I needed to find a way of 
moving participants away from well-practised responses relating to the conflict 
reflecting their political opinions.   
To that end, I developed scenarios for two experiments which, on the surface, 
were completely unrelated to the conflict, but which contained dynamics relating to 
competent or incompetent performance, pressure to conform to social norms, 
morally problematic actions, and for the second experiment, one’s national ingroup 
being judged on moral grounds by outsiders.  These were dynamics which had 
emerged strongly during the course of the interviews.  The scenario design was, 
effectively, a hybrid between a strictly nomothetic approach which could be 
meaningful to participants beyond the Israeli context, and a more idiographic 
approach seeking to simulate, albeit metaphorically, underlying dynamics relating to 
moral dilemmas as described by the interviewees.   
The scenarios were piloted and fine-tuned with US participants recruited via 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in several iterations between January and April 2014, 
with an additional iteration in November 2014.  The largest pilot study contained 
392 participants.  I planned to run the full studies as large-scale online experiments 
in Hebrew with participants in Israel, with equal numbers of participants from the 
political left wing, centre left, centre right, and right wing.  But I chose to conduct 
the piloting phase of the research in English with participants in the US recruited 
through MTurk for two reasons.  First, running the pilot studies in English would 
enable me to improve and modify the designs without having to use translators.  
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Second, the population of Israel is small, the population of Israelis who participate in 
online experiments is smaller, and the population of left wing Israelis (who form a 
minority of the population) participating in online experiments is smaller still.  I did 
not want to reduce the number of available left wing Israelis during the piloting 
phase of the research.   
2.4.2 Online Experiments: Design Strategy 
Once the initial experimental design was finalised, the main studies in Hebrew were 
conducted in two separate tranches.  This reflected an iterative approach to the 
design process.  After analysing the first tranche of data from Israel, I formulated 
further hypotheses, which I then tested in a second tranche of experiments using 
different participants.  The first tranche went online on 9 July 2014, just as an 
incursion by the Israeli military into Gaza known as Operation Protective Edge was 
launched.  The second tranche was run on 12 December 2014, four months after the 
end of the Gaza incursion.  Concerns about how the time and situational differences 
might affect the results of the experiments were assuaged by the fact that the Israeli 
results in both tranches duplicated the patterns identified in the US pilot studies. 
The experiments were designed to address the following research questions.  
Experiment 1: When performing a morally problematic action, does competence of 
one’s own performance affect self-assessment of morality?  Is this affected by 
whether or not one is conforming to social norms, and whether the victim of one’s 
actions is perceived as an ingroup or outgroup member?  Experiment 2: When 
members of a perceived ingroup perform a morally problematic action which targets 
perceived outgroup members, does competence of their performance affect how 
individuals assesses their morality?  In such a situation do conservative individuals 
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assess the perceived ingroup members as more moral than do more liberal 
individuals?  Is this different when assessing the morality of perceived outgroup 
members targeting one’s ingroup?  And for both experiments: where competence has 
been shown to affect assessment of morality, what is the role of cognitive dissonance 
in this process?   
The final designs of the experiments were as follows.  Experiment 1 was a 
2x4 between-subjects design which required participants to read a 2
nd
-person 
scenario and to imagine themselves as the main character—a competent or 
incompetent counterfeiter attempting to cash a cheque which they had fraudulently 
produced.  Still imagining themselves as the counterfeiter, they then filled in a 
Feelings Thermometer designed to elicit how competent and moral they felt, and 
how much cognitive dissonance they were experiencing.  They then answered 
questions relating to their own personal beliefs about the morality of the actions 
presented in the scenario, and about the responsibility of the main characters for 
performing these actions.  As this was a between-subjects design, each participant 
read a scenario in which their character was either (1) competent or incompetent, (2) 
conforming to social norms in the form of family pressure, or acting on their own, 
and (3) defrauding people within their own country, or in a foreign country.   
Experiment 2 was a 2x2 between-subjects design in which participants read a 
3
rd
-person scenario about a group of competent or incompetent international spies 
who were attempting to place a surveillance device in the office of a friendly 
ambassador from an allied country.  After reading the story, the participants filled in 
a Feelings Thermometer in order to reveal how competent and moral they judged the 
spies to be.  Each participant read a scenario in which the spies were either (1) 
competent or incompetent, and (2) from the participant’s own country spying on a 
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friendly ally; or from an allied country spying on the participant’s country.  Full 
details of the experimental designs can be found in Chapter 6.  
The experiments were run in Hebrew, using the Qualtrics online survey 
platform.  I created separate links for each of the four political categories of 
participants (see next section for details), and separate versions within each link for 
males and females.  In Hebrew, the word “you” is not gender neutral.  It is either 
male “atah,” or female “at.”  The 2nd-person scenarios of Experiment 1 were 
designed so that participants would identify with the main character.  For example, 
“It is a cold afternoon in November and you have just walked in to a small town 
store in upstate New York that offers a cheque cashing service.”  This meant that I 
had to create separate versions for males and females of each of the scenarios and of 
the Feelings Thermometer.   
In the first experimental tranche I also included the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (moralfoundations.org, 2008a) after the competence/morality 
experiment.  I needed this data for Chapter 4 in order to confirm whether moral 
foundations theory, which was developed in the US, could appropriately be applied 
to analysis of differences in moral intuitions across the political spectrum in Israel. 
2.4.3 Online Experiments: Participants 
I recruited 1,207 Jewish Israeli participants through the Midgam Project, which 
provides infrastructure and participant panels for online psychology research within 
Israel.  For these experiments, the Midgam Project provided only people who had 
already established good reputations based on their participation in previous projects.    
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In order to test for any differences across the political spectrum in the 
competence/morality dynamic and for the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, I 
needed equal numbers of left wing, centre left, centre right, and right wing 
participants.  The Midgam Project has detailed demographic information for 
everyone registered with them, including their self-reported most recent voting 
behaviour, so we were able to control for this in the recruitment phase by sending 
equal numbers of individuals to a separate link matching their political 
categorisation.  I also included a question about most recent voting behaviour in the 
demographics section at the end of the experiment, and used these answers (where 
provided) to assign a political category to each participant.  In the few cases where 
participants did not answer this question, I used the categorization provided by the 
Midgam Project.   
The political parties which participants reported voting for were categorized 
as follows:  
Left wing:  Meretz; Eretz Hadasha; HaYerukim; Da’am 
Centre left: Yesh Atid; HaAvoda; Hatnuah; Kadima 
Centre right: Likud; Shas; Yahadut HaTorah Hameukhedet; Am Shalem 
Right wing: HaBayit HaYehudi; Otzma LeYisrael. 
2.4.4 Online Experiments: Data 
Once the required number of participants from each political category link had been 
obtained, I collated this data into separate files for Experiments 1 and 2 using SPSS 
statistical analysis software.  Details of the statistical analyses I conducted and how 
these relate to my research questions can be found in Chapter 6. 
82 
 
2.5 Reflexivity and Epistemological Pluralism 
To date, actively engaging in and reporting on reflexivity has been almost 
exclusively the preserve of qualitative researchers. But the value of, and necessity 
for, reflexivity in quantitative research is beginning to be addressed within the 
academy (see for example, Ryan & Golden, 2006; Pearce, 2015).  For researchers 
using mixed methods it would indeed seem strange to engage reflexively only with 
the qualitative elements of their research.  To address the relevance of reflexivity for 
both the quantitative and qualitative elements of my own mixed methods research, I 
need to first acknowledge the power relationships inherent in the relationships 
between individuals and groups as the objects of research on the one hand, and the 
academy as an institution, and not just of myself as an individual researcher, on the 
other.   
Qualitative research in the form of ethnography emerged in a western world 
dominated by Enlightenment thought and colonial politics, with their corresponding 
notions of positivist rationality, progress and hierarchy.  The authority of early 
ethnographers such as Malinowski was based on their ability to view “primitive” 
societies objectively and scientifically, and to apply positivist empirical techniques 
in categorising and analysing them.  Malinowski (1922) pioneered the technique of 
separating out the ethnographer’s subjective views, in the form of a personal diary, 
from the ostensibly objective, scientific fieldwork data.  Over the following decades 
his methodology became the gold standard of ethnographic research.  But in the late 
20
th
 century such epistemological claims to objectivity became subject to intense 
criticism in the wider discourse in the social sciences, with thinkers such as Foucault 
(1972) arguing that knowledge and power are mutually constitutive and that 
therefore knowledge can never be wholly objective.      
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As part of this radical paradigm shift, the reflexivity debates in the 1970s and 
1980s began to focus on the previously unexamined impact of politics on the 
relationships between western ethnographers and the colonised peoples they studied.  
Asad (1973) challenged the claims of neutrality of colonial-era ethnographers and 
argued that, in failing to recognise the mutually constitutive nature of power and 
knowledge, ethnographers inadvertently reinforced the views and assumptions of 
their own dominant cultures, and in particular those of the powerful institutions 
supporting their research.  Instead of representing cultures as contingent, contested, 
and affected by historical changes in the wider world, these ethnographers presented 
a fiction of other cultures as homogenous, bounded wholes existing in a timeless 
ethnographic present. 
It is, of course, difficult for ethnographers—as for all researchers, working 
qualitatively or quantitatively—to unpick the power dynamics involved in their own 
research, embedded as they are in social and political relations that may well go 
unrecognised.  Indeed, Clifford (1988) argued that one day the ethnographic 
accounts of our own time that we consider to be complete may also be considered 
partial, and that modern perceptions of the failings of earlier ethnographers simply 
indicate the historical contingency and movement inherent in readings of research. 
It was Bourdieu who perceived the importance of the position not only of the 
individual ethnographer, but of the very discipline of research within the wider field 
of power relationships that underpins the formation of methodological categories that 
the early reflexivity debates found problematic such as “culture,” “community,” 
“self,” and “other” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  By this reading it is the processes 
inherent in the field of power relations that need to be addressed and not just the 
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categorisations that result from them if one is going to tackle the concerns raised in 
the reflexivity debate effectively. 
These power dynamics are not, of course, restricted to qualitative research.  
One might argue that they are even more entrenched within quantitative research.  
Research that produces results which can be presented in terms of numbers, 
statistics, charts and graphs—in short, which appears to provide conclusive, clear-cut 
answers grounded in objective scientific analysis—conveys an air of authority not 
available to qualitative research.  But it is this very “objectivity” which needs to be 
questioned if researchers are to avoid falling prey to reinforcing not only their own 
individual prejudices, but also the power dynamics inherent in the systems in which 
their prejudices have emerged.   
As the wider social discourse has moved away from a notion of culture, 
identity and meaning as constituting reifiable, bounded wholes, to one of historically 
contingent ongoing processes, so has the concept of knowledge itself.  If we accept 
that knowledge is historically contingent, the role of research practice shifts from 
one of pinning down “solid,” concrete meanings to one of identifying “liquid” 
processes of constituting meaning.  To work reflexively we should be seeking to 
understand the processes involved in defining subjective social “truths,” rather than 
seeking to focus objectively on the “truths” themselves.  This is as true for 
researchers conducting quantitative research as it is for those working qualitatively.   
In acknowledgement of this, I will engage reflexively with my current 
research as follows.  First, I will address my role as an individual researcher 
engaging with the topic of morality in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Next, for both the qualitative and quantitative studies, I will examine inherent power 
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dynamics between the research participants and myself as both a product and a 
representative of the academy. 
As an individual who is neither Israeli nor Jewish I am frequently asked, and 
sometimes with a good deal of suspicion on the part of the person asking, why I have 
chosen to conduct research within Israel on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  There is 
a narrative commonly heard within Israel that the international community unfairly 
singles out Israel for criticism, and that this is the result of widespread anti-
Semitism.  The impacts of such a narrative on research projects such as mine are 
twofold.  First, it can make potential participants wary of engaging with the 
researcher; and second, it can make the researcher very (and potentially overly) 
cautious about saying or doing anything that might possibly be misconstrued by 
people searching for signs of anti-Semitism.  For a universalist liberal such as 
myself, the possibility that anyone might think I was anti-Semitic is deeply 
disturbing.  Therefore, when engaging in, and when discussing, my research I 
frequently feel as if I am navigating a minefield.  But there is no point in undertaking 
any research unless one is willing to grapple with such complexities.  I do my best to 
ensure that I ask the questions that need to be asked in order to make the research 
meaningful, and that I do this in a way that makes it clear that my motivations are 
honourable and transparent.   
So, why did I choose the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a topic of research?  
And why does the research presented in this thesis focus only on Israelis?  I came to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via a rather circuitous route.  In the late 1990s, at a 
time when the anti-globalisation movement was emerging, I became interested in the 
dynamics of interactions between grassroots networks and powerful institutions.  
During this time I read about one such grassroots network—Women in Black—
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which had been formed by Jewish Israeli women who were actively opposed to the 
military occupation of Palestine, and which had expanded into other countries, 
including the UK.  In December 2001, during the second intifada, I travelled with 
London-based members of Women in Black to the West Bank to make a 
documentary film about their participation in non-violent direct action against the 
occupation.  I made further filming trips to Israel and the West Bank, travelling 
through Israel at a time when suicide bombings were common, and I was on the 
ground during the siege of Bethlehem, and in the aftermath of the attack on Jenin in 
2002.  
I came to realise that the questions I had about the nature of intergroup 
conflict in general, and of this conflict in particular, and of how such conflicts might 
eventually be overcome, were not going to be answered through documentary 
filmmaking. It was at this point that I entered academia as an undergraduate studying 
Social and Political Sciences.  Since that time I have conducted research among both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  The current research focuses only on Israelis for two 
reasons.  First, to conduct detailed analysis of how individuals from both societies 
experience and deal with moral dilemmas relating to the conflict is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  Therefore I needed to choose either Israelis or Palestinians for the 
present research.  I chose Israelis because, as the more powerful actor in this conflict 
Israel has, I would argue, more scope at present to alter the nature of relations 
between Israel and the Palestinians.  I am very aware that not all of the people I 
interviewed during the course of this research would agree with that assessment, but 
this is how I came to focus on moral judgment among Israelis for the current 
research.  I am fortunate to have both Israelis and Palestinians among my close 
friends.  I have no interest in mythologizing or demonising either community. 
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Moving beyond reflexivity relating to the personal to that of the structural, 
my role as both a product and a representative of the academy becomes evident in 
several ways.  First, I feel that my research is meaningful and of value, and that 
therefore it is reasonable that I should ask people to participate in my research as 
interviewees or in online experiments.  Is this assessment justified?  Given that the 
academy is funding the research, I have spent four years conducting the research, 
and numerous individuals have agreed to participate in the research, it would seem 
that the general consensus holds that the privileged position of the academy in the 
construction of knowledge is respected, or at least tolerated.  The fact that individual 
PhD researchers can travel the world in the pursuit of knowledge and find countless 
numbers of people willing to help them in their projects is testimony to a well-
established dynamic in which the authority of the academy is fairly widely accepted.  
That in many instances, including in my qualitative research, it is also acceptable for 
the research to be conducted in English even though this is not an official language 
of the country in which the research is being conducted, is further evidence of power 
dynamics in play. 
However, as the quantitative phase of my research involved running online 
experiments, it was possible to transcend my limited Hebrew language abilities by 
engaging translators to produce Hebrew versions of my research materials.  Using 
translators, no matter how talented and conscientious they may be, always entails 
relinquishing a certain amount of control on the part of the researcher.  But I was 
grateful that in this phase of the research I was able to avoid imposing my native 
language on the research participants.   
It would be naive, however, to assume that the researcher-participant 
relationship is a one-way street in terms of achieving goals.  It is possible for 
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individuals to gain all manner of benefits from participating in research projects.  For 
example, some are paid, some enjoy the chance to talk about themselves to an 
appreciative audience, and some find the opportunity to reflect on the topics covered 
in the research useful.  But it is also possible for participants to benefit in ways that 
challenge the perceived power dynamics of research.  At the end of their interviews, 
two of the right wing individuals I spoke with each stated that they had found the 
interview “good experience” for learning how to present their views of Israel and of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an international audience.  In a situation in which 
the battle for international public opinion is viewed as an integral element of the 
conflict, and university students are actively encouraged to engage in hasbara
12
, 
academic researchers may find themselves in an unexpectedly recursive power 
dynamic. 
Similarly, the requirement to communicate one’s research findings as 
particular types of product favoured by the academy involves power dynamics which 
can prove complex.  Much has been written about the impact of conveying 
ethnographic data through written text.  It has been argued that the bounded form of 
the text implies that the society represented within it is similarly a bounded whole 
(Marcus, 1998), and that authors are likely to create a false sense of order in an effort 
to produce the coherence that the textual form requires (Clifford, 1988).  In this way 
the very forms that research products take—textual, linear—effectively misrepresent 
the complexity of the subjects of research.  This is problematic.  But the 
requirements of academic publication culture can also produce a misleading version 
of the research process itself, particularly if that process has embraced 
                                                 
1212
 Hasbara is a term which can be translated as propaganda, or as clarification.  Since 2013 the 
Israeli government has offered scholarships to students for engaging in online hasbara, that is, for 
countering online information considered critical of Israel by providing alternative analyses (Ravid, 
2013). 
89 
 
epistemological pluralism.  Although this situation is changing, some academic 
journals still tend to favour publishing research that is presented as falling neatly into 
one epistemological/methodological camp or another, rather than as crossing 
disciplinary boundaries.  Although I consider one of the main strengths of the 
research presented in this thesis as the interplay between induction and deduction, 
between the idiographic and the nomothetic, in order to maximize my chances of 
getting the research published I will be isolating these processes within separate 
journal articles.  I am grateful to have had the chance, in this chapter, to engage with 
a more holistic discussion of the methodology and methods which contributed to this 
research.   
2.6 Conclusion 
Taking an epistemologically pluralist approach to my research design, I integrated 
qualitative research in the form of semi-structured interviews, and quantitative 
research in the form of online experiments.  In doing so, I employed methods 
favoured by both experimental and constructivist social psychologists. 
Although I approached the semi-structured interviews with research 
questions grounded in specific theories, I also remained open to “useful noise” in the 
form of themes relating to moral judgment which emerged from the interviews.  
Through an inductive approach to the interview data I identified evidence of what I 
hypothesized to be a cognitive bias not currently in the psychological literature, and 
designed online experiments to test for this.  Following analysis of the experimental 
data, which provided support for the cognitive bias hypothesis, I then applied this to 
further analysis of the qualitative data.  In this way, the research design travels from 
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the idiographic, to the nomothetic, and back again, with each phase of the research 
informing the design of the subsequent phase.  Without this integrated approach, the 
original contributions of the thesis relating to the identification of the proposed 
competence/morality cognitive bias, and the analysis of how this might affect 
perceptions of ingroup morality and outgroup competence within the context of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have been possible. 
This thesis is grounded in questions involving individuals’ perceptions of 
ingroup-outgroup identities pertinent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In the 
following chapter I use interpretative phenomenological analysis to gain insight into 
the meanings that the 40 Jewish Israeli interviewees attach to issues relating to these 
identities, to the nature of the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, and to prospects 
for peace. 
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3 “Us,” “Them,” and Hamatzav: an Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide insight into the complexities of how the 40 
Jewish Israeli interviewees perceive ingroup and outgroup identities relevant to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how they perceive the nature of the conflict itself and 
the prospects for peace.  I employ interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to 
examine points of convergence and divergence, within and between different ethnic 
and political groupings, regarding the meanings that individuals attach to events and 
experiences relating to these topics.  The use of interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) is appropriate for this task as IPA embraces an idiographic, 
phenomenological, and heuristic approach which prioritises individuals’ 
interpretations of their own particular, context-specific experiences.  This process 
has been referred to as a “double hermeneutic” as it involves the researcher 
interpreting the narratives produced by the interviewees who are, in turn, interpreting 
the meanings of their own experiences (Smith et al., 2009).   
I would add to this assessment of the interview process that participants may 
also be engaged in their own form of multiple hermeneutics: they may at times try to 
present their interpretations in a way that they think the researcher will approve of, in 
effect attempting pre-emptively to interpret the researcher’s interpretation of their 
interpretation.  When interviewing individuals about a topic as contentious and 
sensitive as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such efforts on the part of interviewees 
may indicate more than simple social desirability bias.  As described in Section 2.4, 
during the course of the interviews, two of the right wing interviewees stated that the 
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interviews had been “good experience” for learning how to present their 
interpretation of events to an international audience.  Although such strategies on the 
part of interviewees (and I am not suggesting that only right wing interviewees were 
motivated to try to make a “good” impression) may to some extent gloss their true 
feelings, their answers do provide insights into what they consider to be socially 
acceptable to outsiders.  As there were clear differences across the political spectrum 
in interviewees’ reported interpretations relating to the analytical themes, useful data 
was provided in spite of any such strategies. 
I begin this chapter with an analysis of the interviewees’ family histories, 
categorised by the primary ethnic groupings salient within Israeli society: Ashkenazi, 
Mizrahi/Sephardi, Russian/FSU, and Ethiopian, and discuss these in relation to the 
political affiliation of the interviewees.  See Figure 3.1 for a demographic breakdown 
of the interviewees’ ethnicity by political category.   
Figure 3.1: Political Category x Ethnicity 
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3.2 Perception of Identity: Family History 
I started the interviews by asking each person to relate how they or their 
family had come to live in Israel.  This question allowed space for the interviewees 
to engage with the meanings they construed from the interrelation of personal, 
family, and historical events.  Each interviewee is identified by a code indicating 
their political affiliation:  L1– L10 (left wing), CL1 – CL11 (centre left), CR1 – 
CR10 (centre right), and R1 – R9 (right wing). 
3.2.1 Ashkenazim (N=25)    (CL1 - CL6, CR1, CR3, L1, L3 - L10, 
R2 - R9) 
Not surprisingly, the spectre of the Holocaust looms large in the family histories 
described by all of the Ashkenazi interviewees, except for two whose families had 
been in Palestine before the rise of Nazism.   The degree of separation from these 
events varied depending on the age of the interviewees.  L1, born in Germany in the 
1920s, described his childhood experience of Kristallnacht and of how his father, a 
doctor, had his medical licence revoked because he was Jewish.  Other interviewees 
had parents or grandparents who had either escaped from Europe when they saw the 
writing on the wall, or who had survived concentration camps.  All but two the 
Ashkenazi interviewees had lost extended family members in the Holocaust.   
Across the political spectrum a theme emerged of individual family members 
who had tried to convince others that it was unsafe to remain in Europe, but who 
were not listened to, and who were thought to be unnecessarily alarmist or even 
deluded.  The sense, among interviewees describing these events, of these 
individuals having survived a near miss was palpable, as was the sense of frustration 
that others had not listened and had therefore perished.   
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My father’s father came to Israel, he was born in Germany.  And when Hitler 
took, the, how you say, took the government in 1932, he started to understand 
that something very bad is going to happen.  And then for about 6 months he 
was travelling in Germany trying to convince Jewish to run away from 
Germany.  And then 1934 he understood that no one, that everyone looks at 
him like a lunatic.  So he just left everything, he left his family and went to 
Israel. L10 
From my mum’s side, they were in Poland and belonged to a Hassidic sect.  
And they saw the writing on the wall so-called back in the 1920s or the late 
20s, 30s that there’s gonna be some problems for Jews.  So he tried to 
convince as many people, obviously.  They thought he was crazy to come to 
Israel, the swampland, nothing much happening here.  I mean there were 
people obviously coming from the 1900s, returned from the mid-1800s, but 
not in massive waves.  And they, because of that they saved my whole 
family. R4 
 Differences emerged between the political groups relating to the lessons 
learned from the Holocaust, with right wing interviewees stressing the importance of 
protecting the Jewish ingroup and expressing a belief in the ubiquity of anti-
Semitism.  For these interviewees, Jewish people would be identified and persecuted 
as Jews regardless of how they viewed their own identity or of how well-integrated 
they were within societies in which they were a minority group.  To think otherwise 
would be dangerously naïve.  They described the land of Israel as inextricably linked 
with the concept of security for the Jewish people: without a Jewish homeland which 
was able to provide a safe haven for Jewish people facing persecution from 
anywhere in the world, another Holocaust was highly probable, if not inevitable.  
Military service in defence of Israel was therefore the responsibility of all Jewish 
people. 
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I don’t care where you live, this is a Jewish army.  It’s finally after all these 
years…And I believe that every Jew at 18 has to come here, even if he 
doesn’t want to live here later”. R4 
[Israel] was founded to be a Jewish state, it was founded to be the safe haven 
for the Jewish people, and not coincidentally, in the Jewish homeland…as a 
Jew, anywhere in the world, in the United States, in England, in Iran, or in 
China, you know that whatever happens, anti-Semitism, you have a home in 
the state of Israel.  R9 
In contrast, left wing interviewees saw the lessons of the Holocaust as 
indicating the need to ensure universal human rights: their focus was on the need to 
protect all people in vulnerable situations, not only Jewish people.  This difference 
was most acutely demonstrated by L1, who described how, as a 17-year old high 
school student, when news broke of the Kurds being gassed by Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, he expected to be taken out of high school early to serve in an IDF task force 
sent to rescue the Kurds.  He laughs now at how naïve he was at the time to believe 
this, and described a process by which he gradually came to understand that the 
Israelis were no more likely to act selflessly in the face of the suffering of others than 
any other nation, in spite of the experience of the Holocaust.   
For left wing interviewees, the right wing’s strategy of circling the wagons re 
the Jewish ingroup, and of prioritising their own desire for a Jewish homeland at the 
expense of the rights and desires of the Palestinian Arabs living in the region, took 
the “wrong” lesson from the Holocaust and put Jewish people—both within Israel 
and abroad—at greater risk of anti-Semitism and attack.  The difference in attitudes 
between the risks and benefits of “groupishness” between the left wing and right 
wing were very clear in this regard. 
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3.2.2 “Russians” from former Soviet Union countries (N=6) (CL7, 
CR5 - CR8, CR10) 
While the Ashkenazi interviewees were represented across the political spectrum, the 
six interviewees in this study from countries from the former Soviet Union (FSU), 
commonly referred to in Israel as “Russians,” were all political centrists.  Data from 
the 2003 and 2009 Israeli national elections indicates that, within the population as a 
whole, Israelis from the former Soviet Union largely support centre right and right 
wing political parties (Arian & Shamir, 2003: Philippov & Knafelman, 2011).  
Immigrants from the former Soviet Union were allowed into Israel according to the 
Law of Return, which allows individuals with Jewish ancestry, or who have a Jewish 
spouse, to become citizens of Israel.  However, these criteria are different from 
halakhic rules (based on the Torah) which state that to be Jewish an individual must 
either be the child of a Jewish mother, or have undergone an Orthodox Jewish 
conversion process.  Therefore, the Jewishness of many of the FSU immigrants has 
been called into question (e.g., Kravel-Tovi, 2012; Maltz, 2014). 
The FSU interviewees had all come to Israel as children, brought by their 
parents following the break-up of the Soviet Union.  Prior to this event, emigration 
from the USSR was extremely difficult if not impossible, and interviewees described 
their parents taking the “opportunity” to emigrate based on a combination of 
financial incentives, for example, the search for a better quality of life, as well as in 
response to varying levels of anti-Semitism.  
And how we came to live here? Because of financial aspects, not because of 
Zionism or something, for my parents at least, not because of Zionism or 
something like this.  Mostly from financial aspects, and a little bit for anti-
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Semitic aspects there.  But the most aspect was, the heaviest aspect was the 
financial. CR8 
I think it was, there were 2 parts.  One of it was a better, the Soviet Union in 
the 90s started to fell apart and the things were very bad.  So they came to 
Israel to upgrade their situation. CR5 
They all described themselves as secular, and they expressed no strong 
ideological connection with the land of Israel.  But those from the centre right were 
concerned about the security implications of dismantling the settlements in the West 
Bank.  They expressed views about the land of Israel that were more pragmatic than 
emotional. 
Without the West Bank, the strip, the beach strip is very thin.  And having 
regular Arab armies on the border, they can cut Israel to half.  They can fire 
rockets to Tel Aviv even in the centre.  It’s unacceptable.  You have to have 
the border farther.  Is term of defendable borders, there is such a term?  
Defensible. CR7 
Some of the FSU interviewees, such as CL7 from Moldova, had family 
members who had survived the Nazi concentration camps, while others described 
persecution by the Soviets.  CR10 described a growing sense of nationalism within 
former Soviet states such as Lithuania, where he was born, and a fear that this 
nationalism would result in greater antagonism towards the Jewish population.   
A strong theme running through the FSU stories of emigration was that of 
“get out while you can,” which in some ways echoes the theme found in Ashkenazi 
reports of the tragedy that ensued for family members who did not leave Europe in 
time, but also reflects a sense that the political situation in their home countries was 
volatile enough that the policies towards emigration might change at any time. 
98 
 
Well, up until a certain time in the Soviet Union you couldn’t really decide 
that you can leave, so I think they use the, once it was possible they took a 
chance to leave. CR10 
But by far, the strongest motivating force as described by the interviewees 
was that of the opportunity to benefit financially from emigration to a country seen 
both as economically more stable, and providing more opportunities for Jewish 
people, than those of the former Soviet Union.  For these interviewees, Israel offered 
the opportunity to work hard and to make a better life for themselves. 
3.2.3 Ethiopians (Beta Israel) (N=4) (CL9 - CL11, CR9) 
The secular, largely financial, emigration incentives described by the FSU 
interviewees could not be more different from the motivations for making aliyah
13
 of 
the families of the Ethiopian interviewees.  Like the FSUs, this group of interviewees 
were also all political centrists, and the wider Beta Israel population has tended to 
vote for centre right and right wing parties (Yemini-Anteby, 2005).  Also like the 
FSUs, their Jewishness has been called into question (Schwarz, 2001), but their 
collective history is very different. 
All of the Ethiopian interviewees came from religious families who felt 
strongly that, because they were Jewish, they belonged in the land of Israel.  
Although none of these interviewees related any personal stories of discrimination in 
Ethiopia due to their religion, they described a group of people who were very aware 
of being a minority group within a largely Christian population.   
                                                 
13
 Aliyah (in Hebrew, “ascent”) is the term used to describe Jewish people immigrating into Israel. 
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We are Jewish and we always dreamed to come to Israel.  In Ethiopia from 
your first day in the world you hear about Jerusalem, Israel.  Our dream is to 
come to Israel and to be in one place with all Jewish nation. CL9  
 CR9, who was born in Israel after her parents made aliyah, describes how her 
family had always dreamed of going to Jerusalem, and were prepared to walk there, 
but were ignorant of the distance and dangers involved in making such a trip.   
They don’t know to make the operation.  They just thought if they go and go 
and go it will be ok...They was believing that God will be always with them.  
And it will be ok because God want them to come to Jerusalem.  CR9 
She described how her family, in a group with other families, spent eight months 
walking through the desert in their quest to reach the Jewish homeland.  Inadequate 
supplies of food and water, and the presence of disease led to the deaths of many in 
the group, including three of CR9’s siblings.  Although her father will sometimes 
talk about this journey, her mother finds it too upsetting. 
 CL11’s experience of the journey across the desert was first-hand, as he and a 
group of friends made the crossing when he was 16.  He describes how one of his 
friends was shot and killed by the Sudanese military as they were crossing through 
Sudan, and echoes CR9’s descriptions of hunger, thirst, and disease.  His gratitude 
towards the State of Israel for providing him with the opportunity to live in a 
developed country, to attend university, and to attain a high status position within 
Israeli society through his work, concurs with other Ethiopian interviewees’ sense of 
gratitude and good fortune at having the chance to live in Israel. 
I was given everything by the Jewish Agency and the Youth Aliyah.  And 
then I do go to study a BA in Social Work and then I become independent. 
CL11 
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I can say that it’s not easy, but my parents feel very blessed to be here.  And 
my grandmother is living with us and she’s, she’s always grateful for being 
here and not there.  Because they thought about Ethiopia as temporary.  Not 
their land.  CL10 
 Such feelings were expressed by all of these interviewees, regardless of 
whether or not they identified as religious: the hardships endured by either 
themselves or their parents, both while living in unmodernised communities in 
Ethiopia, and during the exodus to Israel, stand in sharp contrast to the lives they 
currently lead, and the reality of this contrast is particularly salient for this group, 
making them very loyal to the state. 
3.2.4 Mizrahi/Sephardi/Mixed (N=5) (CL8, CR2, CR4, L2, R1) 
Although they have distinct histories, with Mizrahim originating from Jewish 
communities within Muslim majority countries in the Middle East, and Sephardim 
descended from Jewish communities who lived in the Iberian Peninsula until the 15
th
 
century, the two groups are frequently conflated in mainstream Israeli narratives, and 
the terms are often treated as synonymous.  The salient aspect of these ethnic groups 
in terms of mainstream Israeli discourse, is their ‘otherness’ from the Ashkenazim 
and their perceived ethnic and cultural similarity to Arabs (Khazzoom, 2003; Shabi, 
2008).  Khazzoom (2003) argues that, over the last two centuries, Ashkenazi Jews in 
Europe had embraced westernisation as a form of self-improvement, and 
subsequently felt threatened by aspects of traditional Jewish life which they 
perceived in negative terms as “oriental” and unmodern.   In order to distance 
themselves from their “oriental” history, they drew distinctions between themselves 
and the Mizrahi and Sephardi Jewish communities.  Today the Mizrahim and 
Sephardim have a lower social and economic status than the Ashkenazim (Yiftachel, 
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2000), and although among this study’s interviewees they are represented across the 
political spectrum, in the wider population they have tended to support nationalistic 
centre right and right wing political parties (Zanotti, 2013). 
All right, so the Sephardi Jews, I personally think that a lot of their culture is 
very fundamental and not progressive enough.  And I can even see this in my 
wife’s mother, for example, who’s from Iraqi descent.  And you see the 
difference between how she thinks and how my parents think.  CR1 
(Ashkenazi) 
The lower position on the ethnic hierarchy of these groups was keenly felt by 
R1, who explicitly distanced himself from his Sephardi heritage, stating not only that 
he identified as Israeli rather than Sephardi, but also emphasising that his Sephardi 
roots “certainly do not come out in my personality.”  R1 had emigrated from 
Australia, and focused on this rather than discussing how and when his family had 
migrated from Spain to Australia.  His own personal motivations for emigrating to 
Israel were rooted in Zionist ideology.  Like the right wing Ashkenazi interviewees, 
R1 described the land of Israel as the destiny of the Jewish people, the place where 
Jews belonged, and the place where the Jewish identity was being “fermented.”  He 
advocated the view of Israel as a melting pot, in which ethnic differences disappear 
in an overarching Jewish identity. 
In contrast, CR2 was comfortable with his Sephardi and Mizrahi roots.  He 
described his mother’s family as having come to Israel from Spain in 1492 as “part 
of the banishment,” and his father’s family as having come from Egypt when, 
following the announcement of the formation of the State of Israel, riots broke out in 
protest.  He described the financial losses suffered by the Egyptian side of his family, 
who went from being wealthy bankers to working in a variety of jobs that were less 
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well-paid, but which allowed them to support the family and contribute to nation-
building.  As with many interviewees from across the political spectrum, CR2 had a 
strong sense of the link between his family’s history and the history of the nation.   
…growing up here makes you part of the wider national story. . .  you grow 
up with all the war stories and the army mythologies and whatever.  So it 
makes you feel part of Israel.  Very much like a part of it.  CR2 
Although Mizrahi Jews also faced instances of historical persecution and 
expulsion, none of the interviewees gave indications of having an emotional 
involvement with this history anywhere near the level described by Ashkenazi 
Israelis in relation to European persecutions of Jews.  Indeed, L10, himself 
Ashkenazi, asserted that the history of the Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews was not widely 
spoken of in Israel.  His feeling was that this was partly due to “the western world” 
not having as much engagement with countries such as Egypt as it has with 
Germany, and that the European population of Israel therefore was less interested in 
this aspect of history.  But he also suggested that the character of the Mizrahi Jews 
was different from that of European Jews in that the Mizrahim were more “joyful” 
by nature and were able to put the persecutions of the past behind them and to focus 
on living in the here and now.  A sense of significant cultural differences between 
Jewish Israelis of different ethnic and national backgrounds was a common theme 
arising from the interviews.  This contributed to the complexities inherent in the 
concept of a “Jewish identity.” 
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3.3 Perception of Collective Ingroup Identity: What makes 
someone Jewish? 
3.3.1 Left wing (N=10) 
All of the political groups described shared history and shared culture as important 
elements of what makes someone (feel) Jewish.  These commonalities were 
reinforced through practice in everyday life, through speaking Hebrew, celebrating 
traditional holidays, acknowledging historical events through public ceremonies, and 
for most, through military service.  However, there were also clear differences across 
the political spectrum regarding what it meant to be Jewish, with concepts relating to 
social construction of identity more prevalent among the left wing, and with more 
emphasis on religion, strong group ties, and genetics coming to the fore as one 
moved towards the right politically (see Figure 3.2).   
Figure 3.2: Jewish Identity 
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The “melting pot” analogy commonly used in Israeli mainstream narratives 
to describe the Jewish population of Israel in terms of one unified group tended to be 
rejected by left wing interviewees.  L5 acknowledged the differences in 
historical/cultural circumstances of the different Jewish ethnic groups.  
 You could ask a more difficult question, you could ask is there a difference 
between a Yemenite Jew and a Jew from Eastern Europe?  Are they the same 
thing?  So, from that perspective maybe I can only consider myself an 
Eastern European Jew and not just a Jew, you know, something more 
specific. L5   
In this way, L5 acknowledges the plurality of identities of Jewish Israelis, rather than 
foregrounding a common, unifying concept of Jewishness.   
Left wing interviewees were not comfortable with a national/religious 
narrative of Jewishness that they perceived to be grounded in ethnicity and blood ties 
and which systematically privileged those considered Jewish over, for instance, 
Palestinian citizens of Israel.  The tensions inherent in the description of the State of 
Israel as a “Jewish democracy” were problematic for this group, and some described 
such a definition as being at odds with what they saw as Jewish values.   
So I like the tradition, the ideas, the good ideas of the Jewish tradition, and 
there were a lot of moral ideas.  You can find a lot of good things.  If we 
didn’t occupy the Territories everything was different. L4 
They also had a consistently cynical perception of the State as employing a 
flexible definition of Jewishness when it came to allowing certain groups to 
immigrate to Israel in order to serve in the IDF.   
So I really think it doesn’t have to do with any religious, obviously there’s 
religious things there on a different level, but we’re talking security ones, 
how the IDF is looking at it, so either you’re an Arab or you’re a Jew, and if 
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you’re Russian then you’re a Jew.  It really doesn’t matter if you’re a goy14.  
L8 
The left wing’s frustration with what they saw as unethical government 
policies based on ethnicity and religion had resulted in several of the interviewees 
distancing themselves from identifying strongly as Jewish, and they resented having 
Jewishness deemed a salient part of their identity by others.  
 I had a few years where I did a lot of deep research into ethical issues in 
Judaism, and the conclusions that I came to were a little bit radical.  And 
today I hold the position that orthodox Judaism is a racist religion.  It’s 
derogatory for women, for homosexuals, for non-Jews, for non-religious 
Jews at its core.  And because in Israel we don’t really have—I’m an 
atheist—we also don’t have a religious plurality here, so it’s basically 
orthodox or nothing.  Even the secular Jews in Israel here are orthodox.  So, I 
just don’t affiliate with Judaism.  I deny the right of other people to decide 
for me what my religion is or what my identity is. L6  
It’s not my first identification.  I guess I am Jewish, but it doesn’t, it doesn’t, 
it doesn’t matter much for me. L2 
But there was also recognition that, regardless of what an individual Jewish 
Israeli citizen might feel about being identified as Jewish, this identity was highly 
salient with regard to how they were treated by Israeli society: even individualists 
have to recognise that they live within groups.   
Society makes me Jewish.  The first part of it is that is what I’m seen as from 
the outside.  That is my role here.  And it is important to say that people in this 
country have a role.  And being Jewish means that I am part of the Occupying 
power, I am privileged by definition, and so I can’t say that I’m not Jewish 
because I don’t feel like it.  It doesn’t matter.  I get treated as one.  L7 
                                                 
14
 Goy is a term meaning a person who is not Jewish.   
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3.3.2 Centre Left (N=11)  
Like the left wing interviewees, those from the centre left also cited a shared history 
and culture as key to their sense of Jewish identity, and many of them also indicated 
that identity was at least partly a social construct imposed by others.  Also similar to 
the left wing, some of the centre left interviewees also described having no strong 
sense of Jewish identity, but this group introduced the concept of feeling more Israeli 
than Jewish.   
I guess I’m sort of an atheist, ok?  I’m not that, I’m much more Israeli than I 
am Jew.  I am Jewish, technically.  I observe Jewish holidays.  We celebrate 
Passover and Hanukah, and I will probably do that with my children as well.  
And teach them Jewish history and tradition, but being Israeli means a lot 
more to me than being Jewish. CL1 
Um, for me it’s more a national thing than a religious thing, but I think most 
of the people would not agree with that.  It’s also a religious thing, but in this 
time, in the 21st century, it’s more national. CL8 
The concepts of citizenship and democracy hold great importance for this 
group, so it is not surprising to find that many of them prioritise a national element 
of identity.  However, some of the centre left interviewees can be seen as distanced 
from their more left wing compatriots through their embracing of religious traditions 
as integral to Jewish identity, even for those who are not religiously observant.  
I keep a kosher home, but as long as it doesn’t get back to my parents, I don’t 
keep kosher.  But my house is kosher.  I’m getting married in October but it’s 
(pause) I grew up in a conservative house, so tradition’s very important to 
me.  It’s important to me to marry someone Jewish, it’s important to me to do 
something for the holidays.  But do I go to the synagogue?  Not necessarily.  
But I do the meals, it’s a key part of who I (pause) do I feel like I have a 
connection with Jews across the world? Yeah.  CL5 
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A sense of Jewish cultural solidarity was described as persisting even 
between interviewees with very different cultural backgrounds: the deeper cultural 
connection stretching back to biblical days held more sway than the cultural 
differences experienced by individual Jews from different countries. 
I mean somebody who’s Ethiopian, on the one hand you can say we have 
different ethnicities.  On the other hand, we have a shared, we have parts of 
our collective memory are the same, parts of our practices are the same.  And 
other parts are very different.  But just because two people look alike doesn’t 
mean they think alike.  I have, you know, somebody who’s Moroccan or 
whatever background, there’s things that I’m going to have a lot more in 
common with him than I’m gonna have with my Irish Catholic friend that I 
grew up with at home. CL5 (originally from the USA) 
This perception of “collective memory” indicates a strong sense of “the 
group” which transcends individual experience and allows for a fixedness in the 
concept of group identity which can become conflated with biological difference. 
You know, biologically you cannot convert yourself to either direction.  It’s 
happy that people that are not biologically part of this chain want to become 
part.  I do not think or will say that they are no less good, worse from us in 
any aspect.  But there is difference.  The biological difference.  Yeah. CL3   
A perceived biological difference between Jews and non-Jews and converts 
was described either in terms of ethnicity or of genetics by all groups apart from the 
left wing.  Particularly for the centrists, there was often a conflation between culture 
and ethnicity when describing salient points of identity.  In this way, their concept of 
Jewish identity wavered between social construct and innate uniqueness.  Indeed, 
some of the centre left interviewees explicitly referred to ethnic and cultural 
differences creating what they saw as insurmountable gulfs between people.  These 
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differences became salient when describing their sense of connection with people 
who convert to Judaism. 
I guess it [conversion] works to a certain extent.  I think the basic thing is for 
me of feeling, I don’t know, close to someone, in a, in that aspect of he’s 
Jewish and I’m Jewish.  For someone that wasn’t born Jewish or wasn’t born 
into this culture, it’s less.  I would feel less close to him.  CL4 
3.3.3 Centre Right (N=10) 
The concept of Jewish identity was problematic for some Ethiopian and FSU 
interviewees, whose religious identity has been called into question within Israel. For 
these interviewees there was a tendency to prioritise a concept of Israeli identity over 
Jewish religious identity.  
[Re Ethiopians being required to convert to Judaism] This is a process that 
my community have to do… I don’t agree about it.  Because in Ethiopia 
everyone is, everyone consider themselves as Jewish.  CL10 (secular 
Ethiopian) 
I think I’d rather be Israeli than Jewish because I know that I gave my time to 
the IDF, I do my time after the 3 years, I pay my taxes, I go to the university, 
so as far as I’m concerned, I’m Israeli.  The Jewish is a bonus, it’s not really 
something that I have to be.  To be proper Jew you have to be Jewish on your 
mother’s side.  So you’re like not authentic Jew.  So I won’t look, I really 
don’t want to look at myself as not authentic Jew, I look myself as [authentic] 
Israeli. 
CR5  (Russian/FSU) 
  The FSU Israelis described a shared a history of persecution based on Jewish 
ethnicity.  For them, whether or not they were religious was beside the point: 
Jewishness—and the need for a Jewish state—was not a matter of choice. 
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In terms of ethnic group only for me.  All the other stuff, religion stuff, ok, 
it’s maybe a little bit tradition and stuff, but for me, it’s first and before 
everything else, it’s your ethnic group.  And people in other places in the 
world dislike you or hate you because of your ethnic group, so yeah, it’s 
important that you will have a Jewish state in the ethnic term. CR6  
(Russian/FSU) 
 For the centre right interviewees, the concept of “the group” was very strong.  
There was an acceptance that they, as individuals, would always be identified and 
treated as Jews by the rest of the world.  The idea that loyalty to one’s group is 
inherently good surfaced many times throughout these interviews. 
I’m not religious Jewish whatsoever, but I still like to marry Jew and not non-
Jew for example.  Because it’s important to me that my children will be Jew.  
CR4 
I’m a Jewish person.  It’s part of my group, that’s the group I belong to.  
That’s enough. CR3 
The topic of conversion to Judaism frequently muddied otherwise coherent 
arguments by secular interviewees of what constitutes Jewish identity: one can 
“become” Jewish through religious conversion. 
I had an atheist girlfriend . . . And I remember it was very hard for me when 
she used to say that Jewish people, like it’s just religion.  Because I wanted to 
say that it’s not just religion. It’s something more, it’s like a shared history, a 
shared culture.  And then she would argue that, yeah but then you just accept 
other people, like everybody can become Jewish if he just does the right 
ritual.  So, I don’t know.  It’s hard for me to draw the line.  CR10 
And interestingly, while advocating the benefits of group solidarity CR10 
also introduced the concept of Jewish moral superiority while simultaneously 
maintaining a sense of cultural relativism. 
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Judaism is like a dynamic experience that can change over time and over 
years, and it’s more… And also it has some kind of a moral supremacy, 
which I don’t necessarily think is a bad thing.  I just think that supremacy has 
to be something that each party has for his own faith and for his own people.  
I think everybody should feel like they’re the chosen people.  And everybody 
should kind of make their decisions based on the fact that everybody else also 
thinks they’re the chosen people.  CR10 
This acceptance that individuals, regardless of which ethnic group they identify with, 
will generally have a strong sense of group solidarity was a common theme 
throughout the centre right interviews. 
3.3.4 Right Wing (N=9) 
For the right wing, the sense of group solidarity remained very strong, but there was 
no corresponding sense of moral relativism.  For these interviewees the Jewish 
people have been charged by God with a unique role in history, and this remains true 
whether or not individual Jews choose to recognise this.  This was clearly spelled out 
by R3 when discussing left wing conscientious objectors. 
I believe that this Jewish nation is really differentiated from other nations in 
the notion that the national identity of Jews ever connected to a destiny.  
Okay?  It was, I mean it was from the very beginning of the Jewish nation.  
And I think, I’m sure, I mean, I can see that, when people are uncertain about 
their national destiny, if they don’t want to take part in things that seems rude 
to them, seems against justice, this is it.  So I think the origin of this 
weakness that the army is less and less within the consensus, I think that the 
origin of it is in a very high, very good place.  Very moral place.  Although I 
definitely disagree with them, but I understand the origin. R3 
“National destiny” formed the basis of the right wing interviewees’ 
understanding of their relationship with the land of Israel.  As they believed that the 
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land was given to the Jewish people by God, it necessarily formed an important part 
of their identity as Jews. 
I think that the land and the Bible are kind of connected, meaning that 
without Israel there’s just a lot of commandments that you can only fulfil 
within Israel.  There’s something inherently spiritual within the land.  
Obviously, it sounds crazy now that I’m saying it out loud, but religion is 
crazy.  Obviously, it’s not rational.  So, yeah, in order to be the best Jew you 
can be, you have to fulfil the most commandments and the optimal is by 
living in Israel and by being in our holy places, not just Tel Aviv and 
Beersheva and those things.  I think they go hand in hand, basically, that 
there’s not one without the other. R7   
The bond with the land was sometimes described in highly emotional terms. 
When we went to the Western Wall, the Wailing Wall for the first time, 
which was on the first day, I was in awe.  I literally couldn’t get my prayers 
out, I was just speechless.  Because I felt something, an emotion I’d never 
felt before of awe.  After that, every time I came back I just felt more and 
more like I belonged.  And even though I didn’t know which street connected 
to which street, or even the name of the street that I was standing on, I just 
felt at home.  And that’s something that I can’t describe.  And I feel at home 
in my parents’ home, but this is a different kind of home.  And I feel that this 
is a national home. R8 
For these interviewees, the Jewish nation was understood not only in terms of 
shared history and religious destiny, but also in terms of genetics.  Indeed, R1 spoke 
of genetics and morality in the same breath. 
I just think that it’s somehow in the genetics of the Jewish people.  A strong 
sense of right and wrong. . . I think that people generally are, you know, will 
always, you know, are level-headed, or reach out to the underdog, or are 
careful, you know.  It’s hard to finger.  I think it’s the genetics of the Jewish 
people, in a sense.  Without trying to sound superior or anything. R1   
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But it was Judaism itself which formed the backbone of Jewish identity for 
the right wing.   
Without the Torah there’d be no Judaism, there’d be no Israel, there’d be 
nothing.  R4  
These interviewees accepted the halachic definition of Jewishness, by which a 
person is Jewish if their mother is Jewish, or if they go through a process of religious 
conversion to Orthodox Judaism.  Although they valued the shared culture and 
history of the Jewish people, it was religion that gave the culture and history 
meaning, and religion was not clearly differentiated from the biological. 
It is by birth, it’s definitely by birth.  It’s not “a culture” because we’re all 
over the place and we’re different. R5   
Judaism is handed down by the mother.  Now you can go into why, why, 
why is it that way, and that’s another (pause) but there is a basic reason, a 
genetic reason.  And the genetic reason is very simple.  You know who the 
father is, I mean you know who the mother is, you don’t know who the father 
is.  So if you wanna be sure of something, so you can say, for a matriarchal 
from a religious standpoint, if I know the mother is Jewish, at least I know 
the child is Jewish.  If you say the father is Jewish, I don’t know.  Maybe yes, 
maybe no. R2 
So, from a technical specification it has to be the mother is Jewish or a person 
who converts.  However, someone who is born Jewish is Jewish whether they 
are, they themselves are observant or not is irrelevant. 
Q: So they remain Jewish no matter what. 
A: Absolutely. R1   
This understanding of Jewishness as innate and impervious to change was a far 
cry from the perception of Jewish identity as largely socially constructed which the 
left wing espoused.  Differences between the political groups regarding fixed or fluid 
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concepts of ingroup identity were also echoed in their descriptions of Palestinians as 
a perceived outgroup. 
3.4 Perception of Identity: Attitudes towards Palestinians 
3.4.1 Right Wing (N=9) 
For most of the interviewees, apart from those from the left wing who had become 
involved in joint Palestinian-Israeli activism projects, and CL4 whose mother had 
arranged for him to visit a Palestinian family when he was a teenager, the only times 
they met Palestinians from the Territories or Palestinian citizens of Israel were 
during military interactions (e.g. at checkpoints), or as low-paid workers.  
Opportunities to meet Palestinians as social equals were few and far between, and 
tended to involve programmes specifically designed to encourage interaction, such 
as conflict resolution conferences. 
The unequal nature of most Jewish/Arab personal interactions was reflected 
in right wing attitudes towards Palestinians.  These were consistently negative—even 
when the interviewees were clearly trying not to sound negative—and involved 
perceptions of Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims
15
 as childlike, cowardly, deceitful, 
aggressive, and of having a “different morality” from Jewish Israelis.  Given the 
deterministic correlation between group identity and morality expressed by right 
wing interviewees in relation to Jewish people, it is unsurprising that this also 
surfaced in their perceptions of Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims. 
I think there is something different in the genetics of the Arab people.  I think 
they’re very much educated on the weakest.  If you show a sign of weakness 
then you will be destroyed.  I think it’s part of, maybe, maybe, I don’t know, 
                                                 
15
  I have grouped these three identities together, even though they refer to nationality, ethnicity, and 
religion respectively, because the terms were often used interchangeably during the interviews: the 
concepts of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim were frequently conflated. 
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maybe it’s part of Bedouin mentality of what it used to be to live in this 
environment.  It’s certainly the way Arab countries interact in their own 
regional scene.  You can observe that any sign of weakness is translated as 
the ability to take advantage of that.  So, unfortunately, I think they’re very 
much dominated by fear and aggression. R1 
It’s hard to be ethical and moral when the other side is not. . . I think their 
extremes, they’ll do anything at any cost, which means targeting, you know, 
innocent people, which I think we would never, I know me personally I 
would never do, and I think 99% of the people here would never do that. R7 
 Although R7 described Palestinians as inherently lacking in morality, he also 
felt that Palestinian anger towards Jewish Israelis was understandable.  He describes 
the concept of inter-group conflict as normal and hostility on the part of Palestinians 
as to be expected. 
It makes total sense.  I mean if I was, if we were in their place, if any normal 
person was in their place (pause) obviously, except we wouldn’t do suicide 
bombs and wouldn’t kill civilians.  But it’s perfectly understandable to think 
that a regular Palestinian would think that we stole their land and they should 
do everything they can to take it back from us.  It’s normal. R7 
 This reflects an acceptance of intractable conflict between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians and Arabs which the right wing perceived as self-evident.  But again and 
again they described, with some dismay, an international community which did not 
fully appreciate the danger posed by Muslim extremists. 
Now, for example, in Pakistan, which is an all Muslim country, every year 
they have well over 200-300 bombs.  Every single year.  Which are the ones 
that are defused, outside of the ones that go off.  And it’s a Muslim majority 
country, where there’s an alternate minority of Christians and one or two 
surviving Jews, who either call themselves Christian or Muslim to hide 
themselves.  So I think the hatred in the Muslim world is of a different ilk.  
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Whereas you had Baruch Goldstein
16
 in the double cave, and you had the one 
other person labelled recently the Jewish terrorist, I can’t think of his name, 
who committed 5 different acts of bombings or attempts of terrorism.  But 
those are 2 cases.  Those are not 200-500 bombs a year in one country.  
Those are not thousands of cases. R8 
I don’t think the world has really grasped what’s going on with the Muslim 
population.  I don’t want to, I don’t want to, like, generalise, but there’s a 
problem today.  There is a problem.  Of extremists, and the extremists are 
doing crazy things.  And the extremist is not just the extreme.  It’s like, you 
know, I remember hearing in security briefings in the army a long time ago.  
And there was, you know, there’s suicide bombers just lined up.  It’s not only 
one or two.  There’s hundreds.  There’s hundreds of people, you know, 
waiting to go.  And people you don’t hear about being caught. You know, 
with bombs strapped to themselves.  Women and children and God knows. 
R4 
 The frustration expressed by interviewees such as R4 clearly echoed the 
frustration described by Ashkenazi Israelis when recounting family histories in 
which one of their ancestors tried in vain to convince other European Jews of the 
danger posed by Nazism.  For the right wing, the world, including many of their 
fellow Jews, was turning a blind eye to an unpalatable but unmistakable truth: in 
their view Arabs were never going to be anything other than enemies of the Jews. 
Plenty of them call for the extinction of all Jews.  Whether they would 
actually be the ones to do it is a different story.  But a lot of them believe that 
in their hearts.  That Jews either don’t deserve to live, or definitely don’t 
deserve to live in the land of Israel. R8 
Why nobody asks them [Palestinian citizens of Israel] to serve in the army?  
Why is they not serving with me within the same tank?  Let’s ask ourself. . . I 
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 Baruch Goldstein was an American-born right wing Israeli extremist who opened fire with an 
automatic rifle on Muslim worshipers in the Ibrahimi Mosque in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron 
on 25 Feburary 1994.  He killed 29 people and injured 125 before being overpowered and beaten to 
death by survivors of the attack. 
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think that the answer is obvious.  But not everybody wants to talk about it.  
Because they’re enemies.  That simple, because no one in Israel, not even the 
most left-hand [left-wing] people, they will not agree to give them tank in the 
hand.  And if I go to the battle tomorrow against Syria I cannot be sure that 
they will not turn around the barrel against me. R3 
 Along with the theme of Arabs as eternal enemies, ran the theme of Arabs as 
childlike, governed by emotions to their own detriment, and of being better off under 
Israeli control. 
Even when we pulled out of the Gaza Strip, we left everything for them and 
they turned it into training camps for their terrorists
17
.  We left it to them for 
agriculture.  We said, here, we were exporting agriculture to Europe.  We’ll 
leave it for you.  So they came in in their hatred and just completely 
destroyed it. R2 
Indeed, R4 argued that many Palestinians wanted Jewish Israelis to be in charge, as 
their quality of life was better under the Israelis. 
I get people working in my fields, I mean the whole Judea and Sameria was 
built by Arabs.  It’s almost absurd to think about it in one way, because they 
want to live.  There are people out there, they want [us to remain in] our role.  
They want us to be here because they know, you know, go interview people 
in Gaza.  In Gaza today, I don’t know how good it is there.  I think they’re 
begging for us to come back.  No joke.  I wouldn’t be surprised.  And I’m not 
surprised and I’ve heard it before.  It’s a pity. R4 
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 The fate of the agricultural infrastructure of the Israeli settlements in Gaza has 
been the subject of debate.  The interpretation put forward by R2 is widely heard 
within Israel.  However, there has also been research which contends that during the 
disengagement most of the usable infrastructure was destroyed by the settlers or the 
military (e.g., Butler, 2009).  Other analysis argues that greenhouses left intact were 
of little use to the Palestinians as, due to Israeli restrictions on travel and movement 
of goods, the Palestinians were unable to export 60% of what they were already 
growing: more infrastructure would not solve this problem (Zelnick, 2006).    
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Although these interviewees tended to be very clear about differences 
between Jews and Arabs in general, they were careful not to imply that the 
Palestinians had—or even wanted— a distinct national identity.  To do so would risk 
giving legitimacy to the idea of a two-state solution. 
When you have somebody from Ramallah and somebody from Chen and 
somebody from Hebron, they will not marry, because they’re all from 
different tribes.  So a girl from Hebron will not marry, be able to marry a boy 
from Chen, because the family will say that’s an outsider girl.  They’re not 
allowed to marry them because they come from a different tribe.  That’s how 
it is now…They want the Jews out, but they don’t want a Palestinian identity.  
They want the Jews out and then let’s fight it out to the death to see who’s 
gonna be this new Palestinian nation. R8 
 In an interesting variation on the theme of Arabs as eternal enemies, R3 was 
adamant that the presence of the Palestinians was necessary for Jewish Israelis to 
understand their own identity: for him, the Palestinians/Arabs existed solely in order 
to serve this purpose. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in the Bible.  [laughs] Actually, it’s not a 
matter of a few tens years.  Um, according to the Jewish religion, basically 
everything this, in this world has a target, has a goal that God gave it.  
Everything.  Everybody.  Every creature.  Every man.  And in my view, the 
role of the Arabs is different from the role of other nations that were, um, 
engaged with the Jewish people. . . I think that they have a role to cause us, to 
force us as Jewish nation to get to the point where we crystallise our identity, 
and through this identity we’ll really deeply understand our connection to this 
land.  So, I think that the question is not me against him, the question is who 
am I?  And I think that this actually takes us to the first, or one of the first 
questions that you asked me: what is my Jewish identity.  So I think that this 
Israeli-Palestine conflict is just a story.  It’s a kind of theatre, but the real 
question is, who am I as a Jew? R3 
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Throughout the interviews, the right wing participants described perceived 
differences between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs as innate.  These perceived 
differences were presented as incontrovertible facts which indicated that the 
Palestinians were unsuited to governing themselves, and could therefore never 
constitute a reliable “partner for peace.”   
3.4.2 Centre Right (N=10) 
Whereas the right wing’s perceptions of Jewish identity was consistent in contrasting 
the perceived Jewish ingroup as inherently different from the perceived Palestinian/ 
Arab/Muslim outgroup, the same could not be said of the centre right.  Within this 
group—and sometimes at different times by the same people—differing perceptions 
of Arabs were described.  CR7’s and CR1’s views of Arab mentality, for example, 
would have seemed right at home with those of the right wing interviewees. 
We have totally different mind states than they are, and totally different 
culture, and I think most of the conflict is not about land or something like 
this.  It’s like clash of cultures.  We don’t think alike, I think.  I don’t know if 
they value knowledge and stuff like this. CR7 
There is this unwillingness to understand that the other side doesn’t think the 
same way that we do.  So there’s a huge psychological boundary. . . And to 
say this in the nicest of terms, Arab culture and a predominantly Israeli 
culture that’s fitting to this, but Arab culture is about respect.  And a huge 
part of that respect is about power or force.  And if you don’t put your foot 
down, if you don’t show how strong you are, you are weak.  And if you are 
weak, then you can, then, you know, they can have their way with you. So on 
the one hand, we want to make peace.  But the second we want peace, we are 
the weaker, the weaker position.  And so, you know, either you are going to 
be a strong, powerful force that is going to demand peace.  In which case you 
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have to ready for, as we said earlier, cruelty.  Or you’re going to be 
submissive, and we are going to become another Arab nation.  CR1 
 Another common theme was that of Palestinians as less educated and less 
progressive than Israelis.  This was seen as both indicative of and contributing to 
entrenched differences between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. 
We are more progressive, so we put more the rights of the human rights at the 
centre.  And more educated.  Israel puts its high education really large 
place…It’s very important for us.  And they, for them, the country, not the 
country, the land is more important. CR8 
Only if they’re gonna start focussing their energy on educating their children 
for, like doing stuff for themselves instead of hating us…they’re always 
gonna want more and find another excuse.  Because if they wanted to focus 
(pause) I think if they wanted to focus on creating jobs or building their life 
they could have done it already.  There’s no Israelis in the Gaza Strip.  And 
it’s true even that the settlements over there that have been evacuated, they 
are still in ruins.  No one is going there.  They’re not building any settlements 
there, the Arabs themselves, they’re not doing anything with it.  It was just, 
uh, a reason.  An excuse.  So right now it’s also, they can do, if they would 
focus like 20% of the energy they focus on smuggling arms into creating jobs 
or whatever, I would assume that their situation would have been a lot 
better
18
. CR2 
 
 But other centre right interviewees were interested in discussing similarities 
rather than perceived essentialist differences.  Here, CR6 sounds positively left wing 
in his description of being taught to judge people as individuals, and not by their 
ethnic group. 
When I was growing up, my parents always taught me that you cannot judge 
a whole population by a few people.  They used to say it about the Jewish 
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 Long-standing Israeli government restrictions on importing goods and materials, including building 
materials, into Gaza were not mentioned by right wing and centre right interviewees. 
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people, about everyone.  Especially as Jews we need to know that.  So that 
was very clear when I was growing up.  There was never, I don’t know, 
hatred towards or hatred in my home against Arabs, even during the terror 
acts.  I remember my dad and my mom always saying to me, ok, there are a 
few bad persons, bad men in the Arab population like in any other 
population, but you can’t judge the whole Palestinian…That was the view 
more or less, but we didn’t talk much about politics, I think. CR6 
Similarly, CR5 refutes group-level differences between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish 
Israelis, while CR7 expresses the hope that in time any such differences may 
diminish.   
Everyone is pretty much the same, the inner shells.  The outer shell is what 
you believe, what you do, if you drink, if you smoke.  So it’s not really 
important because in the end of the day if I have a job and you have a job 
everything will be ok.  Because everyone comes home to their families at the 
end of the day, minds their own business, and carry on with their life.  No 
one really wants to pick up a rifle and start shooting everyone else. CR5 
I think with the globalization, there will have to be some coming, some 
equation between us and them.  Maybe we will get closer to them a little bit 
and they will get closer to our state, way of thinking.  I hope someday we 
will be more equal. CR7 
 These quotes demonstrate that there was more variation in views expressed 
towards Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims among the centre right interviewees than was 
the case with the right wing.  Although the centre right had primarily described the 
perceived outgroup in negative terms, for some in this group finding common 
ground with the Palestinians was not completely out of the question.  
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3.4.3 Centre Left (N=11) 
Like the centre right, the centre left interviewees expressed widely differing views 
relating to Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims.  Indeed, some of the attitudes described by 
the centre left were indistinguishable from those of the centre right.  The following 
quote describing working with Bedouin soldiers in the IDF dovetails neatly with 
CR1’s description of Arab culture as inherently aggressive described in the previous 
section.   
Um, there is a certain violence in the way that they lead their life.  And the 
way interactions are made.  In everything.  If I wanted a soldier of mine to do 
something, I had to shout at him to do that.  If I wanted an officer of mine, 
above me, to do something for me or for someone else, I had to shout it out.  
I had to show (pause) or if I was new in some place, I had to attack someone 
publicly, humiliate them, in order to gain respect, in order for me not to be 
attacked. . . . It’s just the way things work there.  And these are unbearable 
for a Western person who wants to live his life with Western values and 
Western ways. CL4 
 This perception of inherent differences between Jews and Arabs, and the 
implications of this regarding attitudes to the ongoing conflict, was discussed by 
CL2. 
When you’re fighting terrorists who target your civilians, it’s very difficult 
for you to say, you know what, we were wrong as well, because you still feel 
like, ok, no matter what we’ve done wrong, they’re worse.  And that, to me, 
is very problematic.  Because I don’t think that we can break our moral 
codes.  It uses an excuse of (pause) we can’t excuse our moral, um, what’s 
the word I’m looking for…mis-steps, ok?  We can’t excuse those just 
because other people don’t have, don’t uphold the same ones we do.  We may 
be fighting people who are fighting on a level which is far below the level 
that we are allowing ourselves to act, but that doesn’t mean we can do 
whatever we want.  And the truth is that when it comes to actual warfare, I 
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think there’s actually very little which doesn’t fit in with our ethical code. 
CL2 
 For CL4, another key perceived difference between Palestinians and Israelis 
centred upon the ability to make good political judgments.  Because of this, he felt 
that the Israelis might have to take on the responsibility of unilateral action regarding 
the conflict. 
I also think that the conflict is (pause) one of the things that makes it very 
hard is the fact that the Palestinians don’t always carry on in a very, in the 
smartest way.  And we can’t always count on their decisions, I don’t think, so 
even.  And anyway, we have to (pause) I think generally in life you can’t 
(pause) not everything is dialogue.  You sometimes need to know the right 
thing and do that.  Maybe the other side doesn’t know the right thing…So, 
yeah, even just from one side making this decision, I think that would be 
better than this situation.  And if there could be an agreement, ok, but I 
wouldn’t count on their ability to make a good agreement.  Now, or at any 
time. CL4 
 But for other centre left interviewees, a lack of understanding by Israelis for 
the perspective of Palestinians was seen as contributing to the continuation of 
conflict.  CL1 describes being an officer in charge of a checkpoint in the West Bank 
when a young IDF officer asked a Palestinian in the queue for a cigarette. 
Now this is something when you’re 19 years old you don’t really realise how 
acute and bad is what you’ve just done.  Because you’re holding a weapon, 
you’re [laughs] you’re in like a roadblock, you’re stalling people from getting 
to the other side…And you don’t really see the whole picture.  But what 
you’re causing is pure hatred on the other side.  And the other side, that 
Palestinian can’t do anything.  He has to give you a cigarette and pretend that 
he’s joking and having fun with you.  Because he’s only thinking, ok, I have 
to get to the other side to get to work, and if this makes it any faster then I 
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don’t care, I’ll give him a cigarette.  And he’s also thinking, if I don’t give 
him the cigarette I don’t know if he’s going to get pissed at me. CL1 
 CL1 described his concern regarding a perceived lack of understanding on 
the part of IDF soldiers of the true nature of the situation of Palestinians at 
checkpoints.  However, for CL3, Israelis and West Bank Palestinians (as opposed to 
those in Gaza) were seen as growing more understanding and tolerant of each other. 
In the West Bank it’s different, I think.  Both them and us accepting the 
existence of the other side.  And relatively, well, there’s no formal peace 
agreement, but the coexistence is getting better and better all the time, which 
is good.  I think nobody in Israel really expect that Israel will continue being, 
Israel borders will continue being, you know, will reach the Jordan River in 
the east.  Practically it’s not the situation and even the right-wing extremists, 
uh, accept it unless they’re blind, you know. CL3 
 In contrast CL7, found that doing reserve duty in combat support exposed her 
to attitudes towards Arabs among her fellow soldiers which she found very 
distressing. 
… there are other people that don’t see that this way, and they see just like 
one group and they want to kill them. . . I was now in like two months ago, I 
was in reserve duty, and I remember it really bothered me because they speak 
about people not like people, like objects.  Like we need to go and like, not 
clear the area, but it was, it felt really racist to me. CL7 
 Although CL2 (earlier in this section) made a clear distinction between his 
perception of the morality of Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis, he expressed 
frustration at Israelis who viewed Palestinian citizens of Israel as synonymous with 
Palestinians from the Territories.  For him, it was important to differentiate between 
fellow citizens of Israel and non-Israeli Palestinians. 
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I grew up, because it’s a religious kibbutz, the society is very close, very 
closed minded about the Arab populations.  It’s sort of like a default.  That it’s 
us and them.  The ability of people who grew up in that closed society to 
perceive Israeli Arabs as anything else than just other Arabs, it’s very, very 
difficult.  It’s very difficult to make a distinction when you don’t know any 
Arabs. CL2 
3.4.4 Left Wing (N=10) 
That Jewish Israelis tend to have little or no direct interaction with either Palestinian 
citizens of Israel or with Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza (apart from during 
military service), and therefore do not get the opportunity to get to know people as 
individuals, was a recurring theme in the left wing interviews when discussing 
Jewish Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims.  Segregated 
neighbourhoods and separate school systems were recognised as barriers to mutual 
understanding, as was the lack of Palestinian narratives in the history lessons in 
Israeli schools. 
I have a lot of family members, of my big family, in settlements. So I visited 
like many times in Hebron, like everywhere.  In Gaza and Hebron and near 
Jenin, everywhere.  So I visited the places many times, and going there, you 
just like drove, you’re driving by Arab villages.  But it’s something you don’t 
really see.  It’s somewhat exotic.  Because you don’t see it in your everyday 
life.  You don’t see like Palestinians in Tel Aviv.  And you definitely don’t 
see the Arab villages, which is quite different from the Israeli villages, or 
cities, or kibbutzim.  But I manage, like most Israelis, to grow up without 
actually know that there is something like Palestinian people. L1 
I mean, for example, school texts, like the books that you learn from, 
obviously were very narrative based towards Zionist history.  I’m quite 
certain that we never learned the other side’s narrative or anything like that. 
L6 
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 The repercussions of this lack of contact, and how these can be overridden, 
were described in relation to the perceptions that Israelis and Palestinians have of 
each other by L7, who is actively involved in peace-building initiatives with 
Palestinians. 
Working with a Palestinian village for a long time, you can see a difference 
inside Palestinian society.  You can see the process they go through.  I mean, 
the first time you go to a Palestinian village, almost any of them, part of the 
slogans that will be in the demonstration, even though you were invited by 
them and so on, part of the slogans will be “Khaybar, Khaybar, ya Yahud,” 
which Khaybar is a city in Saudi Arabia in which Mohammed slaughtered all 
the Jews.  So, it’s a nice story.  “Khaybar, Khaybar ya Yahud” is not exactly 
what I would want.  Hi, I’m Jewish, I’m standing next to you.  And you can 
see very clearly how that’s the beginning of the demonstrations, but after a 
few months and after relationships start with Israelis, Jewish, they know that 
that’s what we are, it changes.  And for me, you know, that is also a change 
for the benefit of Israeli society.  The fact that all that Palestinians know of 
Israelis, Jews, is settlers and military, that’s a very bad, you know, 
impression. L7 
 This perception of a process of change in attitude is in stark contrast to the 
perceptions expressed by more right wing interviewees of Arab enmity as inevitable 
and never-ending.  For the left wing, the identification of Palestinians as enemies is 
as much a social construct as the identification of Jewish Israelis as legitimately 
privileged.   
 Although they are frequently portrayed as bleeding hearts (“beautiful souls” 
in Israeli parlance) by Israelis further to the right, one of the left wing interviewees 
described attitudes towards Palestinians that were far from that of such stereotypes.  
L10 pulls no punches in describing how his own military service affected his view of 
Palestinians. 
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I mean even me, I was growing up in very liberal house, a very accepting 
blah blah blah, and after one or two weeks serving in the Occupied 
Territories I hated the Arab people, the Palestinians, hated.  Because, really, 
what I saw there was people (pause) I mean if you take the, if you talk about 
morality in comparison to the IDF, the Palestinians are terrible.  They act like 
animals.  Really…I saw some situations where an ambulance tries to go out 
of Nablus, and there is some CNN reporter, and the [IDF] officer in the 
checkpoint says to the ambulance, ok, go.  I mean he looks inside and he saw 
I don’t know what.  And then the [Palestinian] ambulance gets on the radio a 
command to stay because there is a, because there is a reporter of CNN, and 
he wants to make a picture of the Israeli army doesn’t let the ambulance to 
go.  And I say, wow, you’re willing to sacrifice a pregnant woman just to get 
this reporter some mis- (pause) and when you see this, and it’s on a daily 
basis, you really start to hate the Palestinians.  Hate.  Really.  To think 
they’re stupid, all the things that you can imagine.  And still, I didn’t, there 
was no one moment I thought this was justifying shooting without, you 
know, just letting the anger. L10 
 Unusually for a left wing conscientious objector (he served time in prison for 
refusing further military service in the Occupied Territories on moral grounds and 
stated that he is willing to do this again if necessary), in the above quote he does not 
consider the impact of the presence of the CNN reporter on the behaviour of the IDF 
soldiers in deciding to allow the ambulance through
19
.  He also generalises the 
actions of particular Palestinians to the whole group, i.e. “the Arab people, the 
Palestinians.”  This was the only example of such generalisation that I heard from 
the left wing, and it is notable for its uniqueness. 
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 It could just as easily be argued that the presence of the CNN reporter was why the IDF soldier at 
the checkpoint allowed the ambulance straight through rather than delaying it.  Deaths of Palestinians 
at checkpoints due to ambulances being delayed or refused passage at IDF checkpoints are well-
documented (see B’Tselem 2002 for a report specific to the second intifada).   The battle for public 
perception was (and remains) an important element in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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 Turning from the impact that interactions with Palestinians in a military 
setting can have on Israeli attitudes, to the very different reactions produced through 
civilian-to-civilian interactions, we return to L7 who describes her growing 
awareness of the realities of life under occupation for Palestinians as she 
accompanied her activist father to a Palestinian village. 
At the time they were just starting to talk about the separation fence.  And 
coming to that village, we knew there was a plan to have the fence 
somewhere there, in the village.  And it was kind of like, yeah, it will go 
somewhere here, and nobody knew actually what it was going to be.  And 
specifically that village, they are inside Jerusalem municipality lines, but they 
are green IDs, they’re West Bankers’ IDs, which means that legally they are 
illegal inhabitants in their own houses.  And the fence is—then was, now is— 
closing them inside East Jerusalem, cutting them off from the West Bank 
which has to be their centre of life because they’re West Bankers legally.  
They’re illegal inside their houses…That’s kind of where I started 
understanding what was going on around me. L7 
  This description of a Kafka-esque legal limbo faced by one East Jerusalem 
village reveals a perception by L7 not only of these Palestinian villagers as suffering 
from circumstances beyond their control, but of the Israeli government as being the 
party responsible for the creation of these circumstances.  This is in direct contrast to 
more right wing interviewees who interpret the actions of the Israeli government, 
and by proxy the IDF, as having been brought upon themselves by the Palestinians 
through their own ill-judged behaviours, which they see as resulting from inherent 
differences in Arab morals and values.  This indicates a very different attitude 
between the left and right wing towards both the Palestinians as people, and towards 
hamatzav, “the situation.”  Frustration at the implications for peace of essentialist 
attitudes towards Palestinians is expressed by L8.  
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Since Abu Mazen
20
 the Palestinians have been very clear, even earlier I think 
in the Arab League’s offer of 2002, the Arabs have made it very clear that 
they’re interested in peace along the ’67 lines.  And Israel has decided to, um, I 
don’t think Israelis are even aware that they’re being offered peace.  This is 
really, really weird.  I really am puzzled by this, because I do believe that the 
Israeli people want peace. L8 
3.5 Perceptions of Hamatzav (“The Situation”) 
There is a clear transition regarding whether or not Israel is perceived as sufficiently 
agentic to be able to end the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as one moves from left to 
right across the political spectrum: the left wing are adamant that ending the conflict 
is within Israel’s control, and the right wing vary between placing responsibility on 
“the Muslims” and advocating accepting that peace is impossible to achieve.  This 
correlates with differences between left and right in their perceptions of Jewish and 
Arab identity, with the left wing favouring a view of identities as at least partly 
socially constructed, and therefore subject to change, in contrast to the right wing 
which perceives identity as more fixed.   
I think it’s in Israel’s hands…there is a big political interest to make people 
think that it’s not in our hands, you know?  And it’s part, a huge part.  There 
is this very significant statement of Prime Minister Barak after the Camp 
David failure in 2001.  He said “ain partner”, there is no partner.  I mean, and 
he, and this statement, the impact and it’s so oft-quoted, you know? L2 
Yeah, so, dismantle the settlements, end apartheid, abolish the JNF
21
, you 
know, the Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Agency, reform the law of 
return, the law of citizenship, accept responsibility for ethnic cleansing in 
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 Mahmoud Abbas, commonly referred to as Abu Mazen, has been the Palestinian President since 
2005. 
21
 The Jewish National Fund was founded in 1901 with the purpose of acquiring land in Palestine for 
use by Jewish people only.  Its policies and practices have been the subject of considerable 
controversy (see, for example, Leon, 2006). 
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1948.  I’m not saying that 5 million have to return to Israel within the ’67 
borders, but Israel has to accept, to admit responsibility for ethnic cleansing 
in 1948, and come up with some proposed solution, including the absorption 
of a considerable number of Palestinian refugees.  Or, you know, creating a, 
going for the one-state solution.  So, basically, there’s a lot that Israel has to 
do here. L5 
I think that I’d rather be pragmatic and accept the fact that I live in a conflict-
ridden part of the world, and simply invest my energies to try and reduce that 
conflict to the lowest level, and have the lowest (pause) reduce the 
consequences as much as possible.  Because I think that that is the best thing 
that we can achieve. R1 
Because of this idea of honour, they [the Palestinians] would say, look at 
what you did to us for umpteen years, you oppressed us for so many years.  I 
think they would never let that go, especially because you have Hamas, who, 
that’s what their belief is.  Their number one belief is wiping Israel off the 
map.  So you can’t change people like that. R8   
The centrist interviewees take positions which draw on each of these two 
poles, with more disagreement among their ranks than is found within the left wing 
and the right wing.   
This conflict is fuelling so much, you know, it’s all about the money, I don’t 
know.  It’s all about money.  You know, this conflict fuels the biggest 
industries in Israel, and it’s not in their interest to finish it.  And I think that’s 
a big part of why, that’s one big part of why we can’t reach a solution.  CL6 
I’d love for the work I did in the army to be scrapped because there’s no 
need.  But as long as there is a need then I, I’ll definitely be part of it.  
Because if I don’t do that, then no one will do that, and if no one does that, 
then there won’t be a Jewish state.  There won’t be a state of Israel because 
we will be driven out.  If not by the Palestinians then by other Arab nations.  
CL2 
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I think the governments from both sides there’s a lot of things they can do.  
And I think, um, and I think that most of the population, if the government 
would act toward peace, would be in favour of it.  Always, always. CR4 
But there are always wars, especially in this place, it’s historically, there was 
many wars here, so it’s kind of naïve to believe that now we shouldn’t have 
war.  What’s different from now and ancient times…There were always been 
wars, and there will always be wars.  It’s human nature.”  CR7 
A clear difference between left and right is that of who is perceived as 
benefitting from the situation remaining as it currently stands.  Both left wing and 
centre left interviewees stated that the status quo is sustainable for Israel, as Israel is 
both militarily and economically powerful enough to continue to contain the 
situation in the Territories, while right wing interviewees stated that the Palestinians 
benefit from the current situation as it gives them more time to achieve their aims of 
statehood. 
While the other political groups referred to geographical disputes, the role of 
special interests in sustaining the conflict, and political interests, the right wing 
described the conflict in terms of sacred duty.  Again, this correlates with their views 
on group identity, in which different peoples have been put on earth by God to fulfil 
different roles. 
3.6 Perceptions of Possible Solutions to the Conflict 
Here there was a clear divide between the right and left.  Whereas the left and centre 
left focused on various ways of finding amicably negotiated solutions to the conflict, 
most of the centre right and right wing interviewees favoured forceful action and/or 
coming to terms with the impossibility of ever having peace with their Arab 
neighbours.   
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What we have it’s not a real war, you know.  Like the Russians and the 
Chechnyans, like.  It’s not a real war.  One month like this and this.  And no 
solution.  This doesn’t make any solution to the situation.  We need one real 
war and that’s it…I think that this is the thing that will solve everything.  
Even that the whole Arabics will came.  Israel still can win. CR9 
From what I know, according to Islam, and this is also—it predates Israel—
Mohammed and the way he conquered Mecca, I believe.  Basically, in their 
rules, and this is also something you can see in every peace agreement that 
Israel’s conducted with an Arab country, or even the PLO, the PA, that if 
they don’t have the possibility to beat their enemy, then they’ll make peace.  
And if they…once they do get the chance they will try, they will use a 
chance…It makes things very complicated, because it basically means eternal 
struggle and even if you have a peace agreement that’s 50 years long, even 
though throughout the history I don’t know any peace agreement that actually 
held that long, but that means that it will break at some point. R6 
One solution presented by the right wing involved establishing an Emirates-
type model in the Territories, whereby Palestinians would maintain local control 
over their towns and villages, which Israel would ensure remained separate from 
each other, and which would be under the overall control of Israel.  Palestinians 
would not serve in the Israeli military (and they would not be allowed a military of 
their own), and they would not be allowed to vote in national elections.  This 
proposed solution, in which Palestinians would remain under Israel’s control as 
disenfranchised residents rather than as fellow citizens in a democracy or as citizens 
of an independent state, is consistent with right wing perceptions that “the situation” 
can only be contained, not resolved. 
However, some of the centre right, and most of the centre left and left wing 
interviewees felt that a socio-economic approach, involving joint projects aimed at 
lifting the Palestinians out of poverty, might help to lead to an end to the conflict.   
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I do believe that if we find a way for Gaza to develop economic ties, both 
with Israel and with Egypt, then they can break out of the cycle.  And if they 
have another option I do believe that the moderates will prevent the 
extremists from allowing the violence to escalate.  And we’re not.  Israel 
needs to actively work towards that. CL2 
Tell the Hamas give us one week to walk around the Gaza Strip with flowers, 
go to the people, ok?  Bring in help, in the meaning of infrastructure, TV, 
stuff like that.  Bring in business, ok?  It means ways of earning money, 
working, things like that, and helping them out in that way…After a week, 
let’s come back and see what’s happening.  CR3 
Interestingly, while these centrists perceived economic improvement in Gaza 
and the West Bank as a possible means of ending the conflict, they did not refer to 
the negative impact on the economies of the West Bank and Gaza of existing 
restrictive economic policies (for example, with respect to controlling the movement 
of labour, the collection of taxes, and restrictions on trade) enforced by the Israeli 
government (e.g., Amundsen, Giacaman, & Khan, 2004; Roy, 2005; Strand, 2014).  
Such policies were only cited by left wing interviewees. 
Another area in which the left wing differed from the centrists, consistent 
with differences in their perceptions of the agency of Israel regarding the conflict, 
was in the view of what societal changes would be necessary in order for peace with 
the Palestinians to be possible.  While centrists proposed that peace might be 
achieved if the Palestinians were educated in the ways of peaceful co-existence, the 
left wing (and one lone right wing interviewee) argued that Israelis also required 
such education.  Indeed, some in the left wing felt that, given the current attitudes of 
the majority of Israelis towards the Palestinians, peace would only be possible if the 
international community applied sufficient pressure for change. 
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We should free ourselves from this illusion of a change, an Israeli change 
from within.  No.  A change can only be imposed by a reality, through a 
global campaign. L5 
The left wing’s willingness to relinquish some of Israel’s autonomy in 
seeking a resolution of the conflict is at odds with the desire of the right wing for 
Israel to establish unilateral control.  This can be seen clearly in their different views 
of what a workable one-state solution might look like.  For the left wing, a one-state 
solution would treat both Jews and Arabs as equal citizens, with full voting rights.  
This would prioritise democracy over the concept of Israel as a Jewish state.  The 
right wing, however, envisaged a one-state solution in which only Jews would have 
voting rights and full citizenship. 
 The idea that Israel might cease to be a Jewish state was problematic for 
many interviewees across the political spectrum.   The centre right and centre left 
interviewees consistently favoured a two-state solution, in which Palestinian Arabs 
had autonomy over their own territories, while Israel remained a Jewish democracy.  
(The status of Palestinian citizens of Israel remained a problematic subject.)  A 
minority of the left wing also saw two states as representing the most realistic and 
equitable solution to the current conflict.  For these interviewees, the notion of Israel 
as providing a safe haven for Jews from around the world was sacrosanct: any 
solution would have to ensure that the Jewish people would always have a homeland 
to turn to in times of trouble.  The jury was out as to whether this would be possible 
in a state where Jews and Arabs were equal citizens. 
 This chapter has sought to present some of the complexities relating to 
Jewish Israelis’ perceptions of ingroup and outgroup identities, and to their 
134 
 
subsequent perceptions of the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of the 
prospects for peace.  Interpretations of the nature of Jewish Israeli identity are not 
only complicated, they are actively contested within Israel, with significant dividing 
points between the secular and the religious, liberals and conservatives, and between 
more established and more recent ethnic groups.  Differences in whether identity is 
understood in essentialist terms, or conversely as socially constructed, has 
considerable impact on approaches to interactions with perceived outgroups.   
In the remaining sections of the thesis, different aspects of dynamics of moral 
judgment will be analysed.  Specifically, the following three chapters address how 
cognitive processes involving intuitions and biases can affect moral judgments with 
regard to perceived ingroups and outgroups.  By demonstrating something of the 
heterogeneity of perceptions of ingroup and outgroup identity among Jewish Israelis, 
this chapter gives some indication of the incredible complexity around moral 
judgment in situations of intergroup conflict.   
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 Selective Fairness in Intergroup Dynamics: a moral foundations 4
theory analysis of moral dilemmas experienced by Jewish Israeli 
reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors within the context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict  
 
Q:  But what characteristics do you think are important for a moral 
army? 
A:  Well, at this point, I think that that’s a line that has a very big 
problem, because when you’re trying to be moral to people that you’re 
fighting, that means almost automatically that you’re being immoral to 
yourself and to your own people.  Because you’re trying to protect them. 
    —Interview with Israel Defense Forces reserve soldier22 “R6,” 2012 
4.1 Introduction 
In situations of seemingly intractable conflict, such as that between Israel and the 
Palestinians, the perception of what behaviours are appropriate when interacting with 
perceived outgroup members can be highly politically divisive.  In Israeli politics, 
the left-right divide applies primarily to differences in policies regarding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, with the political left willing to engage in land-for-peace 
initiatives and the political right rejecting relinquishing any territory (Ben-Porat, 
2011; Yishai, 1987).  These polarised positions reflect contrasting beliefs about the 
intentions and trustworthiness of the Palestinians (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006), and 
differing levels of openness to peacemaking initiatives (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).  
The current research uses a moral foundations theory (MFT) framework to address 
                                                 
22
 In the Israeli military system, after fulfilling their compulsory 3-4 years of military service, soldiers 
are then required to be available for compulsory reserve duty until they are in their 40s. Exact age of 
exemption, and frequency and duration of reserve duty varies according to the specific training and 
role of the soldier and of the military needs of the state. 
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how Jewish Israelis across the left-right divide differ in (a) their experiences of 
moral dilemmas relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (b) their perceptions of 
group identities as fixed or fluid, and (c) how they perceive prospects for peace.   
The findings from these analyses are then used to examine and critique particular 
relevant aspects of the current structure of moral foundations theory. 
This chapter comprises two studies: (1) a Hebrew version of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire conducted online with 523 participants; and (2) analysis 
of semi-structured interviews with 40 Jewish Israeli conscientious objectors and 
reserve soldiers from across the political spectrum.  The findings from these studies 
contribute to the literatures on moral judgment and ingroup-outgroup relations –
specifically regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – within political psychology 
and social psychology, and to current debates around the normative claims 
associated with moral foundations theory (e.g., Jost, 2012). 
4.2  Study 1: Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
4.2.1 Aim of Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to establish whether it would be appropriate to apply 
moral foundations theory—developed in the US—to the analysis of moral judgment 
across the political spectrum within Israel.  MFT predicts that liberal left wing 
participants will draw on the Individualising moral foundations (Harm/Fairness) to a 
greater extent than they will on the Binding moral foundations (Authority/Loyalty/ 
Purity), while the conservative right wing will draw more equally on the 
Harm/Fairness and Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations. 
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4.2.2 Analysis 
 As detailed in section 4.1, 523 Jewish Israelis, divided roughly equally 
between four political categories (left wing, centre left, centre right, and right wing), 
participated in this study, filling out a Hebrew language version of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (moralfoundations.org, 2008a).  Figure 4.1 indicates that, 
in line with the predictions of MFT (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) left 
wing liberal Jewish Israelis rely to a greater extent on the Harm/Fairness 
foundations, while right wing conservative Jewish Israelis rely more evenly on the 
Harm/Fairness and Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations.    
 
 Figure 4.1: Adherence to Moral Foundations by Political Category 
 
 
 
Strongly Endorse 
Strongly Reject 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the relation between Israeli political categories and what 
MFT refers to as moral progressivism, a value which is obtained by subtracting the 
scores of the Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations from those of the Harm/Fairness 
foundations (moralfoundations.org, 2008b).  A univariate ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference between the political categories’ mean values of progressivism, 
F(3, 519) = 109.44, p < .001.  A post hoc Tukey test showed that all groups differed 
significantly from each other at p < .001 except for the centre right and right wing, 
which were not significantly different from each other at p = .995. 
 
Figure 4.2: Political Category by Progressivism
 
 These findings demonstrate that differences in patterns of adherence to the 
Harm/ Fairness and the Authority/Loyalty/Purity moral foundations along the left-
right political continuum within Israel correspond with the predictions of moral 
foundations theory.  This suggests that it is therefore appropriate to apply MFT to 
analysis of differences across the political spectrum in Jewish Israelis’ experiences 
of moral dilemmas relating to military service. 
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4.3 Study 2: Interview analysis of Jewish Israeli reserve soldiers 
and conscientious objectors 
4.3.1 Aims of Study 2 
The aims of Study 2 were twofold.  The first aim was to identify differences across 
the political spectrum in Israeli reserve soldiers’ and conscientious objectors’ 
experiences of moral dilemmas relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 
analysing (a) which moral foundations come into conflict when they experience 
moral dilemmas, and (b) how this relates to differences regarding which segments of 
the perceived Palestinian outgroup population triggered moral dilemmas for the 
interviewees.  These findings were then analysed in conjunction with variations 
between the political groups in how fixed or fluid they perceive group identities and 
differences to be, and how these factors affect their perceptions of the prospects for 
peace.  The second aim was to apply these findings to analysis of how strength of 
adherence to the Binding foundations affects breadth of application of the 
Individualising foundations, and to address the implications of this relationship for 
the current structure of MFT. 
4.3.2 Differences along the political continuum in application of 
Moral Foundations 
Moral foundations theory (MFT) would predict that conservative right wing Israelis 
will grant more importance to the Authority/Loyalty/Purity moral foundations than 
will more liberal Israelis further to the left along the political continuum (Graham et 
al., 2009).  However, it is important to bear in mind that the left-right political 
continuum in Israel does not directly correlate with that of the United States, where 
MFT was developed.  The left-right divide in Israel refers primarily to differences in 
approach to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, with ostensibly “radical left wing” Israeli 
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views corresponding to more centrist positions within the US and other western 
nations (Olmert, 2013; Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011).  This was also the 
perception of interviewees branded as radical leftists within Israel. 
If it’s compared to humankind, it’s somewhere in the centre, but to the Israeli 
politics of now I’m radical left. L9 
 
However, as demonstrated in Study 1, differences between adherence to the 
Harm/Fairness and Authority/Loyalty/Purity moral foundations among Jewish 
Israelis retain the pattern predicted by MFT, with politically liberal individuals 
relying primarily on the Harm/Fairness foundations, while politically conservative 
individuals also rely heavily on the Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations.  This is 
also evident in the interviewees’ descriptions of how they perceive differences in 
morality between the political groups. 
Left Wing Conscientious Objectors perceived the centre left as lacking the 
courage of their convictions because although the centre left explicitly opposed what 
they described as the military occupation of Palestine (Harm/Fairness), they 
continued to serve there as soldiers (over-reliance on Authority).  The left wing 
described the centre right and right wing as “racist,” “violent” and “aggressive” 
(Purity/Loyalty, lacking in Harm/Fairness) and asserted that these groups did not 
want to make peace with the Palestinians. 
The Centre Left perceived left wing conscientious objectors as anti-
democracy and “self-righteous” (lacking in Authority).  They described the centre 
right as unthinkingly taking the “path of least resistance” (over-reliance on 
Authority) and saw the right wing, and particularly the settlers, in the same terms as 
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did the left wing, as “racist,” “violent” and “aggressive,” and as presenting obstacles 
to peace (over-reliance on Purity/Loyalty, lacking in Harm/Fairness). 
The Centre Right considered the centre left and left wing “too apologetic” 
regarding Israel’s military actions (lacking in Ingroup Loyalty), and saw the 
conscientious objectors as “not pulling their weight” as citizens (lacking in Ingroup 
Loyalty).  Like the centre left, they perceived the left wing conscientious objectors as 
anti-democratic (lacking in Authority).  They described the right wing, and 
especially the settlers, as posing obstacles to peace.  All of the centre right 
interviewees were secular, and they described what they saw as the right wing’s 
unquestioning adherence to religious tenets as morally problematic (over-reliance on 
Purity). 
The Right Wing interviewees in this study were all religious, and described 
secularism (lacking in Purity) as morally problematic for all of the other groups.  
They saw maintaining a Jewish presence in all of Eretz Israel
23
 as a moral imperative 
(Ingroup Loyalty/Purity).   
This pattern of difference in application of moral foundations was also 
apparent when analysing how the different political groups experienced moral 
dilemmas relating to military service. 
4.3.3 Moral Dilemmas: the predicted liberal/conservative divide 
For the purposes of this research, I am defining a “moral dilemma” as any situation 
relating to military service which is perceived and described by the interviewees as 
involving competing, mutually exclusive, moral behavioural requirements.  As I am 
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 Eretz Israel is also known as Greater Israel, or the Holy Land.  Its exact borders are the subject of 
debate, but are generally considered to include the West Bank and Gaza. 
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employing MFT to analyse these dilemmas, I categorise each situation according to 
which particular moral foundations come into conflict.  In line with the predictions 
of MFT, I would expect to find that left wing liberals experience more moral 
dilemmas involving threats to universal application of the Harm/Fairness 
foundations, and that right wing conservatives would experience more dilemmas 
relating to threats to the Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations.  In the following 
sections I focus on two situations which consistently resulted in strongly differing 
perceptions between the political/ideological groups: (1) experiences of manning 
checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza, and (2) the 2005 Disengagement from 
Gaza. 
Checkpoints 
For left wing interviewees, checkpoints which prevented Palestinians from moving 
freely between their own towns, cities, and villages were a key instrument of 
enforcing the military occupation and therefore, by definition, immoral.  In the 
language of MFT, the left wing saw these checkpoints as contravening both the 
Fairness and Harm foundations toward the Palestinians.  This contrasts with the 
centre left position, which argues that unless liberally-minded soldiers are present at 
the checkpoints, the Palestinians will suffer more (Harm) because the only soldiers at 
the checkpoints will be centre right and right wing.  Whether or not it is possible to 
behave in a truly moral manner if one is working at a checkpoint (Fairness) is a long-
running argument between the left and centre left in Israel.  The left wing argues that 
it is not possible.   
Yes, so part of the decision to refuse [to serve in the military is] because of 
the very understanding that you can’t act morally in a long-lived occupation. 
L1 
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You know, a lot of people are trying, a lot of people, [centre] leftists, speak 
about, “I want to go and serve and change the system from within.”  This is 
the biggest bullshit ever from the way I see it.  “I want to go stand in a 
checkpoint to see that the pregnant woman can get by and be treated in 
hospital.”  Okay, good for you.  Bullshit. L2 
 
 However, for the centre left, the opportunity to reduce what they perceived as 
the harmful impact of the checkpoints (Harm) was seen as a moral imperative. 
And I was in charge of one of these checkpoints, and a woman, a pregnant 
woman did arrive.  That night, by the way, my sister gave birth.  Yeah.  Just 
before.  So this woman comes to us barely walking and with her husband and 
two other women.  And we said no one can go in.  And they said they had to.  
So I didn’t really ask anybody.  I told them, you can’t get your car inside, but 
maybe you can call over here an ambulance and she can go in the ambulance.  
And they said ok.  And I alerted the other forces that I, that an ambulance is 
supposed to arrive, let it pass to get to our checkpoint.  And they said ok…I 
remember articles in the newspapers that I read about babies that died in 
checkpoints.  And I remember that I didn’t want to be one of those soldiers… 
But, also, I was the commander.  I don’t know what, if I were the soldier, I 
guess I would just go along with what the commander would decide.  CL4 
CL4 touches on an important difference between the left and centre left 
regarding deference to Authority: the centre left interviewees respected the Authority 
moral foundation more than did the left wing interviewees.  The left wing 
interviewees were willing to become conscientious objectors in response to such 
dilemmas.  But CL4 recognized and conceded that in a situation where he felt a 
moral dilemma relating to Harm/Fairness with respect to Palestinians, the Authority 
foundation would take precedence if he was ordered by a superior officer not to 
allow the pregnant woman through the checkpoint.  Contrast this with the experience 
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of a right wing soldier who described a very different moral dilemma at a checkpoint 
triggered by the perception of having his hands tied to such an extent by the IDF’s 
ethical standards relating to searching women that he was unable to control what he 
saw as a dangerous situation which could put the perceived Jewish ingroup at risk.  
For example, there was a woman who we really wanted to check [at a 
checkpoint].  We were an all-male unit.  And I was told I couldn’t check her.  
And I said, but she has a bulge in her, I can’t think of the word now, for her 
full dress.  And it’s dark out, it’s between 5 and 5.15 in the morning, it’s very 
dark out there, no lights, I can’t see anything, and our metal detector, we had 
a wand, was broken.  For some reason something was wrong with it and it 
worked when we got in the Hummer, when we got out of the Hummer it 
didn’t work anymore.  And I had a very big moral dilemma, because I said, I 
don’t care what you say.  I want to check this woman.  I don’t want her 
killing a Jew. R8 
Unlike the moral dilemmas detailed previously as experienced by left wing 
and centre left interviewees, which were triggered by concerns about Harm/Fairness 
issues relating to the Palestinians, for R8, a moral dilemma was triggered by Harm 
concerns relating to the perceived Jewish Israeli ingroup.  His dilemma involved a 
clash between the Authority foundation (his orders did not allow him to search the 
woman), and a combination of the Harm and Ingroup Loyalty foundations (“I don’t 
want her killing a Jew.”)   Moral dilemmas around the Disengagement from Gaza 
also involved this particular combination of competing moral foundations for 
soldiers to the right of the political spectrum. 
Disengagement from Gaza 
For one of the centre right and all of the right wing interviewees the Disengagement 
from Gaza, when IDF soldiers were ordered to remove Jewish settlers in Gaza from 
their homes in 2005, was a source of moral dilemma.  Whether obeying the order to 
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evacuate Jewish settlers constituted one’s duty as a soldier, or instead subverted that 
duty through calling on soldiers to act in direct contradiction of what they perceived 
as the primary purpose of the IDF (to protect the Jewish homeland) caused a great 
deal of moral concern among these interviewees.   
This situation resulted in the right wing religious soldiers, who had 
previously condemned the left wing conscientious objectors as self-serving traitors, 
to become (or if they did not receive such orders, to support) right wing 
conscientious objectors who now refused their orders to participate in the evacuation.  
In the language of MFT, these soldiers suffered from competing behavioural 
requirements of the Authority foundation, to follow military orders (evacuate the 
settlements) and from a combination of the Authority, Purity, Harm and Fairness 
foundations, specifically, follow the instructions of the rabbi, keep these lands 
Jewish, do not throw people out of their homes (refuse the order to evacuate the 
settlements).   
Some of the left wing interviewees stated that they found it difficult to judge 
whether the right wing’s refusal constituted a moral or an immoral act: while they 
explicitly recognised the role played by the Harm/Fairness moral foundations in the 
right wing conscientious objectors’ decisions, and were impressed that they were 
willing to contravene the Authority foundation, they still abhorred the right wing’s 
adherence to the Purity foundation.  For the left wing, the fact that right wing 
soldiers refused to remove Jewish Israelis from their homes, but had no such qualms 
about removing Palestinian Arabs from theirs, was morally problematic.  The right 
wing was applying both Harm, and ironically “Fairness,” selectively. 
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Interestingly, some interviewees from both the left and right wing described 
feeling “betrayed” during the disengagement process, with the right wing feeling 
betrayed by the IDF and the Israeli government, and the left wing and centre left 
feeling betrayed by the right wing. 
I think the only time it started to become complicated was when they decided 
that the army is the one that’s gonna evict people from Gush Katif24.  That’s 
when it became complicated because that’s when the army became an enemy 
to some people.   R5 
 
I felt really betrayed by the right wing…I said if I would do what I think, I 
would refuse lots of things that I do here, but this is the policy of the country 
and I’m doing this because this is somehow a democracy and we should just 
do what we’re told and we’re not going to…  And I said, wait a minute, if 
they’re not going to do the orders when they don’t like them, and I’m doing 
the orders that they like when I don’t like them, that really, really pissed me 
off.  CL4 
 
The Disengagement from Gaza was described as a time of high passion.  By 
pitting emotionally-charged values relating to religious belief, the peace and security 
of Israel, and the democratic process against each other, this policy brought some of 
Israel’s key sacred values into conflict. 
4.3.4 Sacred Values 
Sacred values are defined as emotionally-charged values which are non-negotiable 
for those who hold them (Atran, 2010).  Four values which met these criteria and 
which repeatedly surfaced during these interviews were: 
1. Israel as a safe haven for Jews  
                                                 
24
 Gush Katif was the collective name for 17 Jewish Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. 
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2. Keeping Eretz Israel Jewish  
3. Israel as a democratic state  
4. Israel having laws based on principles of universal human rights 
MFT would predict that conservatives would support numbers one and two, 
as these correspond to the Loyalty/Authority/Purity foundations, while liberals 
would support numbers three and four, as these correspond to the Harm/Fairness 
foundations.  And this largely held true in these interviews.  However, keeping Israel 
as a safe haven for Jews was seen as important across the political spectrum.  For a 
nation traumatised by the Holocaust, the value of providing a safe haven for Jews 
from anywhere in the world holds great emotional power. 
You can’t, you just can’t live in this country and pretend it’s any old western 
country like America or England or France or whatever.  It’s not…The 
reason is that this is a place for the Jewish people.  If we are just another state 
of the 200 and I don’t know countries worldwide there’s no difference 
between Israel, Switzerland, and the United States.  This is a place for the 
Jewish people. R5 
For many religious Jewish Israelis, the concept of the safe haven is strongly 
linked to the belief that all of Eretz Israel belongs to the Jewish people 
(EretzIsraelForever.net, 2013), and the right wing interviewees argued this case in 
support of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza.   
I think that the principle plane, the borders of Israel, the connection between 
the nation and the land, are not dependent on what the United Nations has 
decided for Israel, or any other, the British Mandate or any other occupation, 
Turkish, whatsoever.  This is something very, very fundamental in the Jewish 
belief, and I think that statistically, even statistically, about 65-70% of the 
Jewish ancient history has take place in Judea and Samaria
25
.  Okay?  This is 
                                                 
25
 Judea and Samaria are the biblical names for the areas comprising the West Bank. 
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the point.  So, yes, this is part of the Jewish nation.  We were taken to exile 
2000 years ago.  It was just a pause.  And we got back. R3 
 
The other groups, however, saw this as problematic to varying degrees: the 
further to the left the interviewees, the more they described the settlements as 
detrimental to the security of Israel, and therefore to its ability to function as a safe 
haven.  For these interviewees, maintaining a strong democracy was seen as more 
conducive to maintaining Israel as a safe haven for Jews than the settlement project.   
However, for very left wing interviewees, Israeli democracy did not qualify 
as democracy at all, because over four million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank 
and Gaza living under Israeli military rule for over 60 years had no voting rights in 
Israeli elections (Fairness).  For these interviewees, a democracy was only a 
democracy if it recognised the human rights of all of the inhabitants over which it 
held control.  Anything less dishonoured the lessons of the Holocaust, as argued by 
this interviewee who fled with his family as a child from Nazi Germany. 
And I think that part of the heritage, as I see it, from Nazi Germany, is that I 
have to be in the front line in the struggle against chauvinism and racism and 
violation of human rights.  This is the heritage which I took from being a 
refugee.  Which, unfortunately, most of the Israelis don’t share.  For them the 
Holocaust is a license to do evil to others.  And to me the lesson which I 
learned from Nazi Germany is that we have to insist on human rights.  That’s 
guaranteed, that it won’t happen again. L3 
 
That the emotional salience of the same traumatic event—in this case, the 
Holocaust—can underpin sacred values that are universalist, such as human rights, 
as well as those that are grounded in ingroup loyalty, such as that of Eretz Israel 
providing a safe haven for Jews alone, supports the thesis that the content of Sacred 
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Values varies according to relative reliance on different moral foundations (Graham 
& Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2009).  In the following section I analyse differences 
between Israeli political groups in their application of the Harm/Fairness foundations 
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and of how these differences correspond 
with the groups’ perceptions of the nature of group identity, and of possible solutions 
to the conflict. 
4.3.5 Selective application of the Harm/Fairness Moral Foundations 
Numerous studies indicate that conservative individuals identify more 
strongly as members of collectives while liberals are more universalist (see Haidt, 
2012).  However, all of the interviewees in this study, regardless of political 
affiliation, expressed concern for the safety, security and well-being of Israeli 
citizens.  They all applied the Harm/Fairness foundations to this perceived ingroup.  
But there were differences along the political spectrum regarding to whom among 
the perceived Palestinian outgroup they also applied the Harm/Fairness foundations.   
Figure 4.3 details which segments of the Palestinian population triggered 
moral dilemmas for the interviewees.  These figures indicate that the left wing faced 
Harm/Fairness-based moral dilemmas relating to the Palestinian population as a 
whole because they considered the military occupation of the Palestinian Territories 
as immoral full stop.  But groups further to the right cited interactions with 
increasingly smaller sub-sections of the Palestinian civilian population as having 
caused them moral dilemmas.  In other words, the categories of perceived Palestinian 
outgroup members whose situations within the context of the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict cause Harm/Fairness moral dilemmas for them, become fewer the farther to 
the political right one travels. 
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Figure 4.3: Specific sections of the Palestinian population cited by Israeli 
interviewees as having caused them moral dilemmas relating to military service 
 
Left Wing 
 
Centre Left Centre Right Right Wing 
Entire Palestinian 
population in West 
Bank 
Cited by 100% 
 
Entire Palestinian 
population in West 
Bank 
Cited by 90.9% 
None  
Cited by 40% 
None  
Cited by 55.5% 
Entire Palestinian 
population in Gaza 
Cited by 100% 
Entire Palestinian 
population in Gaza 
Cited by 72.7% 
Civilians used as 
human shields by 
Hamas  
Cited by 10% 
Children witnessing 
parents arrested or 
humiliated  
Cited by 22.2% 
 
Palestinian citizens of 
Israel 
Cited by 70% 
Civilians whose 
homes were searched 
Cited by 9.1% 
Civilians whose 
homes were 
confiscated  
Cited by 10% 
 
Children shouted at 
by soldiers  
Cited by 11.1% 
 
 Civilians mistreated 
at checkpoints 
Cited by 9.1% 
Civilians stopped and 
searched  
Cited by 10% 
Children searched by 
soldiers  
Cited by 11.1% 
 
  Palestinian workers 
trying to reach their 
jobs in Israel  
Cited by 10% 
 
 
  Children shot at by 
IDF 
Cited by 10% 
 
 
  Injured children  
Cited by 10% 
 
Note: where individuals cited entire populations (West Bank/Gaza/Israel), no further sub-groups cited 
by those individuals are listed, as these would be included within the larger populations.  A complete 
breakdown of groups cited by interviewees can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
The left wing interviewees described Harm/Fairness moral dilemmas as 
being triggered by the contrast between (a) universalist morals present in Jewish 
teachings (for example, in the books of the prophets in the Jewish Bible) and ethical 
values explicitly espoused by the IDF (see Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.), and (b) 
actions which they perceived as involving harmful and unfair treatment of civilians 
based solely on their membership of a particular ethnic group.  This quote by L1 
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describes the difference between how Jewish and Arab protesters in Jerusalem were 
treated by the authorities during protests in October 2000.   
And it was the first time when I couldn’t understand, like really, couldn’t 
understand how come, how come when it has to do with, like thousands, tens 
of thousands of Haredi [ultra-Orthodox Jewish] people that are throwing 
Molotov bottles at policemen, nobody get killed.  Some of them get arrested 
and get released after two hours.  And when Arab citizens are like facing 
policemen in a much less violent way, 13 [Arab] people are killed.  L1 
In concordance with other left wing interviewees, L1 perceived such 
differential treatment of Arabs and Jews, in addition to being morally abhorrent, as 
contributing to Israel’s security problems by causing more discontent and unrest 
among the Arab population: by not treating Arabs and Jews equally, Israel was 
condemning itself to intractable conflict.  In contrast, interviewees further to the right 
perceived a reverse of this dynamic, asserting that “unpleasant” treatment of Arabs 
was unfortunate but necessary. 
It’s hard to be ethical and moral when the other side is not. . . I think their 
extremes, they’ll do anything at any cost, which means targeting, you know, 
innocent people, which I think we would never, I know me personally I 
would never do, and I think 99% of the people here would never do that.  R7 
This difference of opinion regarding what constitutes fair and appropriate 
treatment of Palestinians corresponds with (a) differences across the political 
spectrum in how fixed or fluid individuals perceived group identity to be (see 
sections 3.3 and 3.4), and (b) with differences in what types of possible solutions to 
the conflict were considered to be plausible (see section 3.6).  Figures 4.4 and 4.5 
illustrate these differences among the 40 interviewees. 
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Figure 4.4: How/whether interviewees perceive differences between Jewish 
Israelis and Palestinian Arabs 
 Left Wing 
Cited by: 
Centre Left 
Cited by: 
Centre Right 
Cited by: 
Right Wing 
Cited by: 
 
Fluid 
 
[Identity is a 
Social 
Construct 
 
People are the 
same 
underneath 
 
Group identity 
not important] 
 
     70% 
 
 
     36.4% 
 
 
     10% 
 
 
      0 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
 
[Navigable 
Cultural/ 
Mindset 
Differences] 
 
     50% 
 
 
     54.5% 
 
 
     40% 
 
 
      44.4% 
 
 
Fixed 
 
[Genetic/ 
Biological 
Differences 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/ 
Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable 
from the land 
of Israel] 
 
     10% 
 
     36.4% 
 
     80% 
 
      100% 
Note: Some interviewees provided more than one category of answer, i.e., Fixed and Middle Ground 
(N=8); Fluid and Middle Ground (N=3); or Fixed and Fluid (N=1).  This reflects the complexities 
involved in their perceptions of group identity and difference. See Appendix 4 for a detailed 
breakdown. 
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Figure 4.5: Interviewees’ Suggested Solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
  
 Left Wing 
Cited by: 
Centre Left 
Cited by: 
Centre Right 
Cited by: 
Right Wing 
Cited by: 
One State: 
Democratic 
 
     40% 
 
      0       0       0 
One State: Jewish 
 
      0       0      10%      66.7% 
 
One State: 
Democratic & 
Jewish 
 
      0       0       0 
 
     11.1% 
 
Two States      50%      90.9%      50%       0 
 
Conflict will 
continue/Only 
relative peace 
possible 
     10%       0      10%      22.2% 
Strong Military 
Assault 
      0       0      40%     33.3% 
Socio-Economic 
Approach 
     10%      9.1%      20%       0 
Put PA in charge of 
Gaza 
      0       0      10%       0 
Palestinians 
restricted to 
enclaves: no vote; 
no military service 
      0       0       0      33.3% 
Involve Jordan in 
deciding where 
Palestinians will live 
(Transfer) 
      0       0       0      11.1% 
 
Negotiation 
 
 
     20% 
 
     27.3% 
 
     20% 
 
 
      0 
Unilateral Decisions       0       9.1%       0 
 
      0 
Note: This was not a list of options, but solutions and methods specifically and spontaneously 
suggested by the interviewees.  See Appendix 4 for a detailed breakdown. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates correspondence between (a) how fixed or fluid the 
political groups perceived group identity and differences to be, and (b) the types of 
possible solutions to be Israeli-Palestinian conflict which they considered to be 
appropriate and achievable. 
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Figure 4.6: Relation of Fixed/Fluid Identity to Possible Solutions to the Conflict 
 
 
This analysis indicates that, for these interviewees, the more fixed group 
identity and differences are conceived to be (which corresponds to the Purity moral 
foundation), the more appropriate it is perceived to be to treat Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinian Arabs differently.  If, as for the interviewees to the right of the political 
continuum, the two groups are understood as having differences in mentality and 
morality which are not amenable to change, then treating the Palestinians equally 
under the law and with regard to their autonomy (freedom of movement/voting 
rights) would be potentially harmful to the perceived Jewish Israeli ingroup.  In 
contrast, the more fluid group identity and differences are conceived to be, the more 
appropriate it is perceived to be to treat all individuals within the control of the State 
of Israel equally (whether as separate and autonomous, or as equal Israeli citizens).  
To do otherwise would be seen by the interviewees further to the political left as 
creating or exacerbating ill feeling between different groups, thereby putting 
everyone at greater risk of harm. 
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4.4 Summary of Studies 1 and 2 
The studies detailed in this chapter suggest that, although both liberals and 
conservatives value and apply the Harm/Fairness foundations (e.g. Graham et al., 
2009), how broadly/selectively the interviewees apply these differs depending on 
how fixed or fluid they perceive group identities of Jewish Israelis and Palestinian 
Arabs to be.  And this subsequently affects what they perceive to be appropriate and 
achievable solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
This research showed a clear pattern relating to differential application of the 
Harm/Fairness foundations along the political spectrum.  The left wing applied 
Harm/Fairness to the Palestinian populations as a whole when they experienced 
moral dilemmas resulting from being ordered to participate in a military occupation, 
and when witnessing differential treatment of Jewish and Palestinians citizens of 
Israel.  The centre left also experienced moral dilemmas relating to military 
occupation (Harm/Fairness), but deferred to the Authority of the state when ordered 
to do military service.  The centre right and right wing described experiencing 
Harm/Fairness-based moral dilemmas only in relation to certain specific sub-sets of 
the Palestinian population perceived as vulnerable, such as children. 
Taken together with the findings of Study 1, which showed that liberal left 
wing Israelis make a clearer distinction between the Harm/Fairness moral 
foundations and the Loyalty/Authority/Purity foundations than do right wing 
conservatives, the results of Study 2 indicate an inverse relationship between 
strength of adherence to the Loyalty/Authority/ Purity moral foundations and breadth 
of application of the Harm/Fairness moral foundations.  The Loyalty/Authority/ 
Purity moral foundations therefore appear to function to limit the extent of the 
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application of the Harm/Fairness moral foundations.  The potential implications of 
this for the current structure of moral foundations theory are discussed below. 
4.5 Implications for Moral Foundations Theory 
I would propose that there are two areas of muddiness in MFT’s presentation of the 
Fairness foundation which have to date not been addressed: fairness in relation to 
justice, and fairness in relation to ingroup loyalty.    
4.5.1 Clarifying Fairness in relation to Justice 
First, as highlighted in Chapter 1, MFT proposes a conception of fairness which is 
equated with justice.  In adopting what is essentially a universalist conception of 
fairness, MFT inadvertently undermines its own remit to describe morality in terms 
which are not limited to liberal western interpretations.  More conservative 
interpretations of justice can include concepts in which the rights of individuals 
directly relate to their predetermined position within an established hierarchy, for 
example in India’s caste system.  In such systems, treating individuals from different 
groups as equals (fairness) would be considered as violating conceptions of justice.  
If MFT seeks to address different cultural notions of what constitutes morality in its 
descriptive framework, I would suggest that the concept of fairness needs to be 
addressed separately from that of justice. 
 The current analysis provides support for this proposal as it indicates that 
more conservative Jewish Israelis, who according to these interviews perceive group 
identity as more fixed than do their more liberal co-nationals, consider it fair and 
appropriate to treat Palestinian Arabs differently (separate legal systems, restricted 
movement) from Jewish Israelis.  From a pragmatic point of view they argue that it 
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would be foolish and dangerous to do otherwise as the Palestinians would increase 
their attacks on Jewish Israelis.  In contrast, the very liberal left wing considers it fair 
and appropriate to treat Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis equally.  They argue 
that this would be pragmatic because to do otherwise creates more distrust and 
hatred between the groups, which puts Jewish Israelis at greater risk of violent 
attack.  Therefore, very conservative Israelis and very liberal Israelis would appear to 
hold different conceptions of fairness and justice.  For the very conservative, justice 
requires treating Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs differently (so, not ‘fair’ in the 
sense of equal treatment), while for the very liberal justice and fairness (in the sense 
of equal treatment) are inseparable.  
4.5.2 Clarifying Fairness in relation to Ingroup Loyalty 
 This begs the question of what it might mean to apply ‘fairness’ selectively. I 
would suggest that instead of constituting two independent moral foundations, 
Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty are better conceived of as representing opposite poles 
along a single continuum.  At one extreme would be Universal Fairness, in which all 
individuals are treated equally with relation to Harm vs. Care regardless of group 
affiliations.  At the other end of the continuum would be an extreme version of 
Ingroup Loyalty, in which perceived ingroup members would always receive 
preferential treatment (see Figure 4.7).  The results of the interview analysis strongly 
suggest that when individuals who strongly adhere to the moral foundations of 
Purity, Authority, and Ingroup Loyalty consider issues of Fairness, they limit their 
consideration of these issues to more restricted groups of individuals than do their 
more liberal counterparts.  For this reason, I would propose revisions to the Moral 
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Foundations Questionnaire to allow for differentiation between perceived morally 
acceptable treatment of ingroups versus outgroups. 
Figure 4.7: Revised Positioning of Fairness and Ingroup Loyalty 
 
Note: This is a schematic diagram, not an x/y chart. 
 
Indeed, one does not have to compare the extremes of left and right in this 
study to see this effect.  Centre left and left wing interviewees disagreed regarding 
whether or not Israel could be considered a democracy.  The left wing argued that 
Israel was not a true democracy as it barred millions of people under its control from 
voting, on the grounds of ethnicity.  By their reading, this was unfair and resulted in 
government policies which harmed Palestinians.  But the centre left, in arguing that 
they had a duty to obey their democratically-elected government when it ordered 
them to go against their own consciences regarding what they perceived as harms 
against the Palestinian population (for example, government policies relating to 
settlement expansion), demonstrated that they did not consider it unfair that the 
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Palestinians were unable to vote in these elections: the centre left were more 
restrictive regarding this particular application of fair (equal) treatment. 
4.5.3 Normative issues  
Haidt (2012, 2013) has acknowledged that strong adherence to the Authority 
/Loyalty/Purity foundations can, in certain circumstances, result in mistreatment of 
outgroups.  But he also contends that liberals have a blind spot in not understanding 
that these foundations can also contribute positively to group solidarity and 
community.  This raises two issues.  First, Haidt’s assertion would seem to suggest 
that liberals do not value any contributions to group cohesiveness and identity.  But 
liberal theorists of multiculturalism such as Kymlicka (1989, 2001) argue the 
benefits of cultural membership for individuals, and Stilz (2009) contends that 
shared principles of justice can form the basis of national loyalty among liberals.  To 
assert that liberals perceive no value for group membership would be an over-
simplification.  Second, according to Moral Foundations Questionnaire research, 
liberals do not wholly discount the Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations.  They 
simply give them less weight relative to the Harm/Fairness foundations (see Figure 
4.1). 
How one interprets this lies at the heart of the current debate regarding the 
normative claims associated with MFT.  While Haidt (2012) argues that these results 
indicate that conservatives have a richer moral palette than liberals as conservatives 
draw strongly on all five moral foundations, Jost (2012) contends that it instead 
indicates that liberals’ relative adherence to the different foundations is more 
discerning than that of conservatives.  I would propose that the findings of the 
current research introduce an additional normative consideration.  The analysis 
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detailed in this chapter suggests an inverse relationship between strength of 
adherence to the Authority/Loyalty/Purity foundations and breadth of the application 
of the Harm vs. Care moral foundation.  A further normative question is therefore 
whether one considers restricting the application of the Harm foundation in this way 
as morally valid, and whether this should vary between situations or whether it 
should be considered universally applicable.  
4.6 Limitations and future directions 
Interview dynamics are always complex, and never more so than in situations where 
participants feel compelled to protect the reputation of their perceived ingroup when 
talking with outsiders.  To that end, when asked to recall situations in which they 
experienced moral dilemmas, interviewees’ answers would be expected to reflect 
some degree of social desirability bias.  However, because the political groups 
differed in their concepts of what actually constitutes morality, then this would also 
affect how they perceive social desirability, and hence how they sought to present 
themselves to me as an interviewer.   
In the world of ingroup-outgroup dynamics, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
an extreme case.  It would be useful to apply MFT analysis to further case studies, 
ideally including groups who are not engaged in open conflict.  Such analysis, as 
well as having the potential to add to our understanding of specific ingroup-outgroup 
interactions, would also serve to reinforce or challenge my arguments regarding the 
benefits of altering the current structure of MFT with regard to clarifying the 
definition of Fairness, and to positioning it at one end of a continuum with Ingroup 
Loyalty at the other. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have made the following key arguments based on analysis of Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire results and of interviews with Jewish Israelis from across 
the political spectrum: 
 Strong adherence to the Binding moral foundations (Loyalty/Authority/ Purity) 
functions to limit the breadth of application of the Individualising moral 
foundations (Harm/Fairness).  In the current research, very conservative 
interviewees were more selective in their application of the Individualising moral 
foundations than very liberal interviewees, who applied the Individualising moral 
foundations more universally. 
 Selective application of the Individualising moral foundations corresponded with 
differences in how individuals from across the political spectrum viewed group 
identities: the liberal left wing perceived group identity as more fluid than did the 
conservative right wing. 
 These differences corresponded with variations in the types of possible solutions 
that the interviewees deemed viable.  The liberal left favoured solutions in which 
Palestinians were granted the same autonomy as Jewish Israelis, either through 
full involvement in the democratic process in a one state solution, or through 
separate nationhood via a two state solution.  In contrast, the conservative right, 
who considered group differences between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs 
as more fixed, favoured solutions in which Palestinians had more limited 
autonomy than Jewish Israelis, for example by being confined to specific 
geographic areas, in order to (a) ensure that Israel fulfilled its remit to be a 
Jewish state, and (b) prevent attacks on Israeli citizens. 
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In turn, these findings suggested amendments to aspects of the current formulation of 
MFT. 
 By definitionally including ‘justice’ as an element of the Fairness moral 
foundation, MFT is currently at odds with its remit to transcend a western, liberal 
conception of morality.  If ‘fairness’ is understood as treating people equally, 
then MFT needs to take into account that some very conservative societies 
consider unequal treatment of individuals based on their different positions/roles 
within society to be morally appropriate and just.  I propose that, as MFT is 
intended to provide a descriptive framework incorporating a broad range of 
understandings of what constitutes morality, ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ need to be 
definitionally distinct. 
 Building on the first two points, I further propose that, structurally, Fairness and 
Loyalty would be better conceived of as opposite ends of a single continuum 
rather than as two separate moral foundations (see Figure 4.6).  Analysis of the 
questionnaire and interview data suggests that liberals and conservatives among 
the participants in the current research hold different conceptions of ‘fairness.’  
According to the questionnaire analysis, both liberals and conservatives strongly 
value ‘fairness’ (see Figure 4.1).  But the interview analysis indicates that very 
conservative individuals largely restrict equal treatment to perceived ingroup 
members, while very liberal individuals tend to advocate equal treatment of 
individuals regardless of ethnic/religious affiliation.  If one conceives of extreme 
fairness (in the form of completely equal treatment regardless of family, ethnic, 
political, or national affiliation) at one end of a continuum, and extreme ingroup 
loyalty (in which perceived ingroups are always prioritized) at the other, then 
these results make sense.  Definitionally, they indicate two extremes, and one 
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would expect actual human beings to fall somewhere between these polar 
opposites, but with very conservative individuals closer to the Ingroup Loyalty 
end of the continuum, and more liberal individuals closer to the Fairness 
position.  Such a model corresponds with the findings of the current research. 
This chapter has focused on how competing moral intuitions can affect moral 
judgment for Jewish Israelis within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In 
the following two chapters I will extend my exploration of cognitive dynamics 
which can affect moral judgment within this context to consider the influence of a 
proposed cognitive bias not currently found within the literature: the effect of 
competent performance on the assessment of actor morality. 
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5    Narratives of Competence and Morality in Israeli Nationalist   
Discourse: the possible connection with cognitive bias 
5.1 Introduction 
In section 2.2.4 I described how, through remaining open to ‘useful noise’ 
arising from the semi-structured interviews, I began to question whether, when 
performing or observing actions which interviewees found morally troubling, their 
assessment of the morality of the actors involved was influenced by how 
competently they performed the actions in question.  Within the interviews, this 
dynamic between competent performance and assessment of actor morality appeared 
to exhibit across the political spectrum.  This led me to wonder whether/how 
narratives of competence and morality within Israeli national discourse would have 
been experienced by the interviewees, and how this might have influenced their 
subsequent moral judgments.  Although the focus of this chapter is on how these 
dynamics relating to competence and morality manifest within Israel, this is by no 
means an exclusively Israeli phenomenon.  For example, nationalist narratives such 
as that of “Manifest Destiny” in the USA, and European colonial narratives can, I 
would argue, also be interpreted in terms of perceived competence of performance 
contributing to moral justification for territorial expansion.  To unpack these 
dynamics within Israel, in this chapter I analyze nationalist narratives involving 
competence and morality specific to Israeli nationalist discourse, how these 
narratives are integrated into the educational system when preparing young people 
for military service, and how these narratives are subsequently embodied by 
individuals within their military service. 
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5.2 Discursive Analysis of Narratives of Competence and Morality 
in Israeli Nationalist Discourse 
The founders of modern Israel faced the task of creating a united Jewish 
nation-state from a population comprising individuals from diverse countries and 
backgrounds.  David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, understood the power 
that mythic narrative has in the formation of national consciousness.  Drawing on 
Biblical narratives already prevalent in19
th
 century Zionist discourse (making the 
desert bloom, Israel as a light unto the nations), and on the narrative of Jewish 
genius, Ben-Gurion played a key role in establishing a nationalist discourse which 
functioned to nurture pride and to instill a sense of belonging and common purpose 
within the nascent Israeli nation-state, and to justify its appropriation of land 
(Tzahor, 1995).    
In a letter to President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, David 
Ben-Gurion declared that Jewish genius would enable the nation of Israel not only to 
make the Negev desert bloom, but also to teach impoverished nations around the 
world to make their own deserts bloom, thus making it possible to feed the world’s 
hungry and, in doing so, to fulfill the Biblical prophecy of or lagoyim (Israel serving 
as a light unto the other nations) (Tzahor, 1995).  In this declaration, Ben-Gurion 
effectively linked three nationalist narratives— or lagoyim, Jewish Israelis making 
the desert bloom, and Jewish genius, which identify Jewish Israelis as having a 
destiny unique among the nations of the world.  I am interested in the role played by 
competence and morality in each of these narratives and of how this contributes to 
nationalist discourse.  In the following sections I use discursive analysis to unpack 
the dynamics of competence and morality within each of these narratives in turn. 
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5.2.1 Jewish Genius 
The narrative of Jewish genius contends that there is something special about 
the Jewish people—either because of genetic inheritance or cultural environment—
that has resulted in (a) above average intelligence, and (b) making a 
disproportionately large contribution to cognitively challenging fields such as 
science and mathematics relative to the small size of the Jewish population.  Within 
this narrative, IQ studies which show that Jewish people in America and Britain have 
higher mean IQ scores than British and American populations as a whole (Herrnstein 
& Murray, 1994; Lynn & Longley, 2006; Lynn & Kanazawa, 2008)
26
, and a 
disproportionate percentage of Jewish Nobel Prize winners (Berry, 1981; Zhang, 
1998) are two areas cited as evidence of exceptional Jewish genius.  Explanations 
for, and to a lesser extent evidence of, Jewish genius have been debated within both 
academia and among the general public.  But this narrative remains firmly fixed in 
the popular imagination.  Debates between supporters and detractors of the various 
theses to do with the Jewish genius narrative frequently take on a decidedly political 
flavor.   
Jewish individuals have frequently been cited as being disproportionately 
represented among Nobel Prize winners for contributions to cognitively challenging 
fields such as science and mathematics (Berry, 1981; Zhang, 1998).  Exact numbers 
and percentages have been contested, however, due in part to differing opinions on 
what qualifies someone as Jewish, and in part to ideological motivations either to 
downplay or emphasize Jewish accomplishment.  To cite two polarized examples, on 
                                                 
26
 Note: the data regarding higher mean IQ scores among Jewish populations only 
refer to Ashkenazim (those of European heritage).  See, for example, Cochran, 
Hardy, & Harpending (2006).   
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a website devoted to reviving anti-Semitism as a valid intellectual position, the 
pseudonymous Radl (2013) contends that figures purporting to show that Jewish 
people are over-represented among Nobel Prize winners are wrong due to flawed 
methodology and that they are in fact, under-represented.  In contrast, the February 
2006 online edition of Jewish Magazine declares that although Jews make up on 
0.2% of the world population and Muslims constitute 20%, there have been only six 
Arab Nobel Prize winners as compared with 165 Jewish winners [note the conflation 
of “Muslims” and “Arabs”].  “Can you supply a reason for the large discrepancy 
between the Arab/Islamic population’s contribution to the world body and that of the 
Jew?” the article asks provocatively (jewishmag.com, 2006).  As what constitutes 
Jewishness is hotly contested, even within Israel (see Chapter 3.3), there is no 
definitive answer to the question of how many Nobel Prize winners are Jewish: as 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, an individual who is to be considered Jewish according to 
halachic law may not identify as Jewish, while many people who identify as Jewish 
are not considered as such according to halachic law.  Broad or narrow definitions of 
Jewishness within these debates would appear to be chosen in the service of 
whichever ideological position is being argued. 
Within academia questions relating to Jewish intelligence have largely been 
debated between proponents of a strong genetic influence in intelligence and those 
who decry such analysis as biological determinism.  For example, Herrnstein and 
Murray (1994), authors of the controversial book on race and intelligence, The Bell 
Curve, although stating that both genes and culture contribute to intelligence, cited 
genetic differences between ethnic groups as strong determinants of intelligence.  In 
an article entitled, Jewish Genius, Murray (2007) argues that genetic components 
likely outweigh environmental influence in explaining high Jewish intelligence.  
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This article was published in Commentary, a neoconservative American magazine 
which was originally founded by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 1945, 
and which historian Richard Pells (2005) has described as the most consistently 
influential journal in political and cultural debates within the US.  The proposed 
strength of the link between race and intelligence has been widely criticized by more 
left-leaning scholars, for example by Chomsky (1972) who disparaged as racist 
Herrnstein’s thesis that intelligence is inherited, and that therefore differences in 
status and financial success between ethnic groups is evidence of a hereditary 
meritocracy.  Similarly, Gould (1996) decried Murray’s analysis as biological 
determinism which effectively ignored the impact of privilege and discrimination on 
different ethnic groups, and which erroneously reduced “intelligence” to a single 
numerical score. 
Explanations pointing to cultural factors specific to Jewish tradition to 
account for high levels of Jewish success in the sciences have also proved 
controversial and divisive.  One suggested explanation is that the emphasis on Torah 
study within ancient Judaism resulted in both high levels of literacy, and a culture of 
questioning and critical thinking which continues to this day (e.g., Lipset & Raab, 
1995; Aune, 2004).  But Hezser’s (2001) historical analysis of Jewish literacy within 
Roman Palestine suggests that literacy rates among Jews were lower than those of 
Greeks and Romans of the same period.  She argues that although Jewish males were 
required to have a rudimentary ability to read and write, ancient Judaism was 
primarily transmitted and understood through oral, ritual, and symbolic traditions.  
Hezser also contends that interpretation of religious texts was primarily the domain 
of the rabbis, and that only a small minority of the male population would have been 
in a position to have direct access to the Torah and to engage in discussions over 
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meaning.  Efron (2014) rejects both genetic determinism and specifically Jewish 
traits and cultural behaviors as an explanation for the success of Jewish people in 
science. Instead, he argues that historical persecution and the need to emigrate to 
new lands resulted in Jewish people embracing scientific endeavor as a means of 
creating new worlds in which Jews would not be victimized.   
Although the nature versus nurture debates on this subject are not only 
complex but also highly politically charged, within the narrative of Jewish high 
achievement in intellectually challenging fields, analyzing how competence and 
morality may be perceived of as interlinked is more straightforward.  Competence in 
scientific and technological endeavours can foster contributions to knowledge which 
have the potential to benefit all of humankind, such as medical advances in the 
treatment of cancer or malaria.  Such competence can, of course, also result in 
technologies which can prove morally divisive, for example, research into nuclear 
weaponry or on human cloning.  Be that as it may, the Jewish genius narrative 
foregrounds a strong link between competence and morality, highlighting both 
Jewish accomplishment and its contribution to humanity at large.   
The strength of this link, I would suggest, is why the numbers of Nobel Prize 
winners, and the explanations for Jewish IQ scores are considered so important, and 
why they are contested: if competence and morality are conceptually intertwined, 
then highlighting or attacking the competence of a particular group has implications 
for the perceived morality of that group.  The nationalist discourse to which the 
Jewish genius, making the desert bloom, and or lagoyim narratives contribute, does 
not isolate competence from morality.  The Jewish people are presented as having a 
unique responsibility to use their intellectual gifts and moral standing to benefit not 
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only themselves, but the wider world as well.  In short, to be or lagoyim, a “light 
unto the other nations.” 
5.2.2 Or lagoyim 
It is too small a thing for you to be my servant to restore the tribes of Jacob 
and bring back those of Israel I have kept. I will also make you a light for the 
Gentiles, that my salvation may reach to the ends of the earth. Isaiah 49:6   
In Ben-Gurion’s nationalist vision, the state of Israel was to serve as a beacon 
to the international community by creating an ideal society worthy of emulation.  In 
this way, the nascent state would legitimize both its initial founding and its 
continuing development, and thereby garner international support necessary first for 
Israel’s establishment and then for its security (Avi-Hai, 1974; Bar-Joseph, 2000).  
In translating the concept of or lagoyim into a nationalist mission, Ben-Gurion 
effectively secularized and territorialised the biblical prophecy found in Isaiah.  
Creating such a link between the religious and the secular was in line with classical 
Zionist principles (Gurkan, 2009).  
 In addition to providing justification for Israel’s existence as a nation-state to 
the international community, or lagoyim also functioned to instill a sense of 
collective mission among Jewish Israelis.  This sense of mission was realized in the 
1950s and 1960s through programs bringing training and aid to developing countries 
(Inbar, 1990) and has remained relevant within the Israeli psyche through IDF aid 
missions providing disaster relief (Stand for Israel, 2015; Erlich, Segal, Marom, 
Dagan & Glassberg, 2015) and through scientific and technological achievements 
(Birenbaum-Carmeli, Carmli, & Cohen, 2000; Almog, 2001; Efron, 2011).   
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It has also been argued that scientific and technological achievement by 
Jewish Israelis, in addition to providing practical support for the establishment and 
sustenance of the state, has also been cited as justification for Israeli control over 
territory.  The core of this argument is that, through superior scientific capabilities, 
Israel is able to produce technologies that benefit everyone within the region (and 
beyond), and that therefore Israel has a greater moral right to control of lands than 
the indigenous Arab population who would not make such good use of the resources 
(Efron, 2011).  This narrative dovetails with stereotypes of Arabs as not being 
capable of making proper use of western technologies as a result of entrenched 
cultural differences (Suleiman, 2004), and serves to create a clear distinction 
between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.  Indeed, the heart of the concept of or 
lagoyim suggests something inherently unique about the Jewish people in contrast to 
all the other nations of the world: the Jewish nation has been tasked with setting an 
example to everyone else, and as long as they are not obstructed in this mission, the 
rest of the world will also benefit from the achievements of the people of Israel.   
Again, nationalist narratives of superiority are not unique to Israel.  But such 
reasoning, I would suggest, has been a contributory factor of Israeli unilateralism in 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Policies as diverse as the 
disengagement from Gaza in 2005, and the establishment of boundaries through the 
construction of the separation barrier/wall in the West Bank which began in 2002, 
were undertaken as unilateral measures by the Israeli government.  An Israeli 
narrative of Palestinian Arabs being inherently less capable than Jewish Israelis, 
coupled with the sense of mission inherent within or lagoyim, produces a discourse 
in which unilateral action on the part of Israel is perceived as not only permissible, 
but morally imperative.  Prime Minister Netanyahu has cited Israel’s ability to 
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determine its own destiny as crucial in order for the nation to thrive and to serve as a 
light unto the other nations (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).  There is, I 
would suggest, a fine line between a conception of one’s nation as having a 
responsibility to act as an example to other peoples, and a justification for acting 
against the wishes of those same people.  Indeed, Efron (2011) describes the Zionist 
attitude towards technologically-driven increases in agricultural production as 
combining (a) a Calvinistic belief that equates success with divine election, with (b) 
a Lockean belief that improving the land entitles one to ownership of the land.  He 
argues that this strongly colonialist attitude unites elements of “intellectual 
superiority, inerrant entitlement, and selfless virtue” (Efron, 2011, p.422).   
This is not to downplay advancements by Israeli scientists that have 
undoubtedly benefitted the wider world, such as the development of micro-irrigation 
techniques that have improved agriculture yields in developing countries (Hillel, 
1987; WorldFoodPrize.org; 2012).  Indeed, technological achievements relating to 
agriculture and water management have proved particularly powerful symbolically, 
linking the concept of or lagoyim to the narrative of “making the desert bloom.”  But 
I would argue that when a nationalist discourse includes narratives in which such 
competence is provided as moral justification for appropriation of land, the declared 
mission of providing benefit to other peoples suffers.  Decades worth of Israeli 
government-sanctioned destruction of Palestinian agricultural projects have been 
documented, for example, uprooting olive trees, fouling or destroying water supplies, 
destroying greenhouses, and preventing farmers from reaching their lands (PFCSO, 
2013; United Nations, 2014).   
Perceived divisions between “us” and “them” relating to land and rights exist 
within the Israeli polity itself.  Ongoing disputes between the Israeli government and 
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the Bedouin (who are citizens of Israel) over land rights have resulted in repeated 
evictions from and destruction of Bedouin villages by the government (Falah, 1989; 
Rangwala, 2004).  In February 2002 the Israeli government sent planes to spray 
poisonous chemicals on 12,000 dunams of land cultivated by Bedouins in the Negev 
(Naqab in Arabic) desert near Beersheva, in order to destroy the crops.  The action 
was repeated in October 2002.  Avigdor Lieberman, then the minister responsible for 
land management, made the following statement: “We must stop their illegal 
invasion into state land by all means possible; the Bedouins have no regard for our 
laws; in the process we are losing the last resources of state lands; one of my main 
missions is to return power to the Land Authority in dealing with the non-Jewish 
threat to our lands.  At the same time, we must settle the land by building new 
communal settlements and family farms.  If we don’t do this, we shall lose the 
Negev forever” (quoted in Yiftachel, 2006, p.3).  Lieberman clearly differentiates 
between “we” Jewish Israelis and “they” as non-Jewish Israelis with respect to who 
has rights to the land (Yiftachel, 2006).  Right wing politicians such as Lieberman 
adhere to an interpretation of Isaiah’s prophecy by which only the Jewish people can 
truly make the desert bloom. 
5.2.3 Making the desert bloom 
The desert and the parched land will be glad; the wilderness will rejoice and 
blossom. Like the crocus, it will burst into bloom; it will rejoice greatly and 
shout for joy. (Isaiah 35:1-2)   
This promise, of a time of peace and plenty when the Jewish people will 
return to the land of Israel and make the desert bloom, has long been a cornerstone of 
Zionist ideology (Kellerman, 1996; Schely-Newman, 1997).  The Jewish National 
174 
 
Fund (JNF), established in 1901 by the World Zionist Organization (WZO) to 
purchase and cultivate land in Palestine for the creation of a Jewish state, draws 
heavily on this prophecy in describing its ongoing mission and achievements: “JNF 
is supporting a new generation of Israeli pioneers in fulfilling David Ben Gurion’s 
vision of making the desert bloom, ensuring Israel’s vitality for generations to come” 
(Jewish National Fund: Our History, 2009). 
The Zionist project envisioned (re-)uniting the Jewish people with the land of 
Israel through the creation of the “New Jew,” or Sabra.  Named after a prickly pear, 
a Sabra was seen as tough and thorny on the outside but sweet on the inside.  In 
contrast to the perceived bookishness of the “old” Jews of Europe, the Sabra was 
physically fit from agricultural work which not only functioned to reclaim the land, 
but also the bodies and souls of the Jewish pioneers (Tzahor, 1995; Bar-Itzhak, 
2005).  According to this narrative, the Jewish pioneers (halutzim) arrived in 
Palestine, and through superior technology, determination and hard work, reclaimed 
territory that had either been left as, or allowed to deteriorate into, wasteland by the 
local Arab population (Bar-Itzhak, 2005; Penslar, 2007).  
 Various elements of this narrative have proved controversial.  First, the 
nature of the activities of the JNF have long been argued over, specifically, whether 
their purchase of Palestinian land was part of an explicit plan to make the entire area 
exclusively Jewish.  Historians such as Morris (1988) have contended that expulsion 
of Arab populations were unplanned by-products of war rather than intentional 
Zionist strategies.  But Khalidi (1961, referenced in Pappe, 2006) argues that “Plan 
Dalet,”a set of guidelines formulated by the Haganah in 1948 for gaining control of 
land in order to establish the Israeli state, indicates that expulsion of Arabs was, 
instead, an intentional strategy.  And Masalha’s (1992) analysis of archival material 
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including diaries of early Zionist leaders provides evidence of a strategy of “transfer” 
of the Arab population into neighboring Arab countries, for example as evidenced by 
the following quote from Yosef Weitz, the JNF’s Director of Land Development: 
"only [Arab] population transfer and evacuating this country so it would become 
exclusively for us is the solution" (Masalha, 1992, p.132; see Shlaim, 1994 for 
analysis of contrasts between Morris’s and Masalha’s theses).   
The narrative of pre-halutzim Palestine as a wasteland has been contested in 
two key ways.  First, the narrative has been criticized as downplaying or ignoring 
existing Palestinian Arab agriculture (e.g., George, 1979), and second, for the 
perceived assumption that only a Europeanized afforested landscape constitutes 
proper use of the land (e.g., Bar-Itzhak, 2005; Sheikh &Weizman, 2015).  While 
acknowledging the accomplishments in land reclamation and agriculture achieved by 
Jewish pioneers, George (1979) analyses historical records which indicate that less 
than 50% of pre-halutzim Palestine had a desert climate, and that much of the land 
“reclaimed” by the pioneers was, in fact, Arab farmland.  Some difference in 
perception of Arab cultivation of the land between Jewish pioneers and the British 
government can be found in a seemingly innocuous paragraph in a 1947 report to the 
UN General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP).  “According to government estimates, most of the land capable of being 
cultivated by present methods is under crops, and any considerable development 
depends on more advanced methods of farming and, more particularly, on more 
extensive irrigation.  Jewish authorities claim, however, that government estimates 
are too conservative” (UNSCOP, 1947).  The report acknowledged differences in 
technologies employed by Jewish and Arab farmers in Palestine, with Jewish farmers 
bringing financial investment and modern irrigation methods, but pointed out 
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differences in motivations for farming by the two populations.  Arab farmers were 
focused on being self-sustaining, while Jewish farmers were interested in producing 
exportable crops: although production of vegetables by Arab farmers was less than 
that of Jewish farmers, the production costs of the Arab farmers were also lower 
(UNSCOP, 1947).  
Control and use of water would, of course, become hotly contested issues in 
the region.  On the one hand, modern water management technologies have made it 
possible to increase agricultural productivity (Friedler, 2001; Oron, DeMalach, 
Gillerman, David, & Lurie, 2002;), but there have also been negative environmental 
impacts including seawater seeping into fresh water aquifers, and contamination of 
water sources through fertilizer run-off (Tal, 2006; Levinson, 2008).  And then there 
are the political implications of water policies.  Broich (2013) describes as 
“environmental Orientalism” the attitudes of British and Zionist conceptions of 
Arabs and contends that water policies in British Mandatory Palestine negatively 
affected Arab farmers’ capabilities to maintain viable agricultural projects.  Lowi 
(1993) describes prohibitions barring Palestinian Arabs from drilling wells without 
permission from the Israeli Civilian Administration.  She describes how only 
“existing uses” of water by West Bank Palestinian farmers are recognized, 
effectively restricting water usage to 1968 levels with only a small margin for 
growth allowed.  More recent water policies have continued this trend.  Reports from 
Amnesty International (2009) and the World Bank (2009) indicate that Israeli 
controls over water use greatly disadvantage Palestinians, whose water consumption, 
at up to 70 litres per day per person, fails to meet the World Health Organization’s 
recommended daily minimum of 100 litres.  Overall Israeli water consumption is 
four times the amount of that of the Palestinians, while water consumption for some 
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Israeli settlements in the West Bank is up to 20 times greater than that of 
neighbouring Palestinian communities (Amnesty, 2009).  As a result of Israeli 
territorial jurisdiction, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to regulate 
management of water sources in the West Bank.  This disparity of power has 
resulted, for example, in Israel increasing its own share of water drawn from the 
Western Aquifer while preventing Palestinians from drilling wells into the aquifer in 
order to meet the growing needs of its population (World Bank, 2009). 
Coupled with restrictions that frequently prevent Palestinian farmers from 
reaching their lands (O’Callaghan, Jaspars, & Pavanello, 2009; Fields, 2010), such 
water policies have limited the potential for improving agricultural techniques.  
Could it be that policies limiting Palestinian farmers’ ability to develop their lands 
result in a self-fulfilling prophecy relating to the roles of competence and morality 
within the “making the desert bloom” narrative?  If Jewish Israeli agricultural 
competence is perceived as contributing to a moral justification for control of land, 
and government policy severely limits the ability of Palestinian Arabs to farm their 
lands competently then, could the resulting differences in agricultural production be 
perceived by some as confirmation of the biblical prophecy that the “wasteland” of 
Palestine will only bloom when it is once again in Jewish hands?  
I have suggested that the three narratives discussed above—Jewish genius, or 
lagoyim, and making the desert bloom—each incorporate elements of competence 
and morality which, at times, become intertwined in such a way that they may feed 
into a nationalist discourse in which Jewish Israeli competence serves as a 
justificatory factor for control of contested territory.  This argument builds on 
Efron’s (2011) contention that Israeli technological superiority is equated with 
perceived exceptional morality and of entitlement to land within Zionist discourse.  
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As a country with near-universal military conscription, military values in Israel do 
not constitute a separate, isolated culture, but are instead inseparable from 
mainstream narratives (Al-Qazzaz, 1973; Israelashvili, 1992).  If competence and 
morality can become conflated within the nationalist discourse, effectively justifying 
appropriation of territory, how does this translate into narratives of competence and 
morality specifically relating to the military?  And how might competent or 
incompetent performance of military duties affect individual soldiers’ assessment of 
the morality of themselves, their fellow soldiers, and the missions on which they are 
engaged?    
5.3 Narratives of Competence and Morality in Israeli Military 
Discourse 
In this section I integrate embodied discourse analysis of interview data 
relating to the lived experience of preparation for, and participation in, military 
service of the 40 Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious objector I interviewed, 
with discursive analysis of narratives of competence and morality specifically 
relating to the Israeli military.   
At its inception, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was perceived as the 
embodiment of a nationalist discourse in which the Jewish people re-established 
themselves securely in their historical homeland, and through hard work and 
intelligence, made the desert bloom (Ben-Eliezer, 1998).  Formed as a conscript 
army by Ben-Gurion in 1948, the IDF was intended to serve a function far beyond 
that of merely defending the state.  Ben-Gurion perceived the soldiers of the IDF as 
the natural successors to the pre-state halutzim (pioneers): soldiers would not only 
protect the nascent state, but also serve as educators and nation-builders.  They 
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would follow in the footsteps of the early pioneers by reclaiming the desert, and 
military service would function to mould Jewish immigrants from around the world 
into a unified and successful Israeli nation (Ben-Ari, 1998; Weissbrod, 2002).   
The school system systematically and pedagogically prepares young people 
for participation in military service.  The following English translation of an excerpt 
from an Israeli Ministry of Education Directive (2007) defining the goals of the 
education system with regard to preparation of young people for military service 
illustrates how Ben-Gurion’s vision of halutzim-soldiers is integrated into the 
education system. 
2.1 To cultivate the adolescents’ feeling of identification and belonging to 
the people, the land, and the State of Israel: 
 a. to develop the adolescents’ Zionist Israeli identity and culture 
 b. to develop the adolescents’ commitment to the community and to 
society 
 c. to raise the consciousness of the youth to the importance of the 
multi-cultural encounter between soldiers in the IDF that reflects the 
diversity of Israeli society 
2.2 To reinforce the feeling of responsibility amongst youth to fulfil their 
right and civil obligation to preserve the security of the state 
2.3 To raise youth’s awareness of questions of moral values while 
reinforcing their critical ability and judgment, their individual 
thinking, and their initiative 
2.4 To encourage adolescents’ willingness to serve meaningfully in the 
IDF while emphasising the importance of service in the military 
alliance, according to the army’s needs, and to their talents and 
aspirations. 
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By linking Zionist ideals to meaningful military service, and to development 
of students’ capabilities and moral values, the education system in Israel begins a 
process through which narratives of competence are linked to those of morality with 
respect to the IDF.  Preparations in high school for military service may include 
information sessions, visits to schools from serving soldiers, psychological and 
physical tests, special needs training, physical training, and a week spent at an army 
base (Israelashvili, 1992).  Physical, cognitive, and psychological testing continues 
during the initial phase of induction into the military in order to assign individuals to 
the military roles and units to which they are deemed most suitable (Israel Defense 
Forces, 2015).  This selection process is highly competitive, and young Israelis find 
themselves competing against not only their previous capabilities, but also directly 
against their peers, in order to secure their place within the military hierarchy.   
But the IDF, everybody goes, it’s good.  The kids, we always used to brag 
about, no, I’m going to be more of a hero than you, I’m going to be a pilot, 
I’m going to be… it was obvious that this (pause) You’re going to go to the 
army, you’re going to do a good job, you’re going to be excellent, and it’s a 
good thing, and obviously the things in high school, the system’s worked out 
this way to bring you fully motivated into the army.  L8 
Highly motivated young Israelis are prepared to throw themselves bodily into 
preparations that will improve their chances of gaining the positions within the 
military that they desire, and which will secure their status in the wider Israeli 
society.  A left wing conscientious objector who had previously served in the air 
force described how, as a high school student, he and a few of his friends undertook 
additional physical training prior to their induction into the military in order to 
maximize their chances for getting assigned to elite training programmes such as 
those for pilots.  
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We signed up to this guy that we paid to get us running around hills with 
bags of sand on our backs and stuff like that.  It sounds very crazy today, but 
we did it then.  Our parents paid for it.  And we took it extremely seriously.  I 
think more as a status symbol than wanting to sacrifice for the state or 
anything like that.  L6 
  A centre right reserve soldier described his own transformation from “a very 
fat child” to physically fit as the point at which he became interested in what he 
might be able to accomplish in the military. 
When I was in 11
th
 grade I decided I’m knocking off some kilograms.  I 
dropped like 15 kilos in 3 months.  And then I said, ok, I’m fit, let’s try and 
see what I can do, like going into the army…that’s the only point that I 
started to show any interest in the IDF. Before that it wasn’t any interest of 
me.  CR3 
In both of these quotes, the desire to “prove oneself,” rather than a strong 
desire to serve the State per se, is evident.  Although in different parts of these 
interviews both of these men also described being motivated to serve their nation, the 
opportunity to test oneself and to compete with one’s peer group were clearly strong 
motivators for some teenage recruits to the IDF—including those who had strong 
nationalist motivations. 
Because I grew up in a kibbutzim religious society, the drive to serve the 
country is very, very high.  And there’s a lot of competition.  You really feel 
like, ok, well if that guy’s going to be a pilot, I want to be, you know, in 
[Sayeret] Matkal
27
, because I want to be better than him. CL2 
Striving for competence in the highly competitive induction phase of military 
service reinforces the narrative of the IDF as highly capable.  This complements the 
narrative of Israeli military superiority.  Israel’s achievements in military technology 
                                                 
27
 Sayeret Matkal is a special forces unit within the IDF. 
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are internationally recognized, and include leading the field in the export of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones (FSRN, 2014); 
development of anti-missile technology such as the Iron Dome system (Shapir, 
2013); and technology that enables shooting at targets from around corners 
(cornershot.com, n.d.).  Participating in complex, competently performed, military 
operations in such a technologically advanced army can prove very attractive to 
individual soldiers. 
So you find in Israel the best people go to the army…At least 20 years ago.  
So there were a lot of great people in the unit.  It was very interesting.  You 
done a lot of many, many operations everywhere.  Like movie stuff, like 
action movie stuff…Lot of operations, lot of very complicated operations.  
The Israeli army is really, really very good.  At least the elite units.  I’m not 
sure about the other parts.  And it was very, very fulfilling.  Very 
empowering.  L1 
 Whether serving as combat soldiers or in non-combat positions such as IT 
development or education, individual recruits find themselves performing their 
prescribed roles within a highly competitive hierarchy in which competence is both 
valued and rewarded.  The narrative of military competence describes a meritocracy 
where those above you in rank are there because they have earned that right.  But 
officers also receive additional training relating to ethics as part of their military 
service, thereby reinforcing the sense that one’s superior officers are also well-versed 
in moral judgment.  And there is an ethos within the IDF of combat commanders 
leading from the front as summed up by the expression, “Follow me.”  This tactic 
has been cited as the reason for high casualty rates among officers. For example, in 
the 2014 invasion of Gaza, 44% of the 64 IDF fatalities were commanders 
(Ginsburg, 2014).  But the willingness of commanders to put themselves in the line 
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of fire ahead of their troops functions to boost morale within the ranks and 
encourages soldiers to trust their superior officers (Flah, 2005).     
The people who we give deadly power to are also generally your higher 
quality people because you have to trust them to do the right thing…I have 
officers who, you know, I went to war with, and I’d do it again.  Never had 
anybody who I didn’t respect, who didn’t meet that standard. CR5 
Indeed, Bar-Tal, Halperin, and Oren (2010) argue that the narrative of Israeli 
military technological superiority is complemented by a narrative of moral 
superiority.  During the second intifada, when Israel’s military operations were 
coming increasingly under scrutiny by the international community (Kober, 2007), 
Shaul Mofaz, then IDF Chief of Staff, famously described the IDF as “the most 
moral army in the world.”  Since then this highly contentious phrase has been taken 
up with enthusiasm by Israeli politicians as well as by the military and much of the 
public (e.g., Medzini, 2009; Keinon, 2014; Novak, 2014), and is embodied in the 
public imagination by the figure of the “good soldier” who is considered to represent 
the majority of the military, while the more morally questionable figure of the “bad 
soldier” is held to represent only a small minority (Even-Tzur & Hadar, 2014).  The 
IDF is presented as exceptionally moral based on two complementary narratives, that 
of only going to war when there is no other choice (ayn breirah), and that of “purity 
of arms” (tohar haneshek), which entails practising restraint and engaging in humane 
conduct when at war (Sucharov, 2005).   
But as well as being contested within the international community, some 
Israelis have also disputed this claim of exceptional morality.  The role of the air 
force (IAF) in national debates about morality and warfare has been significant.  The 
air force is widely considered to be at the pinnacle of the IDF hierarchy, with pilots 
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viewed as the cream of the cream of Israeli society due to the high level of skill and 
intelligence required to successfully qualify as a pilot.  The IAF’s slogan, “The Best 
to the Air Force” has been widely accepted since Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six Day 
War (Ben-Eliezer, 1998; Epstein, 2001).  Competition to become a pilot is fierce.  
Pilots are not only considered to be extremely competent, but are also seen as 
personifying the ethical values of the IDF, and by extension those of the Israeli state.    
One centre right interviewee who served in a support role in the air force 
described looking to the pilots for moral guidance even though, and perhaps even 
because, they were further to the left politically than he was. 
Pilots that serve in the IDF, today many of them are in the left part of the 
political map...And so I always thought to myself, ok, if they’re doing those 
stuffs, and I knew that the air force was very professional, very moral, in 
terms of quality of people it was very high quality, especially the pilots.  This 
is like the top—top of the top, really.  You can’t even, I don’t know, there are 
Navy Seals, or Sayeret Matkal, which are also very good units, but still, 
pilots are, yeah, over there [pointing up].  So I knew that nothing immoral 
happened.  CR6 
CR6 describes the IAF, and especially the pilots, as “very professional, very 
moral, in terms of quality of people it was very high quality.”  Here, competence and 
morality are seen as existing hand in hand for “high quality” individuals.  In trusting 
in the pilots’ moral judgment, CR6 has effectively relegated moral decision-making 
to people higher in the hierarchy.  Such trust in the moral judgement of pilots has a 
long history.  This is why, when in 2003 a group of pilots not only publicly 
denounced the morality of IAF bombing missions in Gaza, but removed themselves 
bodily from further military service, their actions caused shock across the nation. 
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The pilots’ actions were in response to the targeted assassination by the IAF 
of Salah Shehadeh, the leader of the military wing of Hamas.  When the IAF bombed 
Shehadeh’s house, the explosion destroyed the neighbouring house as well.  The 
bomb killed 15 people in total, including eight children and three women, as well as 
injuring dozens of others (Margalit, 2012).  Twenty-seven reserve and active duty 
pilots signed what came to be known as “The Pilots’ Letter,” stating that they were 
no longer prepared to drop bombs in residential areas or to provide support for such 
missions (see Appendix 4).  In statements to the media they said that they did not 
want to become war criminals.  The pilots’ position as the elite of the elite within the 
IDF meant that this very public act of conscientious objection caused uproar within 
Israel, and the leadership was quick to vilify the pilots as providing support to 
terrorist organizations which sought Israel’s destruction (Ben-Eliezer, 2012). 
The pilots challenged a narrative common among technologically-advanced 
militaries—that “pinpoint” bombing is sufficiently accurate to morally justify aerial 
bombardment in civilian areas.  The strength of this narrative can be persistent, even 
in the face of high civilian casualties.  Where bombing missions targeting specific 
individuals or infrastructure are perceived as competently performed, civilian 
casualties may be viewed as unfortunate but as sincerely unintended.  In this way 
moral concerns can be reduced even in the face of increasing numbers of civilian 
casualties.  But analysis of the interview data raised the question of whether 
perceived competence of such missions might provide a moral “cushion” by which 
an individual’s moral qualms regarding bombings carried out in civilian areas might 
be mitigated, while perceived incompetence might instead heighten such moral 
concerns.  This appeared to be the case for one IAF air traffic controller, L6. 
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Incompetent performance, on the part of themselves or of others, appeared to 
prove the final straw that led some reserve soldiers such as L6 to remove themselves 
physically from military duties.  L6 held political views that made him 
uncomfortable with participating in the military occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories and with taking part in aerial bombing campaigns in civilian areas in 
Gaza, but he continued to perform his military service within the elite IAF.  His 
perception of the air force as being highly competent suffered, however, when he 
moved up the chain of command and observed and took part in operations which 
allowed him to see how things actually played out in real-world situations. 
 And my big experience was in the Gaza war in 2008.  I was doing reserve.  I 
did my reserve service in Tel Aviv, in the higher chain of command.  And 
one of the days there was a lot of pressure, throwing a lot of bombs in a short 
period of time.  One of the goals of that operation was to sort of shock and 
awe the Gazan population.  Said they wanted an effect of a bomb landing 
every minute on different targets…And the problem was that we had two 
different airplanes that were supposed to attack the same house.  I was in 
charge of both of them, and he [the commander] said cease fire on the target, 
and I was under, I mean I had too many airplanes, and I didn’t notice that two 
of them had the same target, and I just told one of them to cease fire, and the 
other one fired and bombed the house.  So, that’s an incident that I was 
directly in charge of.  Me and the commander that didn’t make sure that I 
stopped everything that was (pause) and that kind of shocked me…So, I was 
in complete shock in that minute, so I didn’t really understand.  The 
commander later on said it looked like it was ok, there were no civilians.  I 
don’t know if he really meant that or not.  The IDF didn’t do any, um, serious 
investigation into the matter.  It was really not a big deal.  For me it was a big 
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deal, but for them (pause) you know how many civilians were killed in that 
operation
28, so…  L6 
For L6, it was his own and his commander’s incompetence, and not his 
participation per se in a “shock and awe” bombing campaign of which he already 
disapproved on moral grounds, and which he recognised was resulting in high 
numbers of civilian casualties, that led to his refusal to do further military service.  It 
was a failure in competence which, in the end, made this interviewee question the 
morality of his own involvement in the 2008 aerial bombing campaign in Gaza to the 
extent where he felt compelled to physically remove himself from further 
participation.  However, one might arguably interpret this in one of two ways.  First, 
it might be argued that incompetence in this situation negatively affected L6’s 
assessment of the morality of remaining in the IDF because the incompetent action 
put Palestinian civilian lives at greater risk.  If this were the case, then the dynamic 
between competent performance and assessment of actor morality would indicate an 
appropriate integration of relevant information in the assessment of actor morality: if 
actors are not sufficiently competent to ensure that all safeguards for civilians are put 
into place, then this could be seen as relevant to the morality of engaging in the 
operation.   
But there is another possible explanation which dovetails with the 
aforementioned contesting of a narrative of pinpoint bombing as being sufficiently 
accurate to protect innocent civilians from unnecessary risk.  In this argument, a 
perception of competent performance can function to imply that any number of 
civilian casualties is acceptable as long as the actors are performing their specific 
                                                 
28
 Israeli and Palestinian NGOs estimate between 1,385 and 1,419 Palestinian fatalities d during 
Operation Cast Lead, with at least 308 of these under the age of 18. Over 5000 were wounded. There 
were thirteen Israeli fatalities, including 3 civilians. (Institute for Middle East Understanding, 2012)  
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tasks competently.  From my analysis of L6’s statements, this explanation would 
appear to be a better fit for his assessment of the situation: he felt that the perceived 
technological skills of the IDF served as a smokescreen to the damage being done to 
Palestinian civilians.  I began to think that if this were the case, then the 
competence/morality dynamic might indicate the presence of a cognitive bias not 
currently found within the literature. 
The experience of another reserve soldier, CL4, provides further support for 
the hypothsized effect that competent or incompetent performance may have on the 
assessment of morality.   When asked about moral dilemmas he had experienced 
during his military service, CL4 described incidents which troubled him in terms of 
incompetence.  In one example, he described what he perceived as incompetence on 
the part of the IDF which led to the destruction of several Palestinian families’ water 
supplies.  His unit was searching domestic reservoirs in family homes to see if a 
wanted man they were looking for was hiding in one of them.  To determine whether 
or not the man was in a particular reservoir, the soldiers would throw either a live or 
a fake grenade into it, to either kill the man or frighten him into coming out where 
they could capture him.   
CL4 described feeling frustrated that they were not taking a more 
“professional” approach to the problem, for instance by putting a camera on a pole 
and putting that into the reservoir to see if anyone was hiding, instead of destroying 
families’ water supplies.  He described how the family members would plead with 
him in Arabic not to destroy their reservoirs.  Although he does not speak Arabic, he 
said that their meaning was all too clear, and that their fear and distress in turn 
caused him distress. “I wanted it not to happen, and I couldn’t influence that at all.”  
However, he stated that, although he still would not have been able to change what 
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his colleagues were doing, his moral discomfort would have been reduced if he had 
been fluent (competent) in Arabic and he could have apologized to the families.   
I felt bad about it but it really translated to practical things for me.  I wanted 
to know Arabic.  It really felt that if I could talk to them, it would be better, 
so I was really frustrated that I can’t make this conversation.  CL4 
CL4’s description of this incident reveals two separate aspects of the 
dynamic between competence of performance and assessment of morality.  First, 
increased competence—in having the resources to search the reservoirs without 
destroying them—would have enabled him to behave in a way that he perceived as 
more humane, while still obeying protocol.  An alternative to blowing up the 
reservoirs could have been employed and the families would not have lost their 
water supplies.  In this way, increased competence would result in less risk of harm 
to the Palestinian families.  This corresponds with the first explanation of the 
proposed competence/morality dynamic as detailed in the analysis of L6’s interview 
above. 
However, I would suggest that the second dynamic is quite different.  If 
being able to communicate competently with the families whose water supplies were 
about to be destroyed would result in CL4 feeling less morally troubled, then I would 
argue that competence of performance in this case was affecting CL4’s assessment 
of his own morality in an inappropriate way.  If he had been sufficiently competent 
in speaking Arabic, he could have apologized, thereby communicating that he was a 
“good person.”  However, the level of risk of harm to the Palestinian families would 
not change—the reservoirs would still be destroyed and the families would still lose 
their water supplies—but, according to his own assessment, CL4’s moral qualms 
would have decreased.  Interestingly, although this situation had caused him to 
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consider becoming a conscientious objector, he continued to do reserve duty in the 
IDF.  In accordance with the diktats of the State, his physical presence within the 
military continued.   
The examples of the moral dilemmas described by L6 and CL4 pose 
interesting questions regarding dynamics between perceived competence of 
performance and assessment of actor morality for soldiers when faced with situations 
which they find morally problematic.  Both of these men considered the continuing 
military occupation of the Palestinian Territories to be morally problematic.  But 
both had continued to do reserve duty.  For each of these men, incidents involving 
incompetent performance had increased their moral unease.   
But while the experience he described in the interview was the turning point 
for L6 in deciding to stop doing reserve duty, CL4 continued to serve.  For CL4, it 
would appear that the very act of thinking of ways to improve the competence of his 
performance contributed to reducing his moral concerns to a point where he once 
again felt able to serve as a reserve soldier.   He talked about the possibility of 
refusing further military service, but he still physically participated in military 
operations of which he disapproved.  Here, it would appear that the continuing 
influence of competence on assessment of actor morality contributed to enabling 
CL4 to act against his own moral beliefs.  Through his actions he was embodying a 
discourse with which he did not explicitly agree.  In this way there was a disconnect 
between the narrative he espoused, and the narrative he embodied. 
5.4   Conclusion 
The current research has presented evidence in support of the argument that a 
nationalist discourse in Israel which incorporates the narratives of Jewish genius, 
191 
 
Israel as a light unto the other nations, and the Jewish people making the desert 
bloom, weaves together disparate threads of competence and morality into a design 
in which it can be difficult to cleanly separate the one from the other.  In this Israel is 
not alone.  Nationalist and religious collectives have long interpreted the ability to 
achieve their desires as evidence of their inherent moral deservingness.  Whether this 
entails expanding national boundaries (Manifest Destiny in the USA), creating an 
empire (European colonialisms), or re-establishing what is presented as a divinely 
ordered caliphate (ISIS), if “we” are capable of achieving our goals, then the 
inclination to take this as a sign of “our” morality is strong.  
I have argued that within Israel one such dynamic becomes evident when 
examining the narrative of Jewish Israelis “making the desert bloom” in conjunction 
with punitive government policies with respect to Palestinian agriculture.  The 
“making the desert bloom” narrative as adopted by Ben-Gurion equates Jewish 
Israeli agricultural competence with a moral justification for control of land.  
Combined with Israeli governmental policies which negatively affect the abilities of 
Palestinians to farm their lands competently, the resulting differences in agricultural 
production reinforce a narrative which asserts that the “wasteland” of Palestine will 
only bloom when it is under Jewish stewardship.  This self-fulfilling prophecy 
effectively functions to reinforce a belief that Israeli unilateralism with respect to 
policies on appropriation of land is both necessary and justified. 
Nationalist discourses can be embodied in many ways, including through 
military service.  In countries where the military and the wider society embrace the 
same values, these can be transmitted in a systematic way through institutions such 
as the education system to successive generations.  I have argued that young Jewish 
Israelis not only absorb a nationalist discourse in which competence and morality 
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become intertwined intellectually, they embody it through preparation for and 
participation in compulsory military service.  Crucially, the present research suggests 
the possibility that although competent performance may function to ameliorate 
moral qualms of individuals with respect to their actions within military service, 
exposure to incompetent performance may produce the opposite effect, resulting in 
increased moral concerns.   
If competent performance can influence assessment of morality, the very fact 
of 48 years of successfully enforcing a military occupation clamours to be 
interpreted as indicative of self-evident moral superiority: at least by those from the 
occupying nation.  As right wing reserve soldier R3 explained, “When you say, ‘I 
win,’ you actually say, behind the scene, that you have truth.  That you have truth 
and someone else is lying.”   In this Calvinistic interpretation of “might makes 
right,” “might” (competent military performance) is viewed as indicative of “right” 
(moral superiority).  If my initial analysis is correct, then in this way, to be a “good” 
soldier in the competent sense may become conflated with being a “good” soldier in 
the moral sense. However, I would suggest that although one interpretation of the 
interviewees’ statements supports this hypothesis, there is sufficient ambiguity 
within the interview data to warrant further clarification.  Therefore, in order to test 
for the proposed competence/morality dynamic, and in order to gain insight into 
whether this proposed dynamic would better be understood as a cognitive bias (in 
which perceived competence inappropriately influences assessment of actor 
morality), or as a useful heuristic (in which competence appropriately influences 
moral judgment), I designed and conducted two online experiments which are 
detailed in the next chapter. 
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6 Being Good at Being Bad: the influence of competent 
performance on assessment of actor morality  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes two experiments which I designed to test the influence of 
competent actor performance on the subsequent assessment of actor morality.  The 
inspiration for these experiments was the analysis of interviews with IDF reserve 
soldiers and conscientious objectors detailed in the previous chapter which suggested 
that competent or incompetent performance could affect individuals’ assessment of 
the morality of themselves and of their colleagues.  I was interested in first 
determining whether competent performance could be shown within controlled 
experiments to influence assessment of actor morality.  Secondly, I wished to assess 
possible interpretations relating to whether the influence of competent performance 
on judgment of actor morality could best be considered a cognitive bias or a useful 
heuristic.   
 As detailed in Chapter 1, current models involving competence and 
morality/warmth identify these traits as constituting the two dimensions by which 
humans primarily judge individuals and groups, positing that these dimensions are 
distinct (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) and orthogonal (Wojciszke, 2005a).  In this 
chapter I conduct two experiments which provide support for the hypothesis that 
competent performance can influence assessment of actor morality, and that 
therefore competence and morality are only weakly orthogonal.  In taking this 
approach, this study diverges from the current trend in social psychology to design 
experiments to test moral judgment relating to specific actions, and instead engages 
with a person-centred approach to moral judgment (see Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 
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2011; Uhlmann, Pizarro & Diermeier, 2015). While act-centred experiments seek to 
distinguish between deontological and utilitarian reasoning in assessing the morality 
of particular actions (see Greene, Nystrom, Engel, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), a person-centred approach draws on 
the tradition of virtue ethics and contends that when people make judgments about 
morality, such judgments are influenced by the perceived moral character of the 
actors involved, and not simply the morality of the specific acts which are being 
performed.   
 Proponents of a person-centred approach argue that many alleged 
‘inconsistencies’ in moral judgment presented in psychological research as evidence 
of cognitive bias do not, in fact, represent inconsistencies.  They contend that such 
apparent ‘inconsistencies’ are, instead, evidence of people appropriately interpreting 
data regarding the performance of specific acts which are relevant to understanding 
the moral character of the actors (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Ulhmann et al., 
2015).  The present study will explicitly engage with the question of whether or not 
the proposed competence/ morality dynamic is better understood as (a) a useful 
heuristic which draws on relevant information regarding the role of competence 
when assessing actor morality, or (b) a cognitive bias in which assessment of an 
actor’s moral character is influenced in an inappropriate way by perception of the 
actor’s competence.  These alternative explanations are detailed below. 
6.2  Cognitive Bias or Useful Heuristic? 
Explanation 1: The competence/morality dynamic as a cognitive bias 
Wojciszke’s (2005a; 2005b) empirical research provides support for the thesis that 
competence, as a self-profitable trait, is prioritized over morality when individuals 
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judge themselves and their ingroups.  This is because competent, effective 
performance directly affects the ability of the ingroup to survive and thrive.  In 
contrast, morality is an other-profitable trait which directly affects those with whom 
the individual or ingroup members are interacting.  Therefore, morality (or warmth 
using the terminology of Fiske and colleagues) is prioritized when judging others 
(Wojcziske, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006), as 
morality/warmth indicates others’ intentions towards oneself or one’s ingroup.   
In both of these bodies of research, the benefits of competent performance 
are understood as distinct from questions of morality.  However, the narrative 
analyses from the previous chapter suggest that the prioritizing of competence when 
judging the ingroup may also affect judgment of ingroup actor morality, with 
competent actors deemed more moral than incompetent actors.  Therefore, I am 
hypothesizing that competence and morality are only weakly orthogonal. 
If competent performance influences assessment of actor morality, and 
competence and morality are distinct dimensions, this begs the question of whether 
the proposed competence/morality dynamic constitutes a cognitive bias.  One 
argument would be that an individual’s level of competence has no bearing on their 
moral character, and therefore any dynamic through which competence affects 
judgment of morality would indicate cognitive bias.  However, there is an alternative 
explanation through which competence and morality might be considered even less 
distinct and orthogonal.  
Explanation 2: The competence/morality dynamic as a useful heuristic 
The above explanation interprets the proposed competence/morality dynamic as a 
cognitive bias on the grounds that competence and morality are distinct dimensions 
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(Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) and therefore competence ‘should not’ influence 
assessment of actor morality.  But Railton (2014) suggests that when making moral 
judgments, affective processes (also known as System 1 processes – associated with 
heuristics, including cognitive bias) do not simply entail automatic, inflexible 
reactions, but instead can integrate complex representations grounded in experience 
in order to present individuals with realistic – rather than biased – perceptions of 
specific situations.  Railton re-evaluates Haidt, Björklund, and Murphy’s (2000) 
famous scenario of siblings who, after discussing the matter thoroughly and taking 
precautions against pregnancy, decide to have sex with each other on a one-time 
basis on the grounds that it would be an interesting experience that they felt 
sufficiently emotionally stable to cope with.  When Haidt and colleagues presented 
study participants with this scenario and asked them to judge the morality of the 
siblings’ decision, he found that participants tended to assert that their actions were 
immoral, but were unable to identify any harm being done to anyone.   
Haidt and colleagues attributed the participants’ negative reactions regarding 
the morality of the siblings’ decision to a ‘flash of disgust’ and described as ‘moral 
dumbfounding’ their insistence that the action was wrong even though they could 
not present reasons for their moral judgment.  In contrast, Railton (2014) argues that 
even though the siblings were presented in the scenario as having taken sufficient 
precautions to prevent any harmful outcomes from their actions, it was highly likely 
that participants in the study would have brought their own life experiences to bear 
in making their assessments.  Far from simply experiencing a ‘flash of disgust,’ 
participants would have been making an intuitive judgment that incorporated the 
high level of risk that the siblings were taking with respect to potential damage to 
their own psyches. Therefore, although the outcome presented in the scenario 
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appeared to show no negative outcomes, the risks that had been taken were felt to be 
‘not OK’ (Railton, 2014).  Applying this reasoning to the competence/morality 
dynamic, one might argue that competence appropriately influences assessment of 
actor morality because incompetence leads to greater risk of morally problematic 
outcomes.  
 Although focused on outcomes, such an analysis dovetails with the person-
centred analyses of moral judgment of Pizarro and Tannenbaum (2011) and of 
Uhlmann et al, (2015), who argue that many phenomena (mis)identified as cognitive 
bias instead constitute evidence of people interpreting, in a logical and valid way, 
information regarding the performance of specific acts as relevant to understanding 
the moral character of the actors (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011; Ulhmann et al., 
2015).  In analyzing whether the proposed competence/morality dynamic can best be 
understood as a cognitive bias or as a useful heuristic, I will engage with both of 
these alternative explanations.  But first I need to establish whether the existence of 
the proposed competence/morality dynamic can be supported by experimental 
evidence, and to determine what factors might be expected to influence this dynamic. 
6.3  Hypotheses 
According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; Fiske et al., 2007), 
individuals are biased towards assessing their ingroups as being high in both 
competence and morality/warmth.  In our ancestral past, it has been argued, morality 
functioned to enable individuals within groups to cooperate with each other, thereby 
increasing their survival chances (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; 
Trivers, 1971).  But unless members of the group are performing competently, 
survival chances will be low.  It therefore follows, I would suggest, that cooperating 
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in ingroup-beneficial actions being performed competently is more adaptive than 
either (a) acting competently on one’s own, or (b) acting cooperatively but 
incompetently.  If individuals exhibit high morality/warmth but low competence, 
their lack of competence undermines their ability to cooperate effectively.  In this 
way, competence and morality intertwine in their adaptive functions.  
 If this is the case, and competent performance enhances the benefits of group 
cooperation, then might it be the case that competent performance could affect the 
assessment of actor morality in situations in which the acts being performed are in 
some way ingroup-beneficial, i.e. if they function to enhance group solidarity, or 
provide benefits to the ingroup at the expense of outgroup members?   
 The experiments detailed in this chapter were designed to evaluate the role of 
competent performance on assessment of actor morality in situations involving 
morally ambiguous actions which pit group-level moral norms (adherence to which, 
by definition, contribute to group cohesion) against competing generic-level moral 
norms.  Conforming to social norms (Asch, 1951; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; 
Milgram, 1963; Tajfel, 1982), and a propensity to prioritize the interests of the 
ingroup at the expense of those of outgroups (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002; 
Effron & Knowles, 2015) are, of course, well-established psychological phenomena.  
These two phenomena can interact when group-level norms conflict with generic-
level norms.   
For example, a group-level norm requiring gang members to engage in 
violent behaviours would be in conflict with generic-level norms forbidding causing 
harm to others (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2012).  Humans are 
biased towards conforming to the norms of valued ingroups (e.g., Sripada & Stich, 
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2006; O’Gorman et al., 2008; Richerson & Henrich, 2012), and show greater 
empathy towards ingroup members than towards outgroup members, experiencing 
more distress (negative feedback) when harm is done to ingroup members ( Cikara, 
et al., 2011; Chiao & Mathur, 2010; Cikara, et al., 2010; Mathur et al., 2010).  
Positive feedback resulting from competently complying with group-based norms 
could therefore, to some degree, be expected to offset negative feedback resulting 
from transgressing generic-level moral norms, especially if the targets of the generic-
level transgressions were categorized as outgroup members. 
I therefore predicted that influence of competent performance on the 
assessment of actor morality would exhibit when individuals and ingroup members 
were targeting outgroup members and/or conforming to group-level norms.  
Conversely, I also predicted that this phenomenon would not occur when assessing 
the morality of outgroup members targeting ingroup members.   
Hypothesis 1:  When assessing morality from a first-person perspective, 
individuals performing actions which produce  morally problematic results but 
which require high levels of competence will assess their morality as higher if they 
perform competently than if they perform the same actions incompetently if (a) the 
behaviors conform to ingroup social norms, or (b) the victim is an outgroup member. 
Hypothesis 2: (a) When presented with ingroup members victimizing 
outgroup members while performing morally problematic actions requiring high 
levels of competence, participants will assess the ingroup members’ morality as 
higher when they perform the actions competently as opposed to incompetently; but 
(b) when presented with outgroup members victimizing ingroup members while 
performing morally problematic actions requiring high levels of competence, 
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participants will not assess the outgroup members’ morality as higher when they 
perform competently as opposed to incompetently. 
Cognitive Dissonance: a mediating factor? 
Cognitive dissonance can be triggered when an individual’s positive self-image is 
threatened (Steele & Liu, 1983; Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993; Heine & Lehman, 
1997). Therefore, when a person performs an action producing results which they 
consider to be morally problematic, this could be expected to threaten that person’s 
positive moral self–image and produce cognitive dissonance.  But I would suggest 
that if the action in question involves performing a challenging task skilfully, then 
performing this task competently might also be expected to improve a person’s 
positive competent self-image.  This might be sufficient to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance resulting from the threat to the actor’s positive moral self-identity.  With 
dissonance reduced, perception of actor morality might increase as a result of an 
affective cue in which ‘lower level of cognitive dissonance’ = ‘less distress.’   In 
other words, if cognitive dissonance is lower, then one must not be feeling such great 
moral distress.  If this were the case, then cognitive dissonance could be a mediating 
factor in the competence/morality dynamic, regardless of whether competence is 
considered to be distinct from morality (Explanation 1 above), or more closely 
related to morality (Explanation 2 above).   
Hypothesis 3: Where competence has been shown to influence assessment of 
self or ingroup actor morality, cognitive dissonance will mediate this effect.  
Although as discussed earlier, humans have a propensity to favor perceived 
ingroup members over perceived outgroup members (Wildschut et al., 2002; Effron 
& Knowles, 2015), the degree to which individuals identify as group members has 
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been shown to vary according to political ideology.  Numerous studies indicate that 
conservatives are more conformist than liberals (e.g. Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; 
Sistrunk & Halcomb, 2013), and that conservatives also identify more strongly as 
members of collectives while liberals are more universalist (e.g., Haidt, 2012).  I 
would therefore predict that when observing ingroup members performing morally 
problematic actions, conservatives, who strongly identify with the ingroup, would 
assess ingroup members as higher in morality than would more liberal individuals, 
even if the outgroup members are categorized as allies rather than as enemies.     
Hypothesis 4: When presented with national ingroup members victimizing an 
allied national outgroup, conservatives will assess the ingroup members’ actions as 
more moral than will liberals. 
6.4  Overview of the Experimental Design 
I tested these predictions using two online experiments conducted via the Midgam 
Project, which provides infrastructure and participant panels for online psychology 
research within Israel.  These studies formed part of a larger research project into 
moral judgment being conducted in Israel with Jewish Israeli participants.  The 
experiments were conducted in Hebrew.  
 Experiment 1 was a 2x4 between-subjects design, and tested hypotheses 1a, 
1b and 3, relating to the influence of competent performance on judgment of the 
morality of an individual’s own actions.  I asked participants to identify with the 
main character in one of four scenarios about a competent or incompetent 
counterfeiter attempting to cash a fake cheque.  After reading the scenario, 
participants assessed their levels of cognitive dissonance, competence and morality. 
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 Experiment 2 was a 2x2 between-subjects design, and tested hypotheses 2a, 
2b, 3, and 4, relating to the influence of competent performance on judgment of 
ingroup vs. outgroup actors’ morality, and the role of cognitive dissonance in this 
dynamic.  In these studies participants read a scenario describing a team of 
competent or incompetent spies planting a surveillance device in the office of an 
ambassador from a foreign but allied country.  After reading the scenario, 
participants assessed the competence and morality of the spies. 
 In Experiment 1 the counterfeiter was successful whether or not s/he was 
competent, and in Experiment 2 the bugging device was eventually discovered 
whether or not the spies were competent.  In Experiment 2 it was necessary for the 
surveillance device to be discovered in order to provide a reason for international 
criticism which threatened the ingroup nation’s reputation.  By ensuring that the 
outcomes of both the counterfeiter scenarios and the spying scenarios were the same 
between the competent and incompetent conditions, the experimental designs 
eliminated potential differences in emotional response resulting from the 
phenomenon of “cheater’s high” (Reedy, Moore, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013). 
6.5  Experiment 1: Competent or Incompetent Counterfeiter  
Method and Participants 
I recruited 804 Jewish Israeli participants via the Midgam Project to participate in an 
online experiment for a payment of 8 shekels (US$2.19) each.  Participants who 
failed a test question checking that participants were paying attention and giving 
valid responses were excluded from the experiment before completing the survey.  
Their places were taken by other potential participants who went through the same 
testing procedure until all places were filled.  During the analysis process I excluded 
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two participants from the Lone Actor conditions whose answers in the feelings 
thermometer section of the experiment were all listed as “1” and who stated that they 
had not been able to identify with the main character.  Due to the iterative nature of 
the design process, scenarios 1 and 2 were conducted separately from scenarios 3 
and 4.  The recruitment process ensured that selection of participants in both tranches 
of the research was conducted identically, and that there was no duplication of 
participants within experiments. 
 The competence/morality dynamic was predicted to occur regardless of 
political orientation.  However, as differences along the liberal-conservative 
continuum were being tested for in Experiment 2, I also decided to test for 
differences in Experiment 1.  In order to ensure roughly equal numbers of 
participants of different political categories, I created four identical versions of an 
online survey with Qualtrics, with one each for politically left wing, center-left, 
center-right, and right wing participants.  The Midgam Project then recruited equal 
numbers of male and female participants from each of these political categories 
based on their self-reported most recent voting behaviors, and sent them to the 
appropriate Qualtrics link.  Experimental conditions were randomly allocated.  The 
data from each of the four Qualtrics links was then collated into one data file.   The 
demographic breakdown for participants in all four scenarios is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Demographics for Experiment 1 
 
 
 
Scenario 
Participants 
(n) 
 
Gender 
(%)  
______ 
Age 
(%) 
___________________ 
Political Category 
(%) 
_________________________ 
 Male  18-
24  
25-
32  
33-
40  
41+  Left  
Wing  
Centre 
Left  
Centre 
Right  
Right 
Wing  
1 203 48.3 19.2 36 23.2 21.7 24.6 27.6 23.2 24.6 
2 203 43.8 23.2 37.9 15.8 23.2 26.6 23.2 24.6 25.6 
3 192 50.0 15.6 45.8 25.5 13 25.0 23.4 26.6 25.0 
4 198 49.5 17.9 44.4 19.4 18.4 23.7 27.8 23.7 24.7 
 
 
 All texts and materials were translated from English into Hebrew and then 
back-translated by two native Hebrew speaking translators also fluent in English.  
The lead author discussed ambiguities in the back-translation with the two translators 
and with the Midgam Project before finalizing the Hebrew translations. 
 Procedure.  I instructed participants that they would be taking part in a 
research project looking at individuals’ reactions to narratives written from different 
points of view.  The participants were then directed, “Please read the following story, 
imagining that you are the main character.” 
 Participants then read one of the four versions of a scenario written in the 2
nd
-
person in which the main character, either a competent or incompetent counterfeiter, 
walks into a shop and attempts to cash a fraudulent cheque which they have 
produced.  Participants were asked to imagine themselves as this character while 
reading the scenario.  In the competent condition, the main character is described as 
being highly skilled, and the cheque is described as being of high quality.  In the 
incompetent condition, the cheque is described as being of poor quality, and the 
main character is described as lacking in skill. In both conditions, the main character 
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is successful in passing the forged cheque, but in the incompetent condition this is 
presented as due to luck rather than to skill.  Therefore there is no difference in 
outcome between the competent and incompetent conditions; the only difference is 
in the level of competence of the main character. 
 There were four variations of the experimental scenario.  Scenario 1 (Lone 
Actor/Home Country): the counterfeiter was portrayed as acting alone and 
committing the fraud in West Jerusalem, a predominantly Jewish area which would 
be perceived as ingroup space by the Jewish Israeli participants.  Scenario 2 (Social 
Norms/Home Country): the counterfeiter was portrayed as conforming to the social 
norms of his/her family, and committing the fraud in West Jerusalem, defrauding 
ingroup members.  In the third scenario (Lone Actor/Foreign Country) the 
counterfeiter was acting alone, and committing the fraud in the USA, a foreign but 
allied country, thereby defrauding outgroup members.  I specifically chose an allied 
national outgroup in scenarios 3 and 4 as we were interested in participants’ 
responses towards outgroups per se, and not specifically towards enemy outgroups.  
In the fourth scenario (Social Norms/Foreign Country), the counterfeiter was 
conforming to the social norms of his/her family, and committing the fraud in the 
USA, thereby defrauding outgroup members.  See Appendix 1 for scenario scripts. 
 This experiment induced cognitive dissonance through the use of 2nd-person 
scenarios in which participants are instructed to imagine themselves as the main 
character in the story.  This design draws on findings from the growing corpus of 
literature in cognitive psychology, media psychology, and communications on 
identification of readers with fictional characters, which has established that readers 
experience affective reactions (Cohen, 2001; Igartua, 2010; Konijn & Hoorn, 2005), 
and specifically, cognitive dissonance (Caracciolo, 2013), in response to characters’ 
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situations. 
 Measures.  Participants were asked to fill in a feelings thermometer with a 7-
point Likert-type scale.  The instructions read: 
Below are words that describe different types of feelings.  Still imagining 
yourself as the main character in the story you have just read, please indicate 
how much each word describes how you are feeling right now by selecting a 
number on the scale.  Don’t spend much time thinking about each word, and 
don't worry about how you think you should feel, just give a quick, gut-level 
response about how this particular telling of the story makes you feel right 
now.  
 I phrased the second paragraph in this way to minimize social desirability 
bias: by putting the “blame” for the participants’ feelings on the way that the story 
was written, rather than on themselves, I encouraged them to answer honestly rather 
than giving answers that they perceived to be socially desirable.  
 The feelings thermometer duplicated Elliot and Devine’s (1994) cognitive 
dissonance scale, which tests for cognitive dissonance, but with the addition of four 
words relating to competence/incompetence (Capable, Skillful, Incompetent, 
Incapable) and four words relating to morality/immorality (Virtuous, Principled, 
Dishonorable, Unethical).  Incompetent, Incapable, Dishonorable, and Unethical 
were reverse-scored.  I selected these eight words during the piloting phase by 
testing 20 candidate words first with 10 colleagues from the UK who filled in a 
questionnaire designed to indicate the extent to which the words were understood as 
relating to competence, morality, both, or neither, and who also provided qualitative 
data in the form of discussions about their understandings of the words.  I then ran 
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the questionnaire online with US participants (N = 30) via Mechanical Turk, and 
chose the eight words which scored the highest for relating either to competence/ 
incompetence or to morality/immorality.  When these words were translated into 
Hebrew for the Israeli study, I tested that the meanings of the translated words were 
also clearly specific to either morality or competence with six native Hebrew 
speakers.  Cronbach’s alpha indicated reliability of feelings thermometer scales to be 
robust: Competence (α = .83), Morality (α = .74), Cognitive Dissonance (α = .85). 
 Participants were then asked, still imagining themselves as the main character 
of the story, how responsible they felt for the success of the cheque fraud.  Much of 
the literature on moral responsibility would suggest that the more causally 
responsible the participants felt with relation to the cheque fraud, the less moral they 
would consider themselves to be (e.g., Copp, 2006; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, & 
Vargas, 2007).  However, I predicted that influence of competence on the assessment 
of actor morality might undermine this correlation.     
 Participants were then instructed to answer—as themselves, rather than as 
identifying with the counterfeiter in the story—questions about their own personal 
beliefs regarding the morality of passing counterfeit cheques, and about whether they 
considered competent cheque forgers to be more moral than incompetent forgers.  
The final section of the experiment was a demographics questionnaire. 
Experiment 1 Results 
Manipulation check.  T-tests confirmed that the counterfeiter was perceived as more 
competent in the competent condition (M = 5.09, SD = 1.24) than in the incompetent 
condition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.10) t(794) = 10.68, p < .001, 95% CI [0.72, 1.05], d = 
0.75.   
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 Hypothesis 1 predicted that morality would be higher in the competent than 
in the incompetent conditions when (a) conforming to social norms, or (b) targeting 
outgroup victims.  I therefore first tested whether scenarios 2-4 (involving 
conforming to social norms and/or targeting outgroup victims) could be grouped 
together for analysis contrasting them against scenario 1.  A univariate ANOVA with 
morality as the dependent factor and condition (competent and incompetent) and 
scenario (2-4 only) as the independent factors indicated no significant main effect for 
scenario F(2, 587) = 1.77, p = .172, 2  = .006, and no significant interaction effect 
for condition and scenario F(2, 587) = 0.12, p = .883, 2 = 0.0004.  Having 
confirmed that scenarios 2-4 could be grouped together for analysis, I then analyzed 
differences in assessment of morality in competent and incompetent conditions 
between scenario 1 (Lone Actor/Home Country, which did not involve social norms 
or outgroup victims) and scenarios 2-4 combined (all of which involved social norms 
and/or outgroup victims).  A univariate ANOVA with morality as the dependent 
factor, and with condition (competent and incompetent) and scenario as the 
independent factors indicated a significant main effect of condition F(1, 792) = 4.54, 
p = .033, 2 = .006 with morality higher in the competent condition (M = 3.09; SD = 
0.07) than in the incompetent condition (M = 2.87; SD = 0.07)  d = 3.14.  There was 
no significant main effect of scenario F(1, 792) = 0.29, p = .865, 2 = .00004.  There 
was, however, a marginally significant interaction effect for condition and scenario 
F(1, 792) = 3.20, p = .074, 2 = .004.   
 To unpack this interaction effect, I conducted T-tests analyzing the effect of 
condition on morality for each of the four scenarios.  Scenario 1 (Lone Actor/Home 
Country): As predicted by hypotheses 1a and 1b, T-tests indicated no significant 
difference in assessment of morality in the competent condition (M = 3.00, SD = 
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1.27) compared with the incompetent condition (M = 2.97, SD = 1.29) t(201) = 0.19, 
p = .85, 95 % CI [-0.32, 0.39], d = 0.03.  Scenario 2 (Social Norms/Home Country): 
As predicted by hypothesis 1a, assessment of morality was significantly higher in the 
competent condition (M = 3.19, SD = 1.42) than in the incompetent condition (M = 
2.83, SD = 1.08) t(201) = 2.05, p = .042, 95 % CI [0.01, 0.71], d = 0.29.  Scenario 3 
(Lone Actor/Foreign Country): As predicted by hypothesis 1b, assessment of 
morality was significantly higher in the competent condition (M = 3.24, SD = 1.15) 
than in the incompetent condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19) t(190) = 2.12, p = .036, 95 
% CI [0.02, 0.70], d = 0.31.  Scenario 4 (Social Norms/Foreign Country): As 
predicted by hypotheses 1a and 1b, assessment of morality was significantly higher 
in the competent condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.29) than in the incompetent condition 
(M = 2.61, SD = 1.15) t(196) = 3.20, p = .008, 95 % CI [0.12, 0.81], d = 0.38.  The t-
tests confirmed the predictions of hypotheses 1a and 1b that there was only a 
significant effect of condition (competent vs. incompetent) on morality when 
participants were conforming to social norms and/or targeting an outgroup victim.  
See Figure 6.1. 
210 
 
Figure 6.1: Influence of Competence on assessment of Actor Morality 
 
 I further unpacked the statistically significant result for scenarios 2-4 
combined by analyzing the effect of competence on assessment of actor morality 
across the political spectrum and by gender.  A univariate ANOVA with morality as 
the dependent factor, and with condition (competent and incompetent) and political 
category as the independent factors indicated a marginally significant main effect of 
political category F(3, 585) = 2.22, p = .084, 2 = .011, but with no clear pattern 
along the left-to-right political continuum (Left wing: M = 3.09, SD = .10; Centre 
left: M = 2.93, SD = .10, Centre right: M = 3.08, SD = .10; Right wing: M = 2.78, SD 
= .10) and no significant interaction effect for condition and political category F(3, 
585) = 0.823, p = .482, 2 = .004.  A univariate ANOVA with morality as the 
dependent factor, and with condition (competent and incompetent) and gender as the 
independent factors indicated a marginally significant main effect of gender F(1, 
589) = 3.52, p = .061, 2 = .006, with assessment of actor morality higher for males 
(M = 3.07, SD = 2.93, ) than females (M = 2.88, SD = .07) but no significant 
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interaction effect for condition and gender F(1, 589) = 0.001, p = .973, 2 = .000002.   
  Hypothesis 3 predicted that cognitive dissonance would function as a 
mediator between competence and assessment of morality.  This prediction was met.  
I conducted a simple mediation analysis on scenarios 2-4 combined using ordinary 
least squares path analysis.  As can be seen in Figure 6.2, participants in the 
incompetent conditions reported experiencing greater cognitive dissonance than did 
those in the competent conditions (a = -0.362, p<.001), and participants who 
experienced greater cognitive dissonance assessed their morality as lower than did 
those experiencing less cognitive dissonance (b = -0.361, p < .001).  The direct effect 
of competence on assessment of morality was significant (c’ = -0.228, p<.001.).  
However, the results range of a bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the 
indirect effect (ab = 0.131) based on 50,000 bootstrap samples did not include a 
value of zero (0.093 to 0.174), meaning that there was an indirect effect of cognitive 
dissonance on assessment of morality.  Analysis of bivariate correlations confirmed 
significant negative correlation between competence and cognitive dissonance r(593) 
= -.274, p < .001, and significant negative correlation between cognitive dissonance 
and assessment of morality r(593) = -.514, p < .001. 
Figure 6.2: Mediating effect of Cognitive Dissonance on influence of 
Competence on assessment of Actor Morality 
   
 a = -0.362       b = -0.361 
 
 
 
 
     c’ = -0.228 
 
Cognitive Dissonance 
 
Condition  
1 =Competent      
2=Incompetent 
 
Assessment of Morality 
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 Across all four scenarios, when participants were asked for their own 
personal views on whether they considered cheque fraud to be immoral (rated on a 
scale from 1 to 7, with 1 = disagree completely, and 7 = agree completely), they gave 
high scores (M = 6.68, SD = 0.94).  When asked if they considered a skilled 
counterfeiter to be more moral than an unskilled counterfeiter, participants gave low 
scores (M = 1.51, SD = 1.27).   
 T-tests indicated significant differences across all scenarios between the 
competent and incompetent conditions regarding how responsible participants felt 
that their character in the story was for the success of the cheque fraud, with 
participants in the competent condition rating their character as more responsible for 
the success (M = 5.46, SD = 1.74) than those in the incompetent condition (M = 
4.40, SD = 1.98); t(791) = 7.98, p <.001, 95% CI [0.80, 1.31], d  = 0.57.   
 
Experiment 1 summary 
This experiment tested for influence of competence on individuals’ assessment of 
their own morality, and for a mediating effect of cognitive dissonance, when they 
were presented as following social norms, and/or victimizing outgroup members.  
Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.  Competence significantly influenced 
assessment of morality when participants were conforming to social norms and/or 
targeting outgroup members, but not when acting on their own and targeting ingroup 
members.  This contradicted participants’ explicitly stated beliefs that competent 
counterfeiters were not more moral than incompetent counterfeiters.  Hypothesis 3 
was also supported.  Cognitive dissonance was identified as a mediating factor 
between competent performance and assessment of morality.  This was hypothesized 
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as occurring due to the need to reduce cognitive dissonance arising as a result of the 
morally problematic action posing a threat to a positive moral self-perception, with 
competent performance mitigating this threat by increasing the actor’s positive 
competent self-perception.   
6.6  Experiment 2: Competent and Incompetent International Spies  
Method and Participants   
Participants were recruited using the same methods as detailed in Experiment 1.  
There were 409 participants with completed surveys.  Eleven survey responses were 
excluded due to missing values.  Thus, the total number of surveys analyzed was 
n=398.  The demographic breakdown is shown in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Demographics for Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 
Participants 
(n) 
Gender 
(%) 
_______ 
Age  
(%) 
___________________ 
Political Category 
 (%) 
_________________________ 
Male 
 
18-
24 
 
25-
32 
 
33-
40 
 
41+ 
 
Left 
Wing 
 
Centre 
Left 
 
Centre 
Right 
 
Right 
Wing 
1 196 45.9 16.9 46.7 17.4 19.0 24.5 27.0 25.0 23.5 
2 202 50.0 16.3 28.7 22.3 32.7 21.3 26.7 22.8 26.2 
 
 
 Procedure:  Participants were presented with a scenario written in the 3rd-
person about a team of competent or incompetent international spies attempting to 
place a surveillance device in the office of the ambassador from an allied country.  
After reading the scenario, participants assessed their own cognitive dissonance, and 
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how competent and moral they perceived the spies to be using a 7 point Likert-type 
scale, and answered questions about how responsible the spies were for the outcome 
of the mission, about their beliefs regarding the morality of spying, and whether they 
considered competent spies to be more moral than incompetent spies.  Finally, they 
completed a demographics questionnaire.   
 There were two variations of the experimental scenario.  Scenario 1 (Ingroup 
Spies): the spies were from the participants’ country (Israel) and were spying on an 
allied country (Micronesia) which was not powerful enough to pose any threat to the 
ingroup nation.  I specifically chose an allied national outgroup as I was interested in 
participants’ responses towards outgroups per se, and not specifically towards 
outgroups perceived as threatening.  Scenario 2 (Outgroup Spies): the spies were 
from Micronesia and were spying on Israel.  Regardless of whether the spies were 
presented as competent or incompetent, the surveillance device they planted was 
eventually discovered, resulting in international disapproval towards the spying 
country.  See Appendix 5 for scenario scripts.   
Experiment 2 Results  
Manipulation check.   T-tests confirmed that the spies were perceived as more 
competent in the competent condition (M = 5.47, SD = 1.30) than in the incompetent 
condition (M = 2.96, SD = 1.38); t(396) = 18.69, p < .001, 95% CI [2.25, 2.78], d = 
1.87. 
 The predictions of hypotheses 2a and 2b, that participants’ assessments of 
morality would be higher in the competent condition when judging the ingroup 
actors, but not when judging the outgroup actors, were met.  T-tests confirmed that 
when judging the morality of their own nation’s spies, participants assessed morality 
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as higher in the competent condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.30) than in the incompetent 
condition (M = 3.55, SD = 1.35); t(194) = 6.16, p<.001, 95% CI [0.79, 1.54], d = 
0.88.  Analysis of bivariate correlation confirmed positive correlation between 
incompetent performance and assessment of morality r(196) = .673, p<.001.  But 
when judging the spies from the foreign country there was no significant difference 
in assessment of morality between the competent condition (M = 3.16, SD = 1.32) 
and the incompetent condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.08); t(200) = 1.59, p = .113, 95% 
CI [0.06, 0.60], d = 0.22.  Analysis of bivariate correlation indicated no significant 
correlation between incompetent performance and assessment of morality r(202) = 
.319, p<.001. 
 The prediction of hypothesis 3, that cognitive dissonance would mediate the 
influence of competent performance on assessment of the morality of the ingroup 
spies was not met.  I conducted a simple mediation analysis using ordinary least 
squares path analysis.  Contrary to my predictions, this indicated that participants in 
the incompetent conditions did not report experiencing greater cognitive dissonance 
than those in the competent conditions (a = -0.046, p = .491).  However, participants 
who did report experiencing greater cognitive dissonance assessed actor morality as 
lower than those experiencing less cognitive dissonance (b = -0.101, p = .029), and 
the direct effect of competence on assessment of morality was significant (c’ = 
0.548, p<.001).   
The prediction of hypothesis 4, that when presented with national ingroup 
members victimizing an allied national outgroup, conservatives would assess the 
ingroup members’ actions as more moral than would liberals, was met.  A univariate 
ANOVA with morality as the dependent factor, and with condition (competent and 
incompetent) and political category as the independent factors indicated a significant 
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main effect of political category F(3, 188) = 6.839, p<.001, 2 = .081, but no 
significant interaction effect for condition and political category F(3, 188) = 1.435, p 
= .234, 2 = .017.  Figure 6.3 confirms that assessment of morality was higher for 
right-wing, conservative participants than for more liberal participants.
29
 
 When all participants were asked for their own personal views on whether 
they considered spying to be immoral (rated on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 = disagree 
completely, and 7 = agree completely), they gave medium scores (M = 3.75, SD = 
1.83).  When asked if they considered a skilled spy to be more moral than an 
unskilled spy, participants gave low scores (M = 1.87, SD = 1.38).   
 
Figure 6.3: Assessment of Morality of Ingroup x Political Category 
 
 There were significant differences between the competent and incompetent 
conditions regarding how responsible participants felt that the spies were for the 
                                                 
29
 In Israel there is a direct correspondence between the political left-right and the liberal-conservative 
spectrum as defined by Haidt and Joseph’s (2006) moral foundations theory (see Chapter 5).     
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failure of the mission.  Participants in the competent condition rated the spies as less 
responsible for the failure (M = 3.43, SD = 1.91) than those in the incompetent 
condition (M = 5.17, SD = 1.84); t(395) = -9.244, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.11, -1.37], d  
= -0.93.   
Experiment 2 summary 
Spies from either the national ingroup or from a foreign outgroup were presented as 
spying on an allied country.  The results supported hypotheses 2a and 2b, which 
predicted that assessment of the morality would be higher in the competent condition 
when judging the ingroup spies, but not when judging the outgroup spies.  The 
influence of competent performance on assessment of actor morality when judging 
the ingroup spies contradicted the participants’ explicitly stated beliefs that 
competent spies are not more moral than incompetent spies.  The prediction of 
hypothesis 4, that when judging the ingroup spies conservative participants would 
assess their morality as higher than did liberal participants, was also met.   
 The prediction that cognitive dissonance would have a mediating effect on 
the influence of competence on assessment of ingroup actor morality was not met.  
Analyses indicated that although, as predicted, there was an inverse relationship 
between self-reported cognitive dissonance and assessment of ingroup actor 
morality, the predicted corresponding inverse relationship between assessment of 
competence and self-reported cognitive dissonance did not materialise. 
6.7  General Discussion  
The findings on the influence of competent performance on assessment of actor 
morality from Experiments 1 and 2 were robust in revealing a novel inconsistency in 
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the way that the participants assessed morality.  When judging their own morality in 
the counterfeiter scenarios (experiment 1), participants conforming to social norms 
and/or targeting outgroup members in the competent conditions assessed themselves 
as more moral than did participants in the incompetent conditions.  Participants 
reading the spy scenarios (experiment 2), assessed the morality of the ingroup spies 
higher in the competent condition.  This dynamic was in contrast to participants’ 
explicitly stated beliefs that a competent counterfeiter or spy was not more moral 
than an incompetent counterfeiter or spy.  This indicates inconsistency between the 
participants’ introspection and of their actual moral judgment regarding the actors 
involved and suggests that competence and morality are only weakly orthogonal.  
But is the competence/ morality dynamic better understood as a cognitive bias in 
which actor competence inappropriately influences assessment of actor morality?  Or 
as a useful heuristic incorporating information relevant to judgments of actor 
morality? 
  One argument in support of categorizing the competence/morality dynamic 
as a useful heuristic which influences assessment of actor morality in an appropriate 
way could be presented as follows.  Competent performance, even in morally 
problematic actions, reduces the possibility that the actions will lead to harmful 
consequences befalling the ingroup.  An incompetent actor increases the probability 
of such harmful consequences occurring, and because of this, even if the 
incompetent and competent actors have the same motivations and achieve the same 
results, the incompetent actor would be deemed as less moral than the competent 
actor.  By putting the ingroup at greater risk, the incompetent actor is perceived as 
less moral than the competent actor not only because of the specific risk related to 
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the actions in question, but also because of the potential the incompetent actor has 
for bringing further harm to the ingroup in the future (see Railton, 2014). 
 This is a compelling argument, but I would suggest that one must ask 
whether putting the ingroup at risk is necessarily immoral.  For example, in 
Experiment 1, it could be argued that even though they were successful, the 
incompetent counterfeiters put their families at greater risk of harmful repercussions 
than did the competent counterfeiters.  An increased risk of criminal prosecution 
would certainly be considered harmful by the ingroup of the counterfeiter’s family, 
but does this make it immoral?  Or does this merely indicate self-interest?  Is it 
immoral for criminal actions to be prosecuted?  If we argue this, then we would be 
saying that any actions (such as incompetent performance) which increase the risk 
for people who are transgressing the laws and social norms of wider society getting 
caught and punished are necessarily immoral. 
 These experiments were designed to test whether competent performance of 
ingroup-profitable actions considered by the actors to be morally problematic 
resulted in them assessing themselves or their ingroup members to be more moral 
than if they performed the same actions incompetently.  I would agree that there are 
situations in which incompetent performance increases risks in a way which might 
reasonably be perceived as immoral (see Railton’s (2014) analysis of Haidt et al.’s 
(2000) incestuous siblings scenario).  But my experiments indicate that competent 
performance can also lead to a higher assessment of actor morality in situations in 
which competent actors reduce the risk of consequences to the ingroup which, 
although harmful, also conform to generic-level moral norms which are recognized 
by the actors.  For this reason, I would argue that the competence/morality dynamic 
is better understood as a cognitive bias. 
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 While the findings for the existence of the competence/morality bias were 
robust, the predictions relating to cognitive dissonance as a mediating factor were, at 
best, mixed.  In Experiment 1, where participants imagined themselves as a 
competent or incompetent counterfeiter, cognitive dissonance was found to be a 
mediating factor.  However, in Experiment 2, where participants read a 3
rd
 person 
scenario about their national ingroup spying on a friendly ally, cognitive dissonance 
was not found to mediate the competence/morality dynamic.  Why might this be? 
Several explanations suggest themselves at this point.  First, cognitive dissonance 
may have occurred in the predicted manner in both experiments, but may simply 
have been more acute in Experiment 1, where participants imagined themselves as 
the actor, and where the action in question was deemed more morally problematic, 
than in the 3
rd
 person scenarios of Experiment 2.  If this is the case then the design of 
the experiments may have been too blunt an instrument to accurately identify the 
role of cognitive dissonance in reaction to a 3
rd
 person scenario.  Second, the results 
of Experiment 1 may have been a false positive, and cognitive dissonance may not, 
in fact, mediate the competence/morality dynamic.  Third, it may be the case that 
although a mediating effect was correctly identified in Experiment 1, the role of 
cognitive dissonance is not necessary for the competence/morality dynamic to 
exhibit.  Cognitive dissonance may mediate in the predicted way in some situations 
but not in others.  There is clearly scope for further research to clarify the role, if 
any, of cognitive dissonance in relation to the competence/morality dynamic.   
 With respect to my interpretation of the competence/morality dynamic as 
indicating cognitive bias which, to date, has not appeared in the literature, some 
might suggest that this might instead indicate a specific variation of Thorndike’s 
(1920) halo effect.  The halo effect is a type of confirmation bias by which 
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individuals tend to translate positive feelings about one aspect of a person into 
positive assessments of other unrelated aspects, or of the person as a whole.  
However, if my experiments were simply revealing evidence of the halo effect, then 
the influence of competence should have been present in all of the experimental 
scenarios.  It was not.  Competence only influenced assessment of morality when 
dynamics involving conforming to social norms or targeting outgroup members were 
present.   Therefore, I would argue that my results suggest the presence of a distinct 
cognitive bias. 
 It is worth noting that these experiments tested for influence of competent 
performance on the assessment of actor morality involving task-relevant 
competences.  It would be interesting in future research to test whether this bias also 
occurs in the presence of task-irrelevant competences.  And the counterintuitive 
finding that in the competent conditions participants judged ingroup actors to be both 
(a) more moral, and (b) more causally responsible for the success of an action which 
participants considered morally problematic, would be an interesting subject for 
philosophers interested in questions of moral responsibility and agency.  
Interestingly, although in the literatures addressing morality and responsibility much 
has been written about free will, agency, and moral luck (see for example, Strawson, 
1994; Pereboom 2001; Fischer et al., 2007; Williams, 1981) I have found nothing to 
date that directly addresses this issue.   
 Another direction for future research concerns determining whether or not 
influence of competence on the assessment of actor morality is universal, and how 
and to what extent this may be affected by specific cultural factors.  It would be 
interesting to conduct controlled cross-cultural studies in order to gain insight into 
how influence of competence on the assessment of actor morality varies between 
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specific cultures, for example contrasting differences in this effect between 
individualistic cultures such as that of the US, and cultures which put a greater 
emphasis on collectivity, such as Japan.  It would also be useful to run experiments 
in which situational factors were manipulated in order to understand how particular 
cultural cues can either encourage or discourage this bias.   
 Greater understanding of situational factors which might encourage influence 
of competent performance on the assessment of actor morality could also make a 
useful contribution to the field of institutional ethics.  An important topic of research 
in this field relates to the conditions that lead employees to speak up when 
confronted with unethical behavior in the workplace (Morrison & Milliken, 2003).  
Organizations which seek to reduce corruption would benefit from understanding 
how this cognitive bias might contribute to assuaging the moral qualms of 
employees when faced with immoral but competent behaviors, and therefore make 
them less likely to voice their concerns.  A useful future research question could 
therefore address whether reward structures that focus exclusively on competence-
based criteria (leaving the institution’s ethical goals safely ring-fenced within the 
mission statement) might be contributory factors to creating cultures in which 
corruption is tolerated. 
 With respect to experimental design, it would be interesting to construct 
experiments where instead of reading scenarios and imagining themselves as the 
characters, participants were actually performing actions competently or 
incompetently.  It would also be useful to move beyond self-report measures by, for 
instance, working with neuroscientists in order to examine what happens within the 
brain itself when individuals make assessments of morality relating to competent or 
incompetent behaviors.  Recent advances in imaging technology such as fMRI have 
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facilitated investigations into brain activity associated with processes of emotion and 
controlled cognition implicated in moral judgment (e.g. Greene et al. 2008; Greene 
et al. 2004) and in attitudes towards outgroups (Bruneau, Dufour, and Saxe, 2012; 
Bruneau and Saxe, 2010).  As the cognitive processes we recruit to make moral 
evaluations are likely to be complex, and could potentially involve reward bases 
systems (striatum/basal-ganglia) as well as executive functioning (pre-frontal cortex) 
and conflict detection (ACC), using fMRI techniques to carry out localization studies 
could provide useful insights into the suite of processes that are involved in the 
influence of competence on the assessment of actor morality when forming moral 
evaluations of specific situations. 
6.8  Conclusion 
As individuals and as members of collectives, people are responsible for making 
moral judgments about decisions and behaviors.  But my research has suggested that 
moral reasoning can be affected by a cognitive bias which can result in competent 
performance affecting assessments of actor morality.  If we wish to avoid such bias, 
then we would do well to be aware of this tendency when making moral judgments, 
especially when in cultures which put a high premium on competence.  In the 
following chapter I analyse how the separate elements identified in the thesis as 
contributing to moral judgment form a cohesive whole in addressing the primary aim 
of this research: to better understand dynamics of mora judgment affecting Jewish 
Israelis conscripted into military service within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.   
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1  Overview of the chapter 
In the Introduction chapter I described the overarching aim of this thesis as involving 
distinct but interrelated goals, the achievement of which would involve a dialogue 
between the universal and the particular.  The primary goal of the research was to 
better understand moral judgment by Jewish Israeli reserve soldiers and 
conscientious objectors within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This 
was to be achieved by (a) engaging with theories of morality and of ingroup-
outgroup relations in such a way that the universalist theories and the culturally 
specific particulars relating to military service in Israel would effectively interrogate 
and illuminate each other; and (b) engaging with moral philosophy, specifically with 
a person-centred approach to moral judgment grounded in virtue ethics, in order to 
provide an appropriate framework through which to understand how individuals 
make sense of the behaviours of themselves and of perceived ingroup members when 
engaging with moral dilemmas relating to long-standing conflict. 
 Chapters 3 through 6 described separate studies which, cumulatively, served 
to construct a dialogue between the universal and the particular in order to address 
these goals.  Table 7.1 provides a summary of how each chapter contributes to this 
dialogue.  I then unpack how engagement between the culturally specific 
ethnographic data and the key universalist theories employed resulted in identifying 
specific elements involved in processes of moral judgment relating to intergroup 
dynamics.  This leads into analysis of how the individual elements involved in moral 
judgment form a cohesive whole in addressing the first aim of the thesis: to better 
understand dynamics of moral judgment for Jewish Israelis called upon to participate 
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in military service within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  And finally, 
there is a discussion of limitations and areas for future research, and a concluding 
section highlighting the key original empirical and theoretical contributions of the 
research. 
Table 7.1: How each phase of the research engages with the 
Particular and the Universal 
Chapter 3:  
“Us,” “Them,” 
and Hamatzav 
This chapter took an idiographic approach, focusing on the 
particular context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and applying 
interpretative phenomenological analysis to interview data in 
order to understand how Jewish Israeli individuals understood 
concepts relating to group identity and to the nature of the 
ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.  
Chapter 4: 
Selective 
Fairness in 
Intergroup 
Dynamics 
This chapter engaged both the universal and the particular by 
applying a universalist theory (moral foundations theory) to 
analysis of interview data focusing on the particular context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and using the findings from 
analysis of the interview data to critique this universalist theory.  
Specifically, by critiquing(a) the inclusion of justice within 
moral foundation theory’s conception of fairness, and (b) the 
structure of moral foundations theory with respect to the 
Fairness and Loyalty foundations. 
Chapter 5:  
Narratives of 
competence and 
morality in 
Israeli 
Nationalist 
Discourse 
 
This chapter focused primarily on the particular by (a) analysing 
nationalist narratives particular to Israel which incorporate 
competence and morality, and (b) applying embodied discourse 
analysis to unpack how the resulting nationalist discourse was 
embodied within the particular context of military service in the 
IDF.  However, this analysis suggested the possibility of a 
hypothesized to be universal cognitive bias by which competent 
performance influences assessment of actor morality, which was 
tested for in the following chapter. 
Chapter 6:  
Being Good at 
Being Bad 
This chapter engaged with a person-centred approach to moral 
judgment grounded in a virtue ethics tradition.  It described a 
nomothetic approach using an experimental protocol to test for 
the presence of the aforementioned hypothesized to be universal 
cognitive bias.  Again, the possibility of the existence of the 
proposed cognitive bias was suggested by analysis of interview 
data, in other words, it originated during an idiographic phase of 
the research focusing on the particular context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
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7.2  Identifying Specific Elements Involved in Moral Judgment 
Seeking to better understand how universal cognitive processes which we all share as 
humans affect, and are affected by, the particulars of specific cultural contexts—in 
the present case with respect to moral judgment within a context of seemingly 
intractable conflict—is at the heart of the research interests underpinning this thesis.  
To that end, I have integrated studies which address cognitive processes which affect 
individuals’ moral judgment and which are hypothesized to be universal, with fine-
grained analysis of Jewish Israeli individuals’ experiences relating to military service 
within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The analysis has engaged with 
a person-centred approach to moral judgment in order to better understand how 
individuals assess the morality of themselves and of perceived ingroup members 
when engaged in morally problematic actions.  The following sections detail how 
this approach has identified specific elements relating to moral judgment relevant to 
the context of military service in Israel, and the implications of these findings for 
structural and normative aspects of the theories involved. 
7.2.1  Culturally Specific Factors Relating to Identity 
Analysis of interview data with 40 Jewish Israeli reserve soldiers and conscientious 
objectors revealed that far from one homogenously perceived Jewish Israeli ingroup, 
perceptions of Jewish identity not only significantly varied, but were also actively 
contested between the religious and the secular, the liberal and the conservative, and 
between different ethnic groups.  Whether Jewishness was perceived as primarily 
related to religion, ethnicity, or shared history and culture, was a question that the 
interviewees acknowledged as being a subject of frequent disagreement within 
Israel.   
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 The interview data revealed that the further to the political right one 
travelled, the more essentialist was the concept of Jewishness.  In contrast, those 
further to the left perceived Jewish identity as primarily socially constructed.  Right 
wing interviewees described Jewishness in terms of genetic inheritance as well as in 
religious terms, and contrasted positive innate characteristics which they associated 
with Jewishness, for example high moral standards and superior intelligence, against 
negative innate characteristics which they attached to Arabs and Muslims, including 
aggressiveness and a childlike inability to make rational decisions.   
 This perception of essential differences between Arabs and Jews also 
influenced perceptions of Mizrahi and Sephardi Israelis, who hold a lower social 
status within Israel than do Ashkenazi Israelis, as they are considered to resemble 
Arabs ethnically and culturally (see Khazzoom, 2003; Shabi, 2008).  Indeed, R1, 
who is ethnically Sephardi, politically right wing, and who described both Jewish 
and Arab/Muslim identities in terms of genetics and innateness, actively distanced 
himself from his Sephardi roots.  He preferred to stress the “melting pot” analogy of 
the State of Israel, in which one’s ethnic origins are subsumed within an overarching 
Jewish Israeli identity.  R1 was keen to embrace an element of his identity which, 
within the socio-cultural context of modern Israel, was perceived as status-enhancing 
and which indicated that he belonged in the land of Israel.  For R1, this meant 
distancing himself as much as possible from any notion that he might resemble or be 
expected to behave “like an Arab.”  Such a strategy of highlighting status-enhancing 
elements of identity while downplaying status-threatening aspects was also adopted 
by some individuals from recent immigrant groups to Israel whose Jewishness had 
been called into question. 
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 The primacy in Israel of a strict orthodox definition of what it means to be 
Jewish has led to tensions not only between religious and secular Israelis but has also 
challenged the perceived Jewishness of immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
(“Russians”) and from Ethiopia (Schwarz, 2001; Kravel-Tovi, 2012; Maltz, 2015).  
This was reflected in statements by some interviewees from these ethnic groups 
expressing their frustration at having their Jewishness questioned, for example 
Ethiopian Israelis whose families had suffered great hardships in making the journey 
to what they perceived as their religious homeland.  In contrast, other interviewees 
proposed that they felt more Israeli than Jewish, and that their Israeli identity was of 
primary importance to them.  As CR5 (“Russian”) stated, “I really don’t want to look 
at myself as not authentic Jew, I look myself as [authentic] Israeli.”  This echoes 
R1’s strategy of choosing the most status-enhancing aspect of his identity and 
downplaying aspects which are seen as placing him lower in the social hierarchy.  
Crucially, for such individuals, performing military service functioned as a way of 
actively proving their Israeliness, thereby raising their status within society and 
reinforcing their perceived right to live in Israel.    
 Where identity was understood in concrete, unchangeable, deterministic 
terms, so too was hamatzav.  If Jewish Israelis and Arabs/Muslims/Palestinians  
were seen as essentially different, with the Palestinians perceived as innately 
aggressive and violent, then continuation of the ongoing conflict was seen as 
inevitable, with “no partner for peace.”  Only containing or categorically defeating 
the Palestinians were put forward as viable options by the right wing and some of the 
centre right.  For these interviewees Israel bore no responsibility for the current 
conflict and therefore had only limited agency regarding how they could respond to 
it: the Arabs were to blame and had brought Israeli reprisals upon themselves.  The 
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left wing, in line with their view of identity as largely socially constructed, saw the 
conflict as amenable to change, and peace with the Palestinians as attainable.  They 
perceived Israel as the actor with the most agency within the situation as Israel was 
militarily and economically more powerful.  These two polarized views of the nature 
of the conflict were modified to varying degrees among the centrist interviewees. 
Summary 
There were clear differences, particularly between the secular left and the religious 
right, in whether identity was perceived as innate or as socially constructed.  Such 
differences correlated with differing perceptions of the conflict with the Palestinians: 
the right wing perceived hamatzav (“the situation”) as resulting from essential 
differences between Jews and Arabs which could never be fully overcome, while the 
left wing saw the ongoing conflict as reflecting situational factors which were 
socially constructed and therefore able to be changed.  The right wing saw Israel as 
responding to a situation that had been forced upon them by the Arabs, while the left 
wing saw Israel in more agentic terms, as an actor whose actions had partly, or 
largely, created and sustained the conflict.  In addition, for Ethiopian and Russian 
Israelis whose Jewishness was called into question, and also to some extent for 
Mizrahi and Sephardi Israelis who were perceived as culturally closer to Arabs than 
were Ashkenazi Israelis, military service functioned as a way of proving their 
Israeliness and of actively distancing themselves from inclusion with perceived 
outgroups.   
Military service in the context of the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, 
for many of the interviewees, as well as being perceived as necessary in order to 
protect the state of Israel from very real threats, played an important role in the 
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active performance of their Jewish/Israeli identity.  But for non-Ashkenazi Israelis, 
including recent immigrant groups whose Jewishness had been questioned, the 
conflict also provided a means of reinforcing their claim to an ingroup identity which 
held practical as well as symbolic meaning for them.  Serving in the military 
reinforced their perceived right as members of the Jewish/Israeli collective to live in 
Israel as members of the dominant elite. 
These findings contribute to the literatures on ethnographies of Israel, 
ingroup-outgroup identities, liberal-conservative studies within social and political 
psychology, and on intergroup conflict.  The differences identified along the liberal-
conservative continuum within Israel with respect to the nature of group identity and 
subsequent differences in perceptions of prospects for a peaceful resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict were shown to have implications for moral judgment 
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and specifically for differences in selective 
application of fairness with respect to the Palestinians.  This is detailed in the 
following section. 
7.2.2  Selective Fairness in Intergroup Dynamics: Treating “Us” 
Differently from “Them?” 
This section of the research introduced one of the thesis’ original empirical 
contributions: the identification of evidence of selective fairness in intergroup 
dynamics, as suggested by a moral foundations theory (MFT) analysis of the 40 
semi-structured interviews.  This analysis identified differences across the political 
spectrum in the Jewish Israeli interviewees’ application of the Harm and Fairness 
moral foundations with respect to members of the perceived Palestinian outgroup.  
Individuals provided details of their experience of moral dilemmas relating to 
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military service within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Analysis of this 
data suggested that, for these interviewees, the Ingroup Loyalty, Authority, and 
Sanctity/Purity moral foundations effectively functioned to restrict to whom the 
Harm and Fairness moral foundations were applied.  The further one travelled to the 
right along the political continuum—which, as detailed in the previous section, 
corresponded with an increasing perception of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Arab 
group identities as involving innate differences— more restrictive categories of 
Palestinians were cited in relation to moral dilemmas relating to military service.   
Very left wing individuals opposed the military occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories on the grounds that, by definition, the occupation violated the Harm and 
Fairness moral foundations by treating the entire Palestinian population unfairly and 
causing them considerable harm.  Crucially for this group of Israelis, the description 
of Israel as a democratic state (a Sacred Value for the left wing and centre left) was 
considered misleading because the over four million Palestinians living in the West 
Bank and Gaza were under the control of Israel, but had no voting privileges, and 
therefore no say in policies which directly affected them.  For the left wing, such a 
situation did not constitute democracy.  In contrast, the centre left interviewees, 
although describing some Harm and Fairness concerns relating to all of the 
Palestinians within Gaza and/or the West Bank
30
, still perceived Israel as a 
democratic nation.  Indeed, the centre left interviewees cited their duty as citizens of 
a democracy as a reason for performing military service in the West Bank and Gaza 
even though they disapproved of the military occupation on moral grounds.  For the 
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 Only one of the centre left interviewees limited their description of moral dilemmas relating to the 
conflict to specific segments of the population, rather than to the entire Gaza and/or West Bank 
population. 
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centre left, the Palestinians did not appear to trigger Harm and Fairness moral 
dilemmas with respect to democratic rights. 
For the centre right and right wing only specific, and very limited, segments 
of the Palestinian population were cited has having triggered moral dilemmas.  
Particularly for the right wing, the Sacred Value of Jewish control over Eretz Israel 
(which includes the West Bank and Gaza within its perceived boundaries) took 
priority over that of Israel as a democratic state.  Their strongest reported moral 
dilemmas related to threats to Jewish sovereignty over the land, such as being 
ordered to participate in the Disengagement from Gaza in 2005.  Their moral 
concerns with respect to Harm and Fairness issues relating to the Palestinians were 
described as arising in response to incidents in which they were personally involved 
rather than from concerns about the Palestinian populations as a whole.  For 
treatment of Palestinians to trigger moral dilemmas for these interviewees, it would 
appear that first-hand experience of emotionally-charged situations, such as 
witnessing mistreatment of children or of pregnant women, was required.  The 
interview analysis suggests that greater reliance on the Ingroup Loyalty, Authority, 
and Sanctity/Purity moral foundations by conservative Israelis who view group 
differences as innate and unchangeable meant that they largely restricted the 
application of the Harm and Fairness moral foundations to people whom they 
considered to be members of their ingroup of Jewish Israelis.    
This point has implications for the current structure of MFT with respect to 
the Fairness
31
 and Ingroup Loyalty moral foundations.  At present, these are 
described as two separate foundations, but I am suggesting that they would be better 
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 In Chapter 4 I also critique the equation of fairness and justice within MFT, arguing that if MFT is 
to accurately describe elements of morality which include non-liberal non-western conceptualisations, 
then fairness and justice need to be treated separately. 
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understood as opposite points along a single continuum: at the Ingroup Loyalty 
extreme the Harm versus Care moral foundation would only be applied to those 
perceived as ingroup members, while at the Universal Fairness extreme the Harm 
versus Care moral foundation would be applied equally to all regardless of perceived 
ingroup-outgroup membership.  In Figure 4.7 I demonstrated the correlation between 
(a) greater reliance on the Binding moral foundations by conservatives, and (b) the 
differences between liberals and conservatives in how inclusively or restrictively 
they apply the Harm versus Care moral foundation.  I presented this alongside a 
continuum with universal application of Fairness at one extreme, and strong Ingroup 
Loyalty at the other.  I would argue that this revised structure with relation to Harm 
and Ingroup Loyalty provides a more accurate way of visualizing the dynamics 
demonstrated by analysis of the interview data between the Individualising (Harm, 
Fairness) and the Binding (Ingroup Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity/Purity) moral 
foundations. 
I am suggesting that, although according to MFT research both liberals and 
conservatives rely heavily on the Harm moral foundation (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt 
& Graham, 2007), when very conservative people consider issues relating to Harm 
versus Care, they are thinking primarily in terms of their perceived ingroup members 
while in contrast, very liberal people are thinking in more universalist terms.  
Otherwise, the fact that in such research conservatives appear to value both Ingroup 
Loyalty and Fairness more or less equally is problematic: by definition the 
behavioural demands of extreme Ingroup Loyalty are at odds with those of strictly 
applied principles of Fairness.  Analysis of the interview data with Israeli soldiers 
and conscientious objectors with respect to attitudes towards Palestinians suggests 
that extreme adherence to Sanctity/Purity, Authority, and Ingroup Loyalty results in 
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limiting to whom one applies the principles of Harm versus Care, and of Fairness.  If 
Universal Fairness and extreme Ingroup Loyalty are conceptualised as opposite 
points along a single continuum, then these findings make logical sense. 
Similarly, the inclusion of “justice” (applying agreed-upon rules in cases of 
dispute) within MFT’s concept of “fairness” reflects a liberal western understanding 
of fairness (treating each individual according to the same, transparent rules) which 
is at odds with fairness concepts from more communally-bound societies in which 
justice would be understood as treating individuals in accordance with their different 
positions within a social hierarchy.  As the purpose of MFT is to include conceptions 
of morality which do not conform to a liberal western model (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph 2004), I would suggest that fairness and justice need to 
be treated separately.   
The above analysis indicates an inverse relationship between level of 
adherence to the Binding foundations (Authority, Loyalty, Sanctity/Purity) and the 
categories of perceived outgroup members to whom the Individualising foundations 
(Harm, Fairness) are applied.  I would suggest that this result has implications for the 
current debates relating to normative claims which have become associated with 
MFT (see Haidt 2012; Jost, 2012; Graham 2014), in which the advisability of 
categorising the Binding foundations as elements of morality in a normative sense 
(as opposed to acknowledging descriptively that some people consider them to be 
elements of morality) is argued.  The normative question is whether one considers 
restricting the application of the Harm and Fairness foundations in this way as 
morally valid. 
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Summary 
This evidence suggests that conservative right wing Israelis rely more heavily than 
their liberal left wing compatriots on the Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, 
Sanctity/Purity).  Crucially, it has revealed that this heavier reliance would appear to 
restrict to whom the Individualising foundations (Harm, Fairness) are applied.  If, as 
this research suggests, the Binding foundations effectively function to limit to whom 
we apply the Individualising foundations, then this poses normative questions 
relating to how the Binding foundations ‘should’ be categorised with respect to 
moral intuitions.  
The research has also identified two areas of concern within the current 
structure of MFT.  First, the inclusion of “justice within the concept of “fairness” 
reflects a liberal western understanding of fairness is counterproductive to the goal of 
MFT to transcend conceptions of morality as defined by a liberal western model 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph 2004),  I have suggested that 
fairness and justice need to be identified within MFT as conceptually distinct.   
Secondly, the research revealed a correlation between (a) stronger adherence 
to the Ingroup Loyalty foundation and (b) greater restriction relating to whom one 
includes within the sphere of those one treats equally with respect to the Harm versus 
Care moral foundation.  Based on this research, I am suggesting that, definitionally, 
extreme Ingroup Loyalty (always favouring perceived ingroup members) and 
comprehensively universal Fairness (treating everyone equally regardless of family, 
religious, or national affiliation), are best understood not as conceptually distinct 
intuitions, but as representing opposite ends of a single continuum. 
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This study contributes to the literatures on moral foundations theory, sacred 
values, ingroup-outgroup relations and intergroup conflict (specifically regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and to current debates around the normative claims of 
moral foundations theory.  It analyses how moral intuitions can affect moral 
judgment, and how this differs along the liberal-conservative continuum.  But this 
was not the only cognitive process influencing moral judgment identified within the 
current research.  Analysis of the interview data also suggested the possibility of a 
cognitive bias which, to date, had not appeared in the literature: the competence/ 
morality bias.  
7.2.3  Narratives of Exceptionalism within Israel regarding 
Competence and Morality 
This was an exploratory phase of the research which examined, firstly, the role of 
narratives of competence and morality within nationalist discourse in Israel, and 
secondly, the effects that this discourse might have on individuals’ performance of 
military service and on their perceptions of the morality of Israel’s military strategy 
with regard to the Palestinians.  Analysis was conducted on three key nationalist 
narratives within Israel which contained strong elements of competence and 
morality—or lagoyim (Israel as a light unto the other nations), Jewish Israelis 
“making the desert bloom,” and Jewish genius.   
The analysis suggested (a) that a perception of exceptional Israeli 
competence, as reinforced through these narratives, has become a contributory factor 
in justifying Israeli control over geographical territory; and (b) the nationalist 
discourse not only contrasts perceived Israeli competence with perceived Palestinian 
incompetence, but perceptions of national competence also influence perceptions of 
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national morality.  Specifically, Ben-Gurion’s nationalist, secularized version of the 
narrative of or lagoyim, in conjunction with the “Jewish genius” narrative (see 
Tzahor, 1995) presents Jewish Israelis as benefiting the rest of humankind (the moral 
element) through superior intellectual and technological capabilities (the competence 
element).  The narrative of “making the desert bloom” contrasts Israeli agricultural 
achievements against failures or lesser achievements perceived as resulting from 
Palestinian incompetence.  Crucially, I have argued that this element of the discourse 
results in downplaying Palestinian successes, and in ignoring the effects on 
Palestinian agriculture of government policies that severely restrict Palestinian 
farmers’ access to their lands, of settler violence and military actions which involve 
destruction of crops and infrastructure (see UNSCOP, 1947; George, 1979; Lowi, 
1993; Amnesty International, 2009; O’Callaghan, Jaspars, & Pavanello, 2009; World 
Bank, 2009; Fields, 2010).  In combination, I have argued that these narratives 
contribute to a nationalist discourse in which a perceived Jewish Israeli identity 
incorporating highly developed intellect and morality is contrasted against that of a 
perceived Palestinian Arab identity of irrationality and dubious morality. 
 I suggest that a perception of inherent differences between Jewish Israelis 
and Palestinian Arabs—which as we have seen from the Chapters 3 and 4 is held by 
Israelis from the conservative end of the political spectrum—has been a key factor in 
two specific areas relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  First, this perception 
serves to justify Israeli unilateralism within the context of the conflict: if “they” 
cannot be trusted to engage in negotiations in a rational and moral manner, then 
“we” are morally obligated to take control of the situation.  Second, it underpins a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which Jewish Israelis, but not Palestinians, are seen as 
able to “make the desert bloom.”  By severely limiting the ability of Palestinians to 
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competently engage in agriculture (Amnesty International, 2009; O’Callaghan, 
Jaspars, & Pavanello, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Fields, 2010), Israeli government 
policies ensure that differences in Israeli and Palestinian agricultural yields are 
inevitable.  I would argue that where competent use of the land is perceived as a key 
element of moral justification for control of that land, the implications of the results 
of such policies on Israeli attitudes regarding the respective rights of Israelis and 
Palestinians within the context of the ongoing conflict are far-reaching.  How such a 
discourse affects the experiences relating to military service for Jewish Israeli 
soldiers was addressed in the second section of this phase of the research. 
In the second part of this study, embodied discourse analysis was applied to 
the semi-structured interviews with the 40 reserve soldiers and conscientious 
objectors.  This allowed for analysis of how a nationalist discourse in which, I have 
argued, elements of competence and morality have become intertwined, is embodied 
by individuals during military service.  Analysis of the interviews suggested that a 
close, and apparently non-orthogonal, relationship between competence and morality 
might indicate a possible cognitive bias in which competent performance may 
influence assessment of actor morality, specifically when individuals judge the 
morality themselves and their military colleagues.  The role of narratives of 
competence and morality in the education system, the military recruitment process, 
and within the military hierarchy itself were explored with respect to potential 
impacts on the ability to make good moral judgments.  One novel finding was that 
for more liberal soldiers, who had moral concerns about their military service, 
competent performance appeared to serve to ameliorate their moral qualms.  But 
crucially, if they experienced incidents of incompetent performance within military 
operations, whether this was due to their own lack of competence or that of their 
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fellow soldiers or officers, such experiences appeared to function to heighten their 
moral concerns.  For some of the interviewees who already found elements of the 
military service morally troubling, it was an experience of a failure in competence, 
rather than any perceived moral outrage, which was described as the final straw 
which led to them becoming conscientious objectors. 
Summary 
These findings demonstrate first, that there is a nationalist discourse within Israel 
which draws on narratives in which elements of competence and morality are closely 
linked.  I am proposing that this is not unique to Israel, but that it is common among 
national and religious groups, although each will have their own culturally specific 
narratives.  Within Israel this discourse not only presents Jewish Israelis as 
exceptionally competent and moral, but also embraces a Calvinistic belief that 
success resulting from competence is indicative of moral virtue (see Efron, 2011).   
Secondly, I describe how a perception of Jewish Israeli exceptional 
competence and morality is reinforced through government policies which 
negatively affect the ability of the perceived Palestinian outgroup to competently 
sustain infrastructure and institutions.  I argue that this leads to comparisons in 
which the Palestinians are perceived not only as less competent than Israelis, but also 
as less morally deserving of having control of land.  Analysis of the possible role 
that such a dynamic between morality and competence can play within intergroup 
conflict makes an original contribution to the literatures on ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics and particularly to those relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Finally, the findings from the embodied discourse analysis phase of the study 
suggest that through their experiences of preparation for and participation in the 
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military, individuals effectively embody the aforementioned nationalist discourse in 
which competence and morality have become intertwined.  The interview analysis 
suggested that while perceived competence of performance can therefore function to 
reduce moral qualms associated with military service, conversely, incompetent 
performance on the part of themselves or of their colleagues could result in 
individuals questioning not only the competence, but the morality of those 
participating in the enforcement of the military occupation in the Palestinian 
territories.   This analysis suggested the possibility of a competence/morality 
cognitive bias, which was subsequently tested for using online experiments as 
described in Chapter 6.    
7.2.4  The Competence/Morality Cognitive Bias 
The original theoretical concept offered by the thesis is that of the proposed 
existence of a cognitive bias in which the competence of performance of a morally 
problematic action can affect the assessment of the morality of the actor.  The 
existence of this cognitive bias had been suggested by analysis of the semi-structured 
interview data.  Here, therefore, I drew on findings from research which took an 
idiographic approach and employed qualitative methods, and applied these to the 
design of an experimental protocol which takes a nomothetic approach in searching 
for evidence of a cognitive bias which I have hypothesized to be universal.   
To test for this bias, two between-subject experiments were conducted online 
with 1,194 Jewish Israelis from across the political spectrum.  Scenarios describing 
individuals performing morally problematic actions either competently or 
incompetently were read by the participants.  In the first experiment participants 
imagined themselves as the main character, while in the second experiment 
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participants read third-person scenarios in which they did not imagine themselves to 
be participating.  They then filled in a feelings thermometer which was designed to 
indicate their assessment of the competence and morality of the main characters, and 
in the first experiment, their levels of cognitive dissonance.  Finally, they answered 
questions relating to how morally problematic they found the described actions to be, 
and whether they considered competent performers of these actions to be more moral 
than incompetent performers.   
The first experiment found that, when judging actions attributed to 
themselves, participants assessed themselves as more moral when they performed 
competently, but only if they were either conforming to social norms or targeting an 
outgroup member.  Statistical analysis suggested that cognitive dissonance mediated 
the influence of competence on actor morality.  The second experiment found that, 
when judging the actions of ingroup members targeting allied outgroup members, 
ingroup members who performed competently were assessed as more moral than 
those who performed the same actions incompetently.  Also, conservative 
participants assessed the morality of the ingroup actors as higher than did more 
liberal participants.  However, when assessing the morality of the outgroup members 
targeting the ingroup there was no such correlation between assessments of 
competence and morality.  Counter to my predictions, and unlike in Experiment 1, 
the Experiment 2 analysis did not indicate that cognitive dissonance mediated the 
competence/morality dynamic.  The role, if any, of cognitive dissonance therefore 
remains an open question, and one which would benefit from further research in the 
future.  However, the experimental findings suggest that when individuals are faced 
with morally problematic actions which they perceive to be ingroup-profitable, they 
will assess the morality of those performing the actions as higher if they perform the 
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actions competently than if they perform the same morally problematic actions 
incompetently. Alternative hypotheses positing that the competence/morality 
dynamic would be better understood as either (a) a useful and valid heuristic, or (b) a 
cognitive bias, were engaged with.  Although I recognize that this is a distinction 
which may well prove to be a subject of considerable contention among academics, I 
provided analysis which favoured the second option, in which the dynamic is 
perceived as a cognitive bias. 
These findings contribute to the literature on cognitive bias and heuristics by 
presenting novel evidence of a proposed cognitive bias not currently in the literature.  
They also contribute to the literature incorporating models of competence and 
morality (Wojciske, 2005), and competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2007).  These 
models describe competence and morality/warmth as distinct and orthogonal.  
However, the experiments in Chapter 6 provide evidence that competence and 
morality are, at best, weakly orthogonal, by demonstrating the effect that competence 
of performance can have on assessment of morality. 
Summary  
The findings of this study contribute to the literatures on cognitive bias by providing 
novel evidence of a cognitive bias not currently identified in the literature.  The 
results suggest that, when judging the morality of themselves or of ingroup members 
who are performing morally problematic actions which either involve conforming to 
social norms or targeting outgroup members, judgment of morality can be influenced 
by a cognitive bias in which competence of performance affects assessment of actor 
morality.   
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These findings also have relevance for the literature on ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics.  The competence/morality cognitive bias has been shown to affect 
individuals regardless of their position along the liberal-conservative continuum.  
However, in a situation involving clearly defined ingroup-outgroup dynamics, as 
evidenced by the results of the second experiment, conservatives were seen to assess 
the morality of ingroup actors more highly than did more liberal individuals.  This 
study also contributes to the literature on models of competence versus morality/ 
warmth by providing evidence that the dimensions of competence and morality are 
only weakly orthogonal.   
 This study provides evidence which suggests that moral judgment can be 
affected by a cognitive bias which can result in individuals assessing the morality of 
themselves and of their ingroup members less harshly if, when performing morally 
problematic actions, they perform these competently.  The effects of this cognitive 
bias are hypothesized to be universal, however it is also proposed that its effects will 
manifest in different ways in different specific cultural contexts.  In the following 
sections I demonstrate how the key findings from across the thesis interrelate. 
7.3  Linking the Findings 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates how four key elements which affect moral judgment 
addressed in the thesis—Cognitive Bias, Culturally Specific factors, Intuitions, and 
Sacred Values— interlink.  Reading from right to left, I have argued that the 
proposed, and hypothesized to be universal, morality/competence cognitive bias is 
evident within Israeli nationalist and military narratives of exceptional morality and 
competence.  These culturally specific narratives are reflected in perceptions of 
“Jewishness” (incorporating high levels of morality and competence) as being 
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conceptualised in contrast to “Arabness” (which is perceived as lower in both 
competence and morality).  There are differences along the liberal-conservative 
continuum in Israel with respect to whether/to what degree such alleged differences 
between Jewish and Arab people exist, and these correspond with differences 
regarding whether group identity is understood as innate rather than as socially 
constructed.  Very conservative people, who perceive group identity—and group 
differences relating to competence and morality—as largely innate, are more 
“groupish” and rely more heavily on the Binding moral foundations (Ingroup 
Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity/ Purity) than do more liberal individuals.   
There are corresponding differences in selective fairness between liberals and 
conservatives, with “groupish” conservatives primarily applying the Harm and 
Fairness moral foundations to perceived ingroup members, while liberals apply these 
foundations more universally.  Such differences in moral intuition correspond with 
differences between liberals and conservatives regarding the sacred values which 
they hold with respect to the State of Israel.  While both liberal and conservative 
Jewish Israelis among the 40 interviewees in this study described the role of Israel as 
providing a safe haven for Jewish people from around the world as a sacred value, 
they differed regarding what form of state could best accomplish this.  For very 
conservative interviewees, Israel as a Jewish state was a non-negotiable sacred value, 
but for very liberal interviewees ensuring that Israel was a democratic state was 
equally sacred and non-negotiable.  As detailed in section 7.2.3, there were also 
differences between the left wing and centre left regarding what they perceived 
would constitute a truly democratic Israel, indicating a difference between these 
groups regarding selective application of fairness with relation to democratic rights 
as they apply to the Palestinians.   
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These findings suggest how, cumulatively, elements of cognitive bias, moral 
intuitions and cultural specifics including sacred values, affect Jewish Israeli 
individuals’ moral judgment with respect to moral dilemmas relating to military 
service within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In presenting these 
findings, I am not suggesting that these elements comprise the sum total of cognitive 
processes influencing moral judgment within this context, only that they contribute 
to the complex dynamics inherent within processes of moral judgment.   
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 Figure 7.1: Interrelation of Cognitive Bias, Culturally Specific Factors, Intuitions, and Sacred Values 
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7.4  Limitations and Future Directions 
This research project has examined dynamics of moral judgment involving cognitive 
processes which are hypothesized to be universal, within one particular set of 
circumstances: that of Jewish Israelis conscripted into military service within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Restricting the research to one cultural 
context allowed for fine-grained analysis of culturally specific factors which 
affected, and were affected by, the influence of the cognitive processes in question 
on moral judgment.  However, a better understanding of the scope and nature of the 
interaction between universal cognitive processes and culturally specific contexts 
requires additional studies in other cultural settings.  There would also be much to 
gain from conducting studies testing for selective application of the Harm versus 
Care moral foundation within other intergroup conflicts.  However, I would also 
suggest that it would be illuminating to extend such research to include a broader 
range of settings, for example, international trade, the financial sector, labour 
relations, and attitudes towards refugees. 
 On a similar theme, it would be useful to extend experimentation relating to 
the proposed competence/morality cognitive bias in order to test for the relative 
strength of the bias in different contexts.  Is the bias stronger in extreme situations, 
such as that of violent conflict?  Is a strong competence/morality bias more prevalent 
in certain industries and institutions?  Can the strength of the bias be increased or 
decreased by altering institutional reward structures, for example by incorporating 
rewards for complying with ethical standards as well as for competent performance 
rather than for competent performance alone?  Does the bias come into play when 
judging perceived outgroup members who are not targeting perceived ingroup 
members? 
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 One interesting point which would benefit from further research is that, given 
the findings of the Chapter 4 Selective Fairness chapter, one might wonder whether 
conservatives in the Chapter 6 experiments would be expected to find targeting an 
outgroup member less morally problematic than did liberals.  I would suggest that, 
given crucial differences in these two studies, this would not necessarily follow.  The 
qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 dealt with a long-standing, violent intergroup 
conflict.  This is an extreme situation in which the fear of death is salient. So, the 
selective fairness exhibited by conservatives in the interviews may well only exhibit 
strongly in similarly extreme situations.  This would correspond with existing 
theories about political ideology and management of threat (Greenberg, Simon, 
Pyszcynski, Solomon, and Chatel, 1992; Jost and Hunyady, 2005), and with previous 
empirical studies which show that situations in which the nation is perceived to be 
under threat can result in national populations moving politically to the right 
(Montalvo, 2011; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014).  For the Chapter 6 study I 
purposefully did not design experiments which mimicked such a sense of threat for a 
very specific reason.  I wanted to isolate the proposed competence/morality dynamic 
from the highly emotive context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  I did this in order 
to test for its existence as ‘cleanly’ as possible.  However, the specific relationship 
between selective fairness, sense of threat, and political ideology would be very 
interesting to test for in future research.   
 In order to transcend the limitations inherent to methods which require 
participants to imagine performing certain actions, and which rely on self-report 
responses, it would be useful to explore other experimental designs.  First, it would 
be interesting to construct experiments where participants were actually performing 
actions rather than imagining performing actions.  Such an approach comes with its 
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own complications, of course—one must be very careful when designing studies in 
which participants perform actions which are considered morally problematic.  It 
would be self-defeating (and rather ironic, given the research questions) to become 
so enamoured of a competently designed experiment that one lost sight of the ethics 
of conducting it.  Secondly, to move beyond self-report, it would be useful to engage 
with neuroscientists, especially with those who have been conducting research into 
cognitive processes involved in ingroup-outgroup dynamics and conflict resolution 
(e.g., Bruneau, Dufour, and Saxe, 2012; Bruneau and Saxe, 2010) in order to gain a 
better understanding of how perception of competent performance of actions affects 
moral judgment of the actor. 
 One interesting question which arose for me during the course of this 
research, but which was beyond the scope of this project to address, relates to 
potential differences between liberals and conservatives in making action-centred 
versus person-centred intuitive moral judgments in situations of intergroup conflict. 
If very conservative individuals are more “groupish” and hold strong stereotypical 
views of “us” in contrast to “them,” then it would make logical sense for them, when 
confronted with morally problematic actions performed by ingroup members during 
intergroup conflict, to make moral judgments based on the inherently “good” moral 
character of the ingroup actors, rather than on the morally problematic action itself.  
In contrast, very liberal individuals could be expected to focus more on the morally 
problematic action.  Such apparent differences arose during the interviews with the 
40 reserve soldiers and conscientious objectors.  It would be interesting and useful to 
test for this experimentally.  If this difference is confirmed, it would also be useful to 
test whether in such contexts both liberals and conservatives initially make quick, 
intuitive moral judgments that are person-centred, with liberals subsequently making 
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slower, action-centred judgments, or whether they differ intuitively in making 
person-centred or action-centred moral judgments.   
 In both English and Hebrew, the meanings of the words good (tov) and bad 
(ra) can relate to both morality and competence.  It would be interesting to analyse 
other languages to see whether this relationship is universal.  If it is not, analysis of 
cultural factors which might contribute to such differences could prove illuminating. 
 Finally, there is scope for a much greater engagement with moral 
philosophy—specifically with the tradition of virtue ethics (VE)—both with respect 
to the competence/morality cognitive bias, and regarding the synthesis of the 
findings relating to sacred values, stereotyping, and intergroup dynamics.  I would 
suggest that the proposed competence/morality cognitive bias, which challenges the 
view of competence and morality as orthogonal (Wojciszke, 2005a) is compatible 
with the concept of arête found within VE.  Arête can be defined as meaning both 
virtue and excellence (Gilbert, 2003).  I would suggest that the competence/morality 
bias echoes the concept of arête insofar as it describes competence (excellence) and 
morality (virtue) as non-orthogonal.  For example, in the Homeric interpretation of 
arête, a personal quality is virtuous if it enables an individual to competently fulfil 
his or her function within society (see MacIntyre, 1985).  Another key concept 
within VE is eudaimonia, which, in a broadly Aristotelian reading of VE, can be 
conceptualised as “human flourishing” (Oakley, 1996). But different people can have 
conflicting concepts about what constitutes flourishing and a “good” life.  Figure 7.2 
briefly synthesizes findings from Chapter 3 relating to sacred values held by liberals 
and conservatives within Israel, with the concept of eudaimonia, and outlines two 
divergent views regarding which sacred values a flourishing state of Israel would 
need to embrace.  
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Figure 7.2: Synthesizing Eudaimonia and Sacred Values 
 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that liberals and conservatives can hold very different 
views on the nature of group identity (socially constructed versus innate).  Chapter 4 
cited research which demonstrates that conservatives adhere more strongly to the 
ingroup-prioritising Binding moral foundations.  And as cited in Chapter 6, models 
of competence versus morality/warmth demonstrate that individuals tend to judge 
their perceived ingroups as rating highly in both morality/warmth and competence.  I 
would suggest that a VE approach to moral judgment, in which the perceived 
character of actors rather than specific acts per se is paramount, could provide a rich 
and engaging theoretical construct for further analysing the synthesis of these 
elements.   
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7.5  Conclusion: Original Contributions of the Thesis 
Empirical Contributions 
Here I will briefly restate the key empirical contributions of the thesis and specify 
the implications of these findings.  First, the research demonstrated how, within a 
world of contested definitions of Jewishness within Israel, clear differences arose 
between liberals, who conceived of group identity as largely socially constructed, 
and conservatives, who saw group identities as largely innate.  These differences 
affected how individuals along the liberal-conservative continuum perceived “the 
situation” of ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, with liberals seeing genuine 
prospects for peaceful co-existence, and with conservatives feeling that due to 
essential differences between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs the conflict could 
only be kept under control, or ended with an overwhelming show of force.   
Crucially, these differences were shown to correspond with variation along 
the liberal-conservative continuum regarding ‘selective fairness,’ that is, selective 
application of the Harm and Fairness moral foundations, with conservatives 
reporting experiencing moral dilemmas related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only 
in response to difficulties faced by small sub-sections of the Palestinian population.  
In contrast, very liberal individuals reported experiencing moral dilemmas relating to 
treatment of the Palestinian population as a whole.  Based on these findings, the 
current structure of MFT with respect to the Ingroup Loyalty and Fairness 
foundations was critiqued, and an alternative structure in which Fairness and Ingroup 
Loyalty were conceptualised as forming opposite ends of a single continuum was 
proposed.  These findings may be of interest to political psychologists specialising in 
intergroup conflict, and especially to those whose research focuses on the Israeli-
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Palestinian conflict, as well as to social psychologists with an interest in applying 
moral foundations theory to real word contexts.  These findings also have 
implications for “is/ought” debates regarding whether the Binding foundations 
within moral foundations theory (Ingroup Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity/Purity) ought 
to be considered as constituting elements of morality (Haidt 2012; Jost, 2012; 
Graham 2014).   
Second, analysis of three key nationalist narratives within Israel—or 
lagoyim, “making the desert bloom,” and Jewish genius—proposed that elements of 
competence and morality within the narratives had become intertwined in such a way 
that they contributed to a nationalist discourse in which Jewish Israeli competence 
was perceived as indicative of Jewish Israeli morality.  I have argued that this, in 
conjunction with Israeli government policies which severely limit Palestinians’ 
ability to competently create and sustain infrastructure and institutions, created a 
situation in which perceived Palestinian incompetence has been contrasted 
unfavourably with the perceived exceptional competence of Israelis, thus reinforcing 
the claim within the “making the desert bloom” narrative that the “wasteland” of 
Palestine will only be brought to fruitfulness under Jewish stewardship.  This 
narrative reinforces a perception of differences in the agricultural competence of 
Israelis and Palestinians that does not acknowledge the negative impact on 
Palestinian farmers of the aforementioned discriminatory policies.  I argue that this 
has become a contributory factor in justifying Israeli control of land, as ostensibly, 
the Palestinians do not have the competence to look after the land properly, and by 
extension, the highly competent Israelis may be perceived as having greater moral 
claim to it.  These findings have implications for a broad range of social science 
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disciplines which focus on the impact of nationalist discourses, and on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
Thirdly, the research described how, during their preparations for and 
participation in military service, IDF conscripts effectively embody a nationalist 
discourse in which concepts of competence and morality are closely linked.  By 
associating Zionist ideals with meaningful military service, and to development of 
Jewish Israeli students’ capabilities and moral values, the education system in Israel 
begins a process through which narratives of competence are linked to those of 
morality.  This is enhanced by intense competition during the recruitment process 
during which individuals strive to achieve their place within the military hierarchy, 
alongside a perception that one can trust one’s superior officers to make good moral, 
as well as tactical, decisions.  The assertion that the IDF is “the most moral army in 
the world” is regularly repeated by Israeli politicians and other high profile officials, 
and research has shown that within mainstream Israeli society a narrative of Israeli 
technological superiority is complemented by a narrative of moral superiority (Bar-
Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010. 
Expanding on this, the current research revealed a novel finding regarding 
how embodying this nationalist discourse can affect individual soldiers.  
Specifically, evidence was presented which suggested that when individuals were 
faced with participating in military actions which they considered to be morally 
problematic, their moral qualms could to some degree be ameliorated if the actions 
were performed competently.  Conversely, if they or their colleagues performed 
incompetently, their pre-existing moral concerns could be brought to the fore.  For 
some of the interviewees, such experiences of incompetence on the part of 
themselves or of their colleagues were cited as turning points in making a decision to 
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refuse further military service.  These findings have implications for areas of 
political psychology focusing on moral judgment, on military service, on intergroup 
conflict in general, and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. 
Theoretical Contribution 
 The original theoretical contribution of the thesis arose from empirical 
evidence supporting a proposed cognitive bias not currently found in the literature: 
the competence/morality bias.  This phase of the research was suggested by findings 
from qualitative analysis of the 40 interviews.  Online experiments designed to test 
for the impact that competent performance of morally problematic actions has on the 
assessment of actor morality were conducted in Israel.  The experimental results 
suggested that when actors performed a morally problematic action, they were 
assessed as more moral if they performed competently rather than incompetently, but 
only if the actors were either conforming to social norms or targeting outgroup 
members.  This counterintuitive finding has, I would suggest, both theoretical and 
practical implications.  Theoretically, the findings suggest that the dimensions of 
competence and morality are not, as previously described, truly orthogonal (e.g. 
Wojciske, 2005).  At best they are weakly orthogonal, as in the current research 
competence of performance has been shown to affect perceived morality both within 
the experimental study, and through analysis of interview data.   
Practical implications of the proposed competence/morality bias are 
potentially wide-reaching.  If individuals’ moral qualms about specific actions can be 
ameliorated through competent performance, then this has implications for 
organisational ethics, broadly conceptualised.  Motivating people through providing 
them with the opportunity to do something well can aid organisations whose work 
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contains elements which individuals may find morally problematic, such as the 
military or the security services, to recruit and retain staff: competent performance 
can function to reduce moral qualms.  The obvious negative side of this is that, due 
to the same dynamic, individuals may find themselves performing actions that (a) the 
organisation itself considers morally problematic and disapproves of, or (b) that the 
individual would reject due to moral concerns were it not for the effect of the 
competence/morality bias.  Similarly, these findings have implications for improving 
our understanding of the attraction of involvement with organisations such as certain 
types of criminal gang or insurgent groups.  Along with financial incentives, 
ideological motivations, and the appeal of intense camaraderie, the effect of the 
competence/morality bias on minimising the moral concerns of potential recruits 
may prove a considerable factor in the decision to engage in such activities.  Only 
marginally less dramatically, I would suggest that this cognitive bias has played a 
role within industries such as banking and finance, in which success, it could be 
argued, has historically taken precedence over ethics.  And even within professions 
with strong ethical ground rules but which place a high premium on competence, 
such as academia, the law, and medical research organisations, the scope for the 
competence/morality bias to lead us astray is, I would suggest, significant. 
I would suggest that the influence of the competence/morality cognitive bias 
and of selective fairness can serve to blur our vision with respect to how we judge 
the morality of ourselves and our colleagues when interacting with perceived 
outgroups in a way that can be detrimental to achieving equitable resolution to 
conflict.  Although this thesis has focused specifically on how intuitions and biases 
can affect the experiences of Israelis called upon to serve in the military within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these cognitive processes are hypothesized 
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to be universal.  The more we are able to understand how such processes can 
influence our moral judgment, the better equipped we will be to guard against 
making judgments that undermine our own ethical intentions, and that can condemn 
us to seemingly interminable conflict.   
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Appendix 1 Framework for Semi-Structured Interviews and Moral 
Continuum Exercise 
 
Guide Questions Organising Themes 
How did your family come to live in 
Israel? 
 
When you were a child, was this talked 
about much?  By whom? 
 
How did you see your family’s personal 
history relating to the wider, national 
history of Israel? 
 
 
Linking personal/family history to Israeli 
nationhood 
When you were a child, what did you 
know about the Arab population of the 
region?   
 
Childhood perceptions of and 
interactions with Arab Israelis and Arab 
Palestinians 
How secure did you feel living in Israel? Childhood feelings of (lack of) security 
What do you remember about your 
awareness of the IDF when you were a 
child?  How was it presented in school? 
At home? In the media? 
 
What were your feelings about doing 
army service as you were growing up?   
 
 
Childhood perception of the IDF 
 
Where did you serve in the military? 
 
What do you consider to be the most 
important characteristics of the IDF?  
What makes it special, different from 
other armies? 
 
What does “tohar ha neshek” mean to 
you?  What ethical training specific to 
the military did you receive? 
 
What does it mean, in idealistic terms, to 
be part of “the most moral army in the 
world”?  What do you think the other 
groups think this means?  What do you 
think they think you think? 
 
And in practical terms?  How did you 
find this in your own military 
experience? 
  What, if anything, about your military 
service caused moral dilemmas for you? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal experiences in the IDF 
 
 
 
 
Who/what do you feel the IDF is meant 
to protect?   
 
Perception of the purpose of the IDF 
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Where does your loyalty to the IDF lie?   Loyalties 
What does it mean to you to identify as 
Jewish?  What makes someone Jewish?  
What does it mean to you to identify as 
Israeli?  What makes someone Israeli?  
  
Who can and cannot become Jewish?  
Who can and cannot become Israeli? 
 
 
Group identity 
What interactions have you had with 
Palestinians as an adult?  In the military?  
In civilian life?   
 
Adult interactions with Arab Palestinians 
How does the conflict affect your daily 
life?  What things do you see throughout 
your day that make you think about it? 
 
Salience of the conflict in daily life 
Re the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, why 
do you think it has continued for so 
long?   
 
In your opinion, is there anything Israel 
can do at present to end the conflict?   
 
Do you think there is a partner for peace 
in Palestine?  Why? 
 
If you had the power to do anything, 
what would you do to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and bring peace?  
 
What do you think the people of other 
political persuasions would think of this 
plan?  What would they propose?  Why 
do you think their view of the situation is 
so different from yours? 
 
 
 
 
Agency relating to the conflict 
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These questions were followed by the “Moral Continuum” exercise.  
Participants placed stickers representing different behaviours along a continuum 
from “Immoral” to “Moral.”   
The stickers related to key behavioural differences between the different 
political ideologies. They were: 
 Refusing military service in the West Bank/Gaza on ethical grounds [Left 
wing behaviour] 
 Refusing to evacuate Jewish Israeli settlements on ethical grounds [Right 
wing behaviour] 
 Protesting against the military occupation of the West Bank/Gaza but 
continuing to serve in the military there [Centre left behaviour] 
 Supporting the military operations in the West Bank/Gaza and serving in 
the military there [Centre right behaviour] 
 
Participants first answered with respect to their own views, and then were 
asked to do the exercise as they thought individuals from different political 
ideological groups would.   
The purpose of this exercise was to move the discussions away from abstract 
concepts of morality within military service and to introduce a more concrete 
assessment of specific behaviours, of the interviewees’ perceptions of the 
motivations of the actors involved, and of how other Israelis perceived these 
motivations.  Although simplistic in design, it led to useful, in-depth discussions. 
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Appendix 2    MFQ Questions Relating to Fairness 
 
Questions and Statements relating to the Fairness Moral Foundation in the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (moralfoundations.org, 2008a.) 
“Section A:  When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent 
are the following considerations relevant to your thinking? 
i. Whether or not some people were treated differently than 
others 
ii. Whether or not someone acted unfairly 
iii. Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights 
Section B:  Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or 
disagreement: 
iv. Justice is the most important requirement for a society 
v. When the government makes laws, the number one principle 
should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. 
vi. I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of 
money while poor children inherit nothing” 
 
The highlighted sections above relate to justice (rights) rather than to fairness (equal 
treatment). 
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Appendix 3 Detailed Breakdowns of Chapter 4 Charts 
 
Sections of the Palestinian population described in relation to moral dilemmas 
(relating to Figure 4.3) 
Interviewee 
ID 
Political  
Category 
Who mentioned 
L1 Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L2 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L3 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L4 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L5 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
L6 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L7 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
L8 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L9 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
L10 Left  Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
CL1 Centre Left Occupied West Bank  
 
Palestinians at checkpoints  
 
Searching civilian homes  
CL2 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
 
Border police using excessive force at 
demonstrations  
 
Palestinians cut off from their land  
CL3 Centre Left Occupied West Bank  
 
Searching civilian homes 
 
Palestinians being used as human shields by 
Hamas 
CL4 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
 
Pregnant woman at checkpoint  
 
Villagers whose water stores were destroyed  
  
296 
 
CL5 Centre Left Home searches  
 
 
Palestinians mistreated at checkpoints  
CL6 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
CL7 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
CL8 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
CL9 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
CL10 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
 
Sick children unable to get to hospital 
CL11 Centre Left Occupied West Bank/Gaza 
CR1 Centre Right None 
CR2 Centre Right Palestinians being used as human shields by 
Hamas  
CR3 Centre Right Home confiscation – confining the family in 
one room  
CR4 Centre Right Stopped and searched a civilian  
CR5 Centre Right Stopping Palestinian workers from entering 
Israel  
CR6 Centre Right None 
CR7 Centre Right None 
CR8 Centre Right Shooting at children  
CR9 Centre Right Children getting hurt  
CR10 Centre Left/ 
Centre Right 
None 
R1 Right None 
R2 Right Children witnessing their father being 
humiliated by soldiers  
R3 Right None 
R4 Right None 
R5 Right None 
R6 Right Children shouted at by soldiers  
R7 Right None 
R8 Right Children being searched  
R9 Right Small girl seeing her father arrested  
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Perceptions of Group Differences, and of Solutions to the Conflict (relating to 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5) 
Interviewee 
ID 
Political  
Category 
How/whether interviewees 
perceive differences between 
Jewish Israelis and Palestinian 
Arabs 
Suggested 
solutions to 
the conflict 
Fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
 
 
Fluid 
Genetic/Biological 
Differences 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Social Construct/ 
People the Same 
Underneath 
 
Group ID not 
important to me 
L1 Left Fluid Social Construct Two states 
 
Negotiation 
L2 Left  Fluid 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Social Construct 
 
Group ID not 
important to me 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Negotiation 
L3 Left  Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
L4 Left  Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
 
 
 
Two states 
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L5 Left  Fluid Group ID not 
important to me 
 
One 
democratic 
state 
 
International 
pressure 
needed 
L6 Left  Fluid Group ID not 
important to me 
Two states 
L7 Left  Fluid 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Social Construct 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
One 
democratic 
state 
L8 Left  Fluid 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Social construct 
 
Group ID not 
important to me 
 
Navigable 
Cultual/Mindset 
Differences 
One 
democratic 
state 
 
Socio-
economic 
approach 
L9 Left  Fluid Social construct One 
democratic 
state 
L10 Left  Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
 
Only relative 
peace is 
possible 
CL1 Centre Left Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
 
Socio-
economic 
approach 
CL2 Centre Left Fluid Social Construct Two States 
 
There needs to 
be a Jewish 
State 
CL3 Centre Left Fixed 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Genetic/Biological 
Differences 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
 
 
Two States 
 
Negotiations 
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CL4 Centre Left Fixed 
 
 
 
Fluid 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Social Construct 
Negotiations 
 
Unilateral 
action by 
Israel if 
negotiations 
are not 
successful  
CL5 Centre Left Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
 
Negotiations 
CL6 Centre Left Fluid Group ID not 
important to me 
Two states 
CL7 Centre Left Fluid Social Construct Two states 
CL8 Centre Left Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
 
Jewish 
majority state 
CL9 Centre Left Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
CL10 Centre Left Fixed 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
CL11 Centre Left Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Two states 
CR1 Centre Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Genetic 
Differences 
Strong 
military 
assault 
CR2 Centre Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two States 
 
Strong 
military 
assault 
 
Then put the 
PA in charge 
of Gaza 
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CR3 Centre Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural 
Differences 
Strong 
military 
assault 
 
Then socio-
economic 
approach 
CR4 Centre Right Middle 
Ground 
Navigable 
Cultural 
Differences 
Two states 
 
Negotiations 
CR5 Centre Right Fluid People the Same 
Underneath 
Two states 
 
But some 
settlements 
need to remain 
 
Negotiations 
 
Socio-
economic 
approach 
CR6 Centre Right Fixed 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Biological 
Difference 
 
Navigable 
Cultural 
Differences 
Two states 
CR7 Centre Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Conflict will 
continue 
CR8 Centre Right Fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Genetic/Biological 
Differences 
 
Navigable 
Cultural 
Differences 
One Jewish 
state 
CR9 Centre Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Strong 
military 
assault 
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CR10 Centre Left/ 
Centre Right 
Fixed 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
  
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Two states 
 
 
R1 Right Fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
 
Genetic 
Difference 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Conflict will 
continue 
 
Negotiations 
only possible 
re short-term 
goals 
R2 Right Fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Genetic 
Differences 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
One Jewish 
State 
 
Strong 
military 
assault 
 
Palestinian 
enclaves: 
restricted 
movement. No 
voting rights 
or military 
service 
R3 Right Fixed 
 
 
 
Genetic/Biological 
Difference 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
One Jewish 
State 
 
Strong 
military 
assault 
 
Palestinian 
enclaves: 
restricted 
movement. No 
voting rights 
or military 
service 
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R4 Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
One Jewish 
State 
R5 Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
Strong 
military 
assault 
R6 Right Fixed Genetic/Biological 
Differences 
 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
One Jewish 
State 
 
Conflict will 
continue 
R7 Right Fixed Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
One Jewish 
State 
R8 Right Fixed 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
One Jewish 
State 
 
Palestinian 
enclaves: 
restricted 
movement + 
no voting 
rights or 
military 
service 
R9 Right Fixed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle 
Ground 
Insurmountable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
 
Jewish people 
inseparable from 
the land of Israel 
 
Navigable 
Cultural/Mindset 
Differences 
One Jewish 
and 
Democratic 
State 
(acknowledges 
this is 
problematic) 
 
Involve Jordan 
re where 
Palestinians 
should live 
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Appendix 4   The Pilots’ Letter (2003)
32
 
"We, Air Force pilots who were raised on the values of Zionism, sacrifice, and 
contributing to the state of Israel, have always served on the front lines, and were 
always willing to carry out any mission to defend and strengthen the state of Israel. 
We, veteran and active pilots alike, who have served and still serve the state 
of Israel for long weeks every year, are opposed to carrying out attack orders that are 
illegal and immoral of the type the state of Israel has been conducting in the 
territories. 
We, who were raised to love the state of Israel and contribute to the Zionist 
enterprise, refuse to take part in Air Force attacks on civilian population centers. We, 
for whom the Israel Defense Forces and the Air Force are an inalienable part of 
ourselves, refuse to continue to harm innocent civilians. 
These actions are illegal and immoral, and are a direct result of the ongoing 
occupation which is corrupting the Israeli society. Perpetuation of the occupation is 
fatally harming the security of the state of Israel and its moral strength. 
We who serve as active pilots—fighters, leaders, and instructors of the next 
generation of pilots—hereby declare that we shall continue to serve in the Israel 
Defense Forces and the Air Force on every mission in defence of the State of Israel." 
 
 
                                                 
32
 English translation provided by Courage to Refuse.  
http://www.seruv.org.il/english/article.asp?msgid=55&type=news 
 
304 
 
 Appendix 5   Scripts for Experiments 1 and 2 
 
1. English Translations of Scripts for Experiment 1 (see below) 
2. English Translations of Scripts for Experiment 2 (see below) 
 
English Translations of Scripts for Experiment 1 
The scripts below are for the Foreign Country conditions of the Counterfeiter 
scenarios.  The scripts for the Home Country conditions were identical except they 
were (a) set in West Jerusalem, (b) there was a soccer game playing on the radio, and 
the description of the final play related to making the winning goal rather than 
making a touchdown, and (c) the check was in shekels, not dollars. 
Lone Counterfeiter / Foreign Country: Competent 
“Please read the following story, imagining that you are the main character. 
It is a cold afternoon in November and you have just walked in to a small 
town store in upstate New York that offers a check cashing service.  You wander 
over to the magazine rack and pick up a copy of the local paper.  While leafing 
through this you glance casually across the room at the cashier working the till.  He 
is distracted now, his attention divided between a woman paying for a pack of gum, 
and the football game being broadcast on a tinny radio over to his right.  In fact, 
although this cashier is usually very conscientious in his work, if a game is playing 
on the radio his attention to work suffers as he gets caught up in the radio 
announcer’s play by play commentary. 
This is good news for you.  Because you are planning to hand the cashier a 
payroll check for $843.59, and that check is as phoney as the smile that is amiably 
spreading across your face as you walk up to the counter. 
The differences between a successful fake payroll check and worthless 
attempts that will get you arrested are many and subtle.  It takes talent and time to 
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make a check that looks and feels like the real thing.  You have to use paper with the 
correct weight and texture, accurately duplicate company logos, and use identical 
fonts and ink colors.  
You have shown both the talent, and the patience to put in enough time, to 
make sure your fake check meets these requirements: your check is a truly beautiful 
piece of work.  Consequently, your chances of success are very high whether or not 
the cashier is distracted by the football game when he examines your check. 
You’re at the counter now, pushing your expertly made check towards the 
cashier.  “Could you cash this for me, please?”  The radio announcer’s voice is rising 
in pitch as he describes the quarterback’s dash for the end zone.  The cashier is 
clearly distracted by this as he says, “Yeah, sure.  Can I see some ID?”  You remove 
a fake driving license from your wallet, and hand it over as the radio announcer’s 
voice grows more and more excited.  The cashier gives only a cursory inspection of 
your documents.  He starts counting out the $843.59, and pauses as cheers erupt 
from the radio speaker, the crowd elated that Miami has just scored the winning 
touchdown.  The cashier cries, “Yes!” and smiles broadly at you as he hands over the 
cash.  
As you walk out the door with your money, the cashier puts your counterfeit 
check in the till.  Later today he will send it to the bank, where not even the bank 
manager will be able to identify your handiwork as a fake.” 
Lone Counterfeiter / Foreign Country: Incompetent 
“Please read the following story, imagining that you are the main character. 
It is a cold afternoon in November and you have just walked in to a small 
town store in upstate New York that offers a check cashing service.  You wander 
over to the magazine rack and pick up a copy of the local paper.  While leafing 
through this you glance casually across the room at the cashier working the till.  He 
is distracted now, his attention divided between a woman paying for a pack of gum, 
and the football game being broadcast on a tinny radio over to his right.  In fact, 
although this cashier is usually very conscientious in his work, if a game is playing 
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on the radio his attention to work suffers as he gets caught up in the radio 
announcer’s play by play commentary. 
This is good news for you.  Because you are planning to hand the cashier a 
payroll check for $843.59, and that check is as phoney as the smile that is amiably 
spreading across your face as you walk up to the counter. 
The differences between a successful fake payroll check and worthless 
attempts that will get you arrested are many and subtle.  It takes talent and time to 
make a check that looks and feels like the real thing.  You have to use paper with the 
correct weight and texture, accurately duplicate company logos, and use identical 
fonts and ink colors.  
You, however, have neither the talent nor the patience to put in enough time 
to make sure your fake check meets these requirements: your check is a truly awful 
piece of work.  Consequently, your chances of success are very low unless the 
cashier is so distracted by the football game that he doesn’t examine the check 
properly.  
You’re at the counter now, pushing your expertly made check towards the 
cashier.  “Could you cash this for me, please?”  The radio announcer’s voice is rising 
in pitch as he describes the quarterback’s dash for the end zone.  The cashier is 
clearly distracted by this as he says, “Yeah, sure.  Can I see some ID?”  You remove 
a fake driving license from your wallet, and hand it over as the radio announcer’s 
voice grows more and more excited.  The cashier gives only a cursory inspection of 
your documents.  He starts counting out the $843.59, and pauses as cheers erupt 
from the radio speaker, the crowd elated that Miami has just scored the winning 
touchdown.  The cashier cries, “Yes!” and smiles broadly at you as he hands over the 
cash.  
As you walk out the door with your money, the cashier puts your counterfeit 
check in the till.  Later today he will send it to the bank, where the bank manager 
will immediately recognize it as a fake.  Your check was badly made and your 
success was due to dumb luck.” 
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Counterfeiter conforming to Social Norms 
For the Social Norms conditions, the following paragraph was included at the 
beginning of the scenarios: 
“You are the youngest adult member of a very close-knit family.  Your 
family is famous for being exceptionally skilled in engraving and printing, and these 
skills have been passed down from parent to child for generations.  The family pride 
rests in the continuation of these skills, and you are expected to continue this 
legacy.  This is very important to you.  In every generation, the young adults have to 
prove that they have mastered these skills, and now it is your turn.  The family’s 
traditional way of having the young people prove themselves is for them to 
successfully produce and cash a counterfeit check.  It is now your turn to do 
this.  You feel strongly that stealing is wrong, and you do not want break the law, but 
everyone in your family has gone through this initiation rite and there is no way that 
you can refuse to do this without making everyone in the family feel like you have 
betrayed them.  The initiation rites are the only times that your family breaks the 
law.  Your family is very important to you, and you do not want to let them 
down.   And so…” 
The following sentence was included at the end of the Social Norms 
scenarios: 
“And you will return to your family who will congratulate you on your 
success.” 
  
308 
 
English Translations of Scripts for Experiment 2 
The scripts below are for the Home Country’s Spies conditions of the 
International Spies scenarios.  The scripts for the Foreign Country’s Spies conditions 
were identical except the spies were from Micronesia and were planting a “bug” in 
the Israeli embassy. 
 
International Spies from Home Country: Competent 
“Please read the following story. 
It is a cold afternoon in November and a team from your country’s national 
security service has just entered the embassy of Micronesia, one of its most 
supportive allies.  The team has been welcomed into the building and are now being 
escorted upstairs, to meet with the Micronesian ambassador to Israel.   
But although Israel and Micronesia are close allies who have built a trusting 
relationship, and the ambassador has always been a loyal friend to Israel, the purpose 
of today’s visit by the Israeli security service team is to install a “bugging” device 
that will allow Israel to eavesdrop on all of the Micronesian ambassador’s meetings. 
In these days of high-tech surveillance and counter-surveillance, you have to 
be very skilled to successfully plant bugging devices that won’t be detected by your 
target.  You have to meticulously plan the design and location of the devices, and of 
course you have to have specialist skills to position the bugging devices without 
anyone realizing what you are doing.   
This team has shown both the talent and the patience necessary to develop 
their skills to a very high standard.  They are considered to be the best team of this 
type within the Israeli security service.  Because of this, their chances of successfully 
placing the bugging device so that it will not be found by the Micronesian embassy 
staff are very high. 
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As they reach the top of the stair case, the leader of the team walks towards 
the Micronesian ambassador, extends his hand, and smiles. 
The Micronesian ambassador warmly welcomes the team into his 
office.  While the Israeli team leader talks with the ambassador, the second member 
of the team pretends to be interested in one of the paintings on the wall of the office 
and walks over to it to look at it more closely.  Just as the team leader purposefully 
drops his papers in order to distract the ambassador’s attention, the third member of 
the team starts to walk between the Micronesian ambassador and the second team 
member who is looking at the painting.  With split-second timing, the team member 
at the painting quickly and expertly hides the bugging device on the back of the 
frame of the painting just as his colleagues distract the ambassador’s attention and 
block his view.  The bugging device is now securely in place, and the ambassador 
has no idea what has just happened. 
The bugging device remains in place for several days until, completely 
unexpectedly, the ambassador decides to change the paintings in his office, and the 
bugging device is discovered.  There was no way the Israeli team could have 
predicted this would happen: it was just bad luck.  The discovery causes a huge 
uproar.  The Micronesian government is now furious with Israel for bugging their 
embassy.  They feel betrayed and complain to the United Nations.   
All around the world, government officials from different countries criticize 
Israel for betraying Micronesia’s trust.  The international community is both 
horrified and extremely angry with Israel for behaving in this way towards a trusted 
friend, and they accuse your country of having no moral values.” 
  
International Spies from Home Country: Incompetent 
“Please read the following story 
It is a cold afternoon in November and a team from your country’s national 
security service has just entered the embassy of Micronesia, one of its most 
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supportive allies.  The team has been welcomed into the building and are now being 
escorted upstairs, to meet with the Micronesian ambassador to Israel.   
But although Israel and Micronesia are close allies who have built a trusting 
relationship, and the ambassador has always been a loyal friend to Israel, the purpose 
of today’s visit by the Israeli security service team is to install a “bugging” device 
that will allow Israel to eavesdrop on all of the Micronesian ambassador’s meetings. 
In these days of high-tech surveillance and counter-surveillance, you have to 
be very skilled to successfully plant bugging devices that won’t be detected by your 
target.  You have to meticulously plan the design and location of the devices, and of 
course you have to have specialist skills to position the bugging devices without 
anyone realizing what you are doing.   
This team, however, does not have much talent or patience, and consequently 
they have very poor skills.  They are considered to be one of the worst teams of this 
type within the Israeli security service.  Because of this, their chances of successfully 
placing the bugging device so that it will not be found by the Micronesian embassy 
staff are very low. 
As they reach the top of the stair case, the leader of the team walks towards 
the Micronesian ambassador, extends his hand, and smiles. 
The Micronesian ambassador warmly welcomes the team into his 
office.  While the Israeli team leader talks with the ambassador, the second member 
of the team pretends to be interested in one of the paintings on the wall of the office 
and walks over to it to look at it more closely.  Just as the team leader purposefully 
drops his papers in order to distract the ambassador’s attention, the third member of 
the team starts to walk between the Micronesian ambassador and the second team 
member who is looking at the painting.  The plan is that, with split-second timing, 
the team member at the painting will quickly and expertly hide the bugging device 
on the back of the frame of the painting just as his colleagues distract the 
ambassador’s attention and block his view.   
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 However, the Israeli team’s timing is off, and instead of coordinating their 
movements so that the ambassador is distracted by the dropped papers and at the 
same time has his view blocked by the third team member, the papers are dropped 
too soon, the third team member is too slow, and the second team member is too 
obvious in his approach towards the painting.  Consequently, the ambassador is able 
to see the second team member reaching toward the painting and suspects that 
something is wrong.  Although the second team member manages to get the bugging 
device in place, the ambassador has seen enough to be very suspicious about what 
the team is up to. 
 When the meeting finishes and the Israeli team leaves, the ambassador 
carefully examines the painting and discovers the bugging device.  The discovery 
causes a huge uproar.  The Micronesian government is furious with Israel for 
bugging their embassy.  They feel betrayed and complain to the United Nations.   
All around the world, government officials from different countries criticize 
Israel for betraying Micronesia’s trust.  The international community is both 
horrified and extremely angry with Israel for behaving in this way towards a trusted 
friend, and they accuse your country of having no moral values.” 
 
